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Abstract	
	
An	examination	of	 the	difference	between	 the	hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 current	
application.	The	analysis	occurs	in	three	steps.	In	section	1,	the	historical	rationale	of	the	hearsay	
rule	is	identified	through	a	reconciliation	of	competing	theories.	Section	2	analyses	the	difference	
between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	the	application	of	the	exclusionary	hearsay	
rule.	Section	3	analyses	the	difference	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	the	
application	of	some	categorical	hearsay	exceptions.		
	
Overall,	 the	thesis	 finds	that	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	has	three	aspects:	concern	
with	the	inherent	reliability	of	hearsay	evidence,	concern	with	procedural	reliability	in	admitting	
the	evidence,	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	adversarial	 process.	 Five	 factors	underlie	 this	 rationale:	 the	
hearsay	dangers,	demeanour	evidence,	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant,	
the	evidence	 is	unsworn,	and	 fairness	 in	 the	adversarial	process	 (this	 is	both	a	 factor	and	an	
aspect	of	the	historical	rationale).	
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1.	Introduction	
	
“Good	my	Lords,	let	my	accuser	come	face	to	face,	and	be	deposed,”1	pleaded	Sir	Walter	
Raleigh.	The	year	was	1603	and	Raleigh	was	on	trial	for	treason	in	England.	He	was	alleged	to	
have	conspired	to	kill	King	James	I.	The	prosecution’s	chief	witness	was	Lord	Cobham,	an	alleged	
co-conspirator.	Interrogated	in	the	Tower	of	London,	Cobham	provided	a	written	confession	that	
implicated	Raleigh.	Cobham	recanted	the	confession	before	the	trial.	Cobham	would	recant	again	
if	he	was	brought	to	court	and	cross-examined.2	The	prosecution	refused	to	produce	Cobham	as	
a	witness	though.	Treason	trials	were	prosecuted	largely	through	hearsay	during	this	time.	The	
rationale	was	plain	and	prejudiced:	treason	trials	had	high	stakes,	and	allowing	a	witness	to	be	
cross-examined	would	make	it	easier	for	the	accused	person	to	secure	an	acquittal.3	Raleigh	was	
convicted	on	the	strength	of	Cobham’s	hearsay.	He	was	sentenced	to	death	and	beheaded.		
The	spectre	of	Raleigh’s	trial	haunts	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	the	way	it	
is	 applied	 in	 Canada	 today.	 This	 thesis	 examines	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
historical	rationale	and	current	application.	The	analysis	occurs	in	three	steps.	In	section	1,	the	
historical	 rationale	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 is	 identified	 through	 a	 reconciliation	 of	 competing	
theories.	Section	2	analyses	the	difference	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	
the	application	of	the	exclusionary	hearsay	rule.	Section	3	analyses	the	difference	between	the	
hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	the	application	of	some	categorical	hearsay	exceptions.		
																																																						
1 David Jardine, Criminal Trials: Vol 1 (London: Charles Knight, 1832) at 427. 
2 Gordon Cudmore, The Mystery of Hearsay (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) at 18. 
3 Ibid. at 19-20. 
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Overall,	 the	 thesis	 finds	 that	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 has	 three	 aspects:	
concern	with	the	inherent	reliability	of	hearsay	evidence,	concern	with	procedural	reliability	in	
admitting	 the	 evidence,	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	 process.	 Five	 factors	 underlie	 this	
rationale:	the	hearsay	dangers,	demeanour	evidence,	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	
the	declarant,	 the	evidence	 is	unsworn,	and	 fairness	 in	 the	adversarial	process	 (this	 is	both	a	
factor	and	an	aspect	of	the	historical	rationale).	While	there	are	many	differences	between	the	
hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 its	 practical	 application,	 one	 constant	 looms:	 the	 law	
remains	concerned	with	preventing	injustices	created	by	the	use	of	hearsay	evidence	–	like	that	
of	Sir	Walter	Raleigh’s	trial.		
	
1.1	Scope	of	the	research		
Hearsay	is	express	or	implied	verbal	or	written	statements	tendered	to	prove	the	truth	of	
its	contents	made	by	a	declarant	who	cannot	be	contemporaneously	cross-examined.4	The	scope	
of	 hearsay	 is	 defined	 by	 two	 factors:	 the	 ability	 to	 contemporaneously	 cross-examine	 the	
declarant	and	the	use	of	the	statement	to	prove	the	truth	of	its	contents.5		
The	academic	literature	is	replete	with	theories	about	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	and	
current	rationale,	respectively.	The	theories	about	the	historical	rationale	are	discussed	at	length	
in	section	2.1.	As	that	discussion	makes	clear,	there	are	competing	theories	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	
																																																						
4 R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 SCR 787 at paras. 56-58 [Khelawon cited to SCC]. 
5 Alan W. Bryant, Sidney N. Lederman & Michelle K. Fuerst, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant – The Law of Evidence 
in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at 238. 
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historical	rationale.	Section	2.2	aims	to	reconcile	the	theories	and	identify	a	new,	comprehensive	
historical	rationale	of	the	hearsay	rule.		
The	 literature	 advances	 a	 number	 of	 overlapping	 rationales	 for	 the	 application	of	 the	
current	hearsay	rule.	An	epistemological	rationale	has	been	advanced.	The	hearsay	rule	exists	to	
encourage	the	presentation	of	evidence	in	open	court	where	the	adverse	party	can	observe	the	
witness	and	test	the	evidence	through	live	cross-examination.6	Other	scholars	have	focused	on	
the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 ability	 to	 prohibit	 prior	 inconsistent	 statements,	 thereby	 discouraging	 the	
police	from	engaging	in	improper	interrogation	techniques.7	There	is	the	view	that	the	hearsay	
rule	 encourages	 members	 of	 the	 public	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 trial	 process	 by	 preventing	
professional	 witnesses	 from	 relaying	 the	 observations	 of	 subjects	 of	 their	 investigations.8	 In	
addition,	the	state	is	prevented	from	using	its	superior	resources	to	gather	remote	statements	
for	 use	 against	marginalized	 accused	 persons.9	 These	 are	 just	 some	 of	 the	 rationales.	More	
abound.	 There	 is	 also	 a	wealth	 of	 commentary	 on	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 practical	 application	 in	
Canada.10	 While	 there	 is	 literature	 on	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale,	 and	 separate	
literature	 on	 the	 current	 rule’s	 rationale	 and	 application,	 there	 is	 no	 literature	 on	 how	 the	
																																																						
6 Bruce P. Archibald, “The Canadian Hearsay Revolution: Is Half a Loaf Better Than No Loaf at All?” (1999) 25 
Queen’s LJ 1 at 24; See also Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, “Less Evidence, Better Knowledge” (2015) 60:2 McGill LJ 175. 
7 See Charles Nesson, “The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts” (1985) 98:7 
Har L Rev 1357; Charles Nesson & Yochai Benkler, “Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and 
Corroboration Under the Confrontational Clause” (1995) 81 Va L Rev 149. 
8 A.L.-T. Choo, Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays of Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), cited 
in Archibald, supra note 6 at 24. 
9 E. Swift, “Smoke and Mirrors: The failure of the Supreme Court’s Accuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois Requires 
a New Look at Confrontation” (1993) 22 Capital UL Rev 145 at 172, cited in Archibald supra note 6 at 24. 
10 See generally Mike Madden, “Anchoring the law in a bed of principle: A critique of, and proposal to improve, 
Canadian and American hearsay and confrontation law” (2012) 35 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 395; Archibald supra note 
6 at 24. 
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hearsay	 rule’s	historical	 rationale	differs	 from	 its	practical	application.	This	 thesis	breaks	new	
ground	by	systematically	comparing	the	two.		
Such	analysis	 is	 important	 for	 lawyers,	evidence	scholars,	or	anyone	who	testifies	 in	a	
courtroom.	 Hearsay	 is	 fundamental	 knowledge	 for	 litigation.	 Understanding	 the	 difference	
between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	current	application	aids	in	understanding	how	
the	 rule	 has	 developed	 and	where	 there	 is	 incongruence	 between	 the	 rule’s	 theoretical	 and	
practical	application.	These	lessons	can	guide	the	doctrine’s	development	to	help	ensure	that	the	
hearsay	rule’s	application	is	consistent	with	its	theoretical	purpose.		
	
1.2	Methodology	
The	thesis	is	divided	into	two	halves	in	terms	of	methodology.	The	first	half	considers	the	
hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	The	research	primarily	consists	of	books	and	articles	written	
by	scholars	who	have	created	theories	about	the	historical	rationale.	These	sources	also	provide	
criticisms	of	the	competing	theories.	Because	of	the	high	volume	of	scholarship,	only	the	six	most	
highly	 regarded	 theories	are	considered.	The	 theories	are	 reconciled	 to	 identify	 the	historical	
rationale	of	the	hearsay	rule.	The	sources	used	by	the	theories	are	relied	upon	to	provide	factual	
support	for	the	reconciled	historical	rationale.	These	sources	are	British	cases	that	developed	the	
hearsay	rule	between	1550	and	1750.		
The	 second	 half	 considers	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 practical	 application	 in	 Canada,	 and	
compares	 it	 with	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale.	 The	 research	 primarily	 consists	 of	
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appellate	and	trial	case	law.	It	also	uses	Canadian	books	and	articles	that	comment	on	the	way	
the	hearsay	rule	and	its	exceptions	are	applied	in	practice.		
Comparing	 the	difference	between	the	hearsay	 rule’s	historical	 rationale	and	practical	
application	 is	 an	 abstract	 exercise.	 The	metric	 used	 to	 test	 the	 difference	 is	 theoretical.	 The	
historical	rationale	of	the	hearsay	rule	has	three	aspects:	concern	with	the	inherent	reliability	of	
hearsay	evidence,	concern	with	procedural	reliability	in	admitting	the	evidence,	and	fairness	in	
the	adversarial	process.	There	are	five	factors	that	gave	rise	to	the	hearsay	rule	and	underlie	this	
rationale:	the	hearsay	dangers,	demeanour	evidence,	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	
the	declarant,	the	evidence	is	unsworn,	and	fairness	in	the	adversarial	process.	These	five	factors	
still	hold	influence	on	the	application	of	the	hearsay	rule	and	its	exceptions.	Since	they	underlie	
the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale,	 they	 are	 used	 to	measure	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
historical	rationale	and	the	hearsay	rule’s	current	application.	For	example,	demeanour	evidence	
reflects	the	inherent	and	procedural	reliability	aspects	of	the	historical	rationale.	If	demeanour	
evidence	is	found	to	be	less	influential	in	the	current	application	of	the	hearsay	rule	than	it	was	
historically,	this	will	suggest	a	difference	within	these	aspects	of	the	rationale.		
In	addition	to	tracking	the	differences	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	
practical	 application,	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 differences	 are	 identified	 and	 evaluated.	 In	 many	
instances,	the	differences	prevent	the	hearsay	rule	from	achieving	its	purpose.	The	discussion	
occurs	on	two	levels.	The	hearsay	jurisprudence	is	examined	to	determine	if	differences	between	
its	 historical	 rationale	 and	 practical	 application	 are	 created	 by	 the	 doctrine	 itself.	 Practical	
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considerations	in	the	modern	practice	of	criminal	law	are	considered	to	determine	if	they	create	
any	differences.	
Not	 all	 of	 the	 hearsay	 exceptions	 are	 analyzed.	 There	 are	 over	 a	 dozen	 recognized	
exceptions	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 The	 taxonomy	 of	 exceptions	 employed	 in	 Canada’s	 leading	
criminal	 evidence	 texts	 is	 used	 to	 sort	 the	 exceptions.	 The	 texts	 are	 The	 Law	 of	 Evidence	 in	
Canada:	Fourth	Edition11	and	McWilliams’	Canadian	Criminal	Evidence:	Fourth	Edition.12	 From	
this	taxonomy,	discussion	occurs	only	for	exceptions	for	which	there	is	a	difference	between	the	
hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	their	practical	application.	The	exceptions	are:	admissions,	
res	 gestae,	 dying	 declarations,	 the	 co-conspirator’s	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule,	 and	 prior	
inconsistent	statements.	Section	3	discusses	prior	 inconsistent	statements	 in	conjunction	with	
the	exclusionary	hearsay	rule.	Section	4	discusses	the	remaining	hearsay	exceptions.		
The	Canadian	hearsay	rule	is	exclusively	considered.	Moreover,	the	analysis	is	limited	to	
the	 application	 of	 the	 rule	 in	 criminal	 litigation,	 where	 the	 majority	 of	 hearsay	 case	 law	 is	
generated.	
	
	
	
	 	
																																																						
11 Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5. 
12 S. Casey Hill, David M. Tanovich, & Louis P. Strezos, McWilliams' Canadian Criminal Evidence, Fifth Edition 
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2012). 
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2.	The	Historical	Rationale	of	the	
Hearsay	Rule		
	
2.1	Competing	theories	
There	is	no	consensus	on	the	historical	rationale	of	the	hearsay	rule.	There	are	six	major	
theories	about	the	rationale.	They	are	advanced	by	six	respective	scholars:	John	Wigmore,	John	
Langbein,	 Richard	 Friedman,	 Edmund	 Morgan,	 H.L.	 Ho,	 and	 Fredrick	 Koch.	 This	 section	 will	
discuss	the	six	major	theories	and	highlight	points	of	disagreement	between	them.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 from	 the	 outset	 that	 the	 theories	 are	 products	 of	 different	
methodologies	 approaching	 the	hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 from	different	 angles.	As	 a	
result,	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	is	described	in	differing	language.	However,	when	
the	different	methodologies	are	peeled	away,	it	is	clear	that	the	theories	describe	aspects	of	a	
common	rationale.		
	
2.1.1	John	Wigmore	
	 The	 first	 theory	 is	 advanced	 by	 John	Wigmore.	 Wigmore	 believes	 that	 the	 historical	
rationale	for	the	hearsay	rule	is	to	prevent	lay	jurors	from	overvaluing	the	reliability	of	hearsay	
evidence.	The	locus	of	Wigmore’s	theory	is	that	lay	jurors	will	misevaluate	testimony.	Wigmore’s	
theory	is	the	most	commonly	accepted	account	in	Canadian	jurisprudence.	
	 Wigmore	did	not	explicitly	articulate	his	theory	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	
His	theory	is	understood	from	the	discussion	of	hearsay	in	his	famous	text,	the	Treatise	on	the	
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Anglo-American	System	of	Evidence	in	Trials	at	Common	Law.	According	to	Wigmore,	unsworn	
hearsay	 statements	 were	 excluded	 from	 evidence	 by	 common	 law	 judges	 beginning	 in	 the	
1670s.13	 	By	1696	both	sworn	and	unsworn	hearsay	statements	were	barred.14	The	equitable	
courts	later	adopted	the	common	law	bar	against	hearsay	evidence.	Although	the	equitable	and	
common	law	courts	sometimes	used	different	triers	of	fact	–	the	common	law	courts	allowed	for	
lay	 jurors	 and	 the	 equitable	 courts	 only	 allowed	 professional	 judges	 –	 the	 equitable	 courts	
adopted	the	hearsay	rule	under	the	legal	maxim	that	“equity	follows	the	law”.15	The	sole	reason	
for	the	historical	bar	against	hearsay	evidence	is	the	cross-examination	of	the	declarant:16	
What	is	further	noticeable	is	that	in	these	utterances	of	the	early	1700s	the	reason	
is	 clearly	 put	 forward	why	 there	 should	 be	 this	 distinction	 between	 statements	
made	out	of	court	and	statements	made	on	the	stand;	the	reason	is	that	“the	other	
side	hath	no	opportunity	of	a	cross-examination.”17	
	
The	value	of	cross-examination	 is	 its	ability	to	show	lay	 jurors	the	potential	sources	of	
unreliability	in	testimony.18	Lay	jurors	will	be	less	inclined	to	overvalue	testimonial	evidence	if	
the	frailties	of	the	testimony	are	brought	to	light	under	cross-examination.	Wigmore’s	privileging	
of	 cross-examination	 in	 the	 rationale	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 is	 unsurprising.	 He	 believed	 cross-
examination	to	be	“beyond	any	doubt	the	greatest	engine	ever	invented	for	the	discovery	of	the	
truth.”19		
																																																						
13 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law: Including 
the Statutes and Judicial Decisions of All Jurisdictions of the United States and Canada, 4 vols (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1904) at vol II, p. 1685-1686, §1364, cited in Frederick W. J. Koch, Wigmore and Historical Aspects of the Hearsay 
Rule (PhD Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, 2004) [unpublished] at 89. 
14 Wigmore, supra note 13 at §1364, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 90. 
15 Koch, supra note 13 at 242.  
16 Wigmore, supra note 13 at 1688, §1364, cited in Koch, supra note 13. 
17 Ibid. [Emphasis added]. 
18 Koch, supra note 13 at 90 
19 Wigmore, supra note 13 at vol. I, p. 27, §1367. 
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Concomitant	with	the	belief	that	cross-examination	is	the	greatest	engine	for	the	truth,	
Wigmore	strongly	distrusted	 lay	 jurors’	ability	to	properly	evaluate	testimonial	assertions.	Lay	
jurors	were	not	believed	to	weigh	hearsay	evidence	with	the	same	competence	as	professional	
judges.20	 Cross-examination	 existed	 as	 a	 corrective	 measure	 against	 lay	 jurors’	 inability	 to	
properly	assess	testimony.		
It	follows	that	the	hearsay	rule	is	not	necessary	when	cross-examination	is	not	necessary	
to	 show	 lay	 jurors	 potential	 sources	 of	 unreliability	 in	 testimony.	Wigmore	believed	 that	 the	
hearsay	rule	is	generally	not	applicable	when	the	trier	of	fact	is	a	judge	alone.21	Unlike	lay	jurors,	
judges	can	properly	assess	testimonial	evidence.		
The	rationale	of	the	many	exceptions	to	the	hearsay	rule	follows	the	same	logic.	Since	the	
purpose	of	the	hearsay	rule	is	to	prevent	lay	jurors	from	overvaluing	testimonial	evidence,	and	
cross-examination	is	the	sole	means	to	show	law	jurors	the	potential	sources	of	unreliability	in	
testimonial	evidence,	hearsay	evidence	is	admissible	if	in	the	absence	of	cross-examination	lay	
jurors	will	not	overvalue	the	evidence.	Wigmore	expressed	this	logic	in	the	terms	of	his	‘necessity’	
and	 ‘reliability’	 criteria	 that	 have	 taken	 a	 foothold	 in	 Canadian	 hearsay	 jurisprudence.	 In	
Wigmore’s	 lexicon,	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 will	 exist	 if,	 first,	 the	 declarant	 of	 the	
statement	cannot	 testify;	and,	 second,	 the	 testimony	will	not	pose	a	 risk	of	misevaluation	by	
jurors	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 cross-examination.22	 In	 such	 an	 instance,	 cross-examination	 is	
“superfluous”	and	the	statement	ought	to	be	admitted	for	the	truth	of	its	contents.22.1		
																																																						
20 Ibid. 
21 Koch, supra note 13 at 90-94. 
22 Wigmore, supra note 13 at p.1791, §1420, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 92. 
22.1 Ibid. 
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Wigmore	also	recognized	there	are	hearsay	statements	 for	which	cross-examination	 is	
superfluous	 because	 of	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 the	 statements	 are	 made.	 In	 these	
circumstances	the	hearsay	statements	should	be	admitted	into	evidence.	Modern	examples	of	
these	statements	 include	utterances	that	 fall	under	the	modern	spontaneous	declaration	and	
dying	declaration	exceptions	to	the	hearsay	rule.	Wigmore	said	that	these	statements	are	“made	
under	circumstances	that	even	a	skeptical	caution	would	look	it	as	trustworthy	(in	the	ordinary	
instance),	 in	 a	high	degree	of	 probability”	 such	 that	 cross-examination	 “would	 add	 little	 as	 a	
security.”23	
All	five	theories	in	the	literature	agree	that	part	of	the	historical	rationale	for	the	hearsay	
rule	is	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant.	Wigmore’s	theory	is	exceptional	
because	he	ascribes	cross-examination	as	the	sole	reason	for	the	creation	of	the	hearsay	rule.	
And	he	considers	the	purpose	of	cross-examination	to	be	to	assist	lay	jurors	in	properly	evaluating	
testimonial	assertions.	This	 is	 in	contrast	 to	 the	view,	 taken	by	some	other	 scholars,	 that	 the	
purpose	of	cross-examination	is	to	expose	the	evidence’s	reliability.24	
Wigmore’s	 focus	on	cross-examination	means	that	he	did	not	consider	the	absence	of	
other,	more	traditional	guards	against	unreliable	testimonial	evidence	as	historical	reasons	for	
the	hearsay	rule.	Demeanour	evidence	is	the	information	that	can	be	obtained	from	a	witness’	
demeanour	while	they	are	testifying.25	Although	demeanour	evidence	is	concomitant	with	cross-
examination,	its	absence	did	not	form	part	of	Wigmore’s	theory.	Wigmore	was	concerned	with	
																																																						
23 Wigmore, supra note 13 at vol. III, p. 154, §1420. 
24 Koch, supra note 13 at 90 
25 Ibid. at 87.  
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the	opportunity	for	cross-examination,	not	the	event	of	cross-examination	itself.	 If	there	is	an	
opportunity	to	cross-examine	a	declarant	on	his	or	her	statement	before	trial,	the	hearsay	rule	
does	not	apply.26	Demeanour	evidence	in	this	circumstance	is	a	“minor	advantage	…	not	regarded	
as	essential.”27	
	 The	testimonial	oath	is	treated	by	Wigmore	as	an	unrelated	rule	of	evidence	which	serves	
a	 purpose	 different	 from	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 It	 is	 designed	 to	 “remove,	 before	 the	 evidence	 is	
introduced,	such	sources	of	danger	and	distrust	as	experience	may	have	shown	to	lurk	within	
it.”28	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	hearsay	rule,	which	is	solely	concerned	with	lay	jurors	overvaluing	
testimonial	 evidence.	 The	 oath	 serves	 to	 improve	 the	 reliability	 of	 testimonial	 evidence	 by	
targeting	 the	 declarant.	 The	 hearsay	 rule	 is	 unconcerned	 with	 improving	 the	 reliability	 of	
testimonial	evidence.	Rather,	the	hearsay	rule	serves	to	prevent	the	trier	of	fact	from	overvaluing	
potentially	unreliable	hearsay	evidence.	The	testimonial	oath	applies	to	all	triers	of	fact	while	the	
hearsay	rule	applies	to	lay	jurors	only.		
	
2.1.2	The	influence	of	James	Thayer	
A	 full	 appreciation	of	Wigmore’s	 theory	of	 the	historical	 rationale	of	 the	hearsay	 rule	
requires	an	understanding	of	the	context	in	which	the	theory	was	developed.	Wigmore’s	theory	
was	developed	during	a	time	in	which	jury	control	theory	was	the	orthodox	academic	view.	Jury	
control	theory	is	the	hypothesis	that	exclusionary	rules	of	evidence	developed	as	an	attempt	by	
																																																						
26 Wigmore, supra note 13 at p. 1709-1710, §1370, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 87. 
27 Ibid. at p. 1695, §1365, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 87. 
28 Ibid. at p. 1378, §1172, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 84. 
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judges	to	control	the	conduct	of	lay	jurors.	James	Thayer	is	a	leading	proponent	of	this	view.	He	
was	 a	 professor	 at	 Harvard	 Law	 School	 while	Wigmore	was	 a	 student	 at	 the	 school.	 Thayer	
believed	that	most	common	law	exclusionary	rules	of	evidence	developed	to	prevent	lay	jurors	
from	misevaluating	evidence.29	Hearsay	was	one	of	several	such	types	of	evidence.		
The	 crux	 of	 Thayer’s	 theory	 is	 that	 the	 common	 law	 exclusionary	 rules	 of	 evidence	
enhance	fact	finding	in	jury	trials	by	excluding	testimonial	evidence	that	will	be	overvalued	by	lay	
jurors.	If	lay	jurors	were	more	competent	evaluators	of	testimonial	evidence,	the	exclusionary	
rules	would	not	be	necessary.	Like	Wigmore,	Thayer	believes	that	the	exclusionary	rules	are	not	
necessary	 in	 judge	 alone	 trials	 because	 judges	 have	 a	 higher	 competence	 for	 evaluating	
testimonial	evidence.	
There	are	two	tenets	to	Thayer’s	theory,	both	of	which	govern	Wigmore’s	theory	of	the	
hearsay	rule.	First,	Thayer	believed	that	common	law	evidentiary	rules	were	not	a	purely	rational	
system	of	proof.30	A	purely	 rational	 system	of	proof	 is	one	 in	which	 “all	 information	 [that	 is]	
logically	 probative	 [is]	 prima	 facie	 admitted	 and	 considered	 by	 the	 trier	 of	 fact.”31	 Thayer	
considered	the	Continental	system	to	be	an	example	of	a	purely	rational	system	of	proof.32	He	
reasoned	that	if	the	common	law	was	a	purely	rational	system,	one	would	expect	to	see	the	same	
exclusionary	 rules	 of	 evidence	 as	 the	 Continental	 system.	 This	 symmetry	 does	 not	 exist.	
Therefore,	reasoned	Thayer,	there	must	be	an	additional	influence	on	the	common	law	system.	
																																																						
29 Koch, supra note 13 at 61. 
30 James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1898) at 
267-268, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 63. 
31 Koch, supra note 13 at 62. 
32 Ibid. 
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That	 influence	 is	 role	of	 lay	 jurors	as	a	 trier	of	 fact.33	This	 feature	 resulted	 in	 the	creation	of	
atypical	exclusionary	rules	of	evidence,	of	which	the	hearsay	rule	is	one	example.	
Second,	 Thayer	 used	 historical	 research	 to	 show	 how	 judges	 went	 about	 creating	
exclusionary	rules	of	evidence	to	guard	against	the	perceived	evaluative	ability	of	 lay	 jurors.34	
Wigmore	 built	 upon	 Thayer’s	work	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 hearsay	 in	 the	Treatise	 on	 the	Anglo-
American	System	of	Evidence	in	Trials	at	Common	Law.	Wigmore’s	theory	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	
historical	rationale	stands	on	the	shoulders	of	Thayer’s	research.		
Thayer	 and	 Wigmore’s	 endorsement	 of	 jury	 control	 theory	 has	 been	 profoundly	
influential	 in	 the	academic	 literature.	They	have	been	described	as	 “dominating	 the	world	of	
evidence	 ‘like	a	colossus’	during	the	first	half	century	after	the	publication	of	their	respective	
works	 in	 1898	 and	 1904.”35	 Indeed,	 almost	 100	 years	 after	 their	 works	 were	 published,	 the	
Harvard	Law	Review	advanced	jury	control	theory	as	the	theoretical	foundation	of	the	hearsay	
rule.36	
	
2.1.3	John	Langbein	
	 The	 second	 theory	 advanced	 is	 by	 John	 Langbein.	 A	 legal	 historian,	 Langbein	 uses	
historical	 evidence	 to	 nuance	 jury	 control	 theory.	 Langbein	 agrees	 with	Wigmore	 that	 most	
exclusionary	rules	of	evidence,	 including	the	hearsay	rule,	were	developed	by	judges	to	guard	
against	 the	 perceived	 tendency	 of	 lay	 jurors	 to	 overvalue	 testimonial	 evidence.	 However,	
																																																						
33 Thayer, supra note 30 at 47. 
34 Ibid. at 109-114 & 137 ff, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 64. 
35 Koch, supra note 13 at 64. 
36 “The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules” (1979-1980) 93 Harv L Rev 1786. 
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Langbein	believes	that	the	exclusionary	rules	relating	to	unsworn	hearsay	evidence	developed	
later,	in	the	1700	and	1800s,	as	defence	lawyers	began	to	represent	accused	persons	in	felony	
trials.37	 Wigmore	 was	 wrong	 in	 taking	 earlier	 cases	 from	 the	 late	 1600s	 as	 establishing	 a	
prohibition	on	hearsay	evidence	in	jury	trials.	Those	cases	described	the	weight	to	be	ascribed	to	
hearsay	evidence.38	The	prohibition	of	unsworn	hearsay	evidence	would	come	decades	later.	
According	to	Langbein,	the	prohibition	of	unsworn	hearsay	evidence	emerged	alongside	
the	rise	of	the	professional	advocate	and	decline	in	the	judge’s	role	in	political	trials.	As	early	as	
the	1500s	and	throughout	 the	1600s,	accused	persons	 in	political	 trials	were	prohibited	 from	
representation	by	a	lawyer.	During	this	time	judges	had	tremendous	influence	over	both	the	jury	
and	accused	person’s	case.	With	respect	to	the	jury,	a	judge	had	multiple	means	of	influencing	
the	rectitude	of	their	decision:	rejecting	verdicts,	requiring	redeliberation,	and	commenting	on	
the	evidence.39	With	 respect	 to	 the	 accused	person’s	 case,	 a	 judge	was	 closer	 to	 that	of	 the	
inquisitorial	judge	in	the	Continental	system	than	to	the	passive	observer	in	modern	Canadian	
criminal	law.40	The	judge	was	de	facto	counsel	for	the	accused	person.	The	judge	could	adjust	the	
inchoate	 standard	of	proof	 to	account	 for	 the	prosecution’s	 representation	by	a	professional	
advocate	and	the	accused	person’s	self-representation.	The	judge	could	also	control	the	accused	
																																																						
37 John H. Langbein, “The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers” (1978) 45(2) U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 at 306-15 [Before 
Lawyers]. Langbein did not challenge Wigmore’s description of sworn hearsay. 
38 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 233-42, 
cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 20. 
39 Lisa Dufraimont, “Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment” (2008) 53 McGill LJ 199 at 220 [Evidence Law 
and the Jury] 
40 Ibid. at 307 & 315. 
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person’s	evidence.	The	orthodox	rule	was	that	the	accused	person	did	not	need	an	advocate	to	
tell	his	or	her	story	because	he	or	she	was	an	expert	about	the	facts	of	the	litigation.41		
This	all	began	to	change	by	the	the	mid-1700s.	A	judge’s	old	methods	of	influence	on	the	
jury	were	eliminated	or	 significantly	 curtailed.42	At	 the	 same	 time,	accused	persons	began	 to	
receive	 professional	 representation	 in	 felony	 trials	 from	 defence	 counsel.	 The	 advent	 of	 the	
defence	counsel	shook	up	the	working	relationship	between	 judge,	 jury,	and	accused	person.	
Defence	 counsel	 now	 produced	 evidence	 through	 cross-examination.	 Defence	 counsel	 also	
asserted	measures	against	judicial	interference,	such	as	the	privilege	against	self-incrimination	
and	the	articulation	the	criminal	standard	of	proof.43		
As	 the	 judicial	 role	became	more	passive	and	 the	 trial	more	adversarial,	evidence	 law	
emerged	as	the	new	method	for	judicial	influence	on	the	rectitude	of	the	jury’s	decision	in	felony	
trials.	Exclusionary	rules	of	evidence	such	as	the	hearsay	rule	were	developed	to	guard	against	
the	perceived	tendency	of	lay	jurors	to	overvalue	testimonial	evidence.44		
Langbein	 has	 been	 understood	 by	 some	 scholars	 to	 disagree	 with	 Wigmore	 on	 the	
historical	purpose	of	the	hearsay	rule.45	This	is	a	misreading	of	Langbein’s	research.	Langbein	and	
Wigmore	agree	that	the	historical	purpose	of	the	hearsay	rule	is	to	guard	against	the	perceived	
tendency	of	lay	jurors	to	overvalue	testimonial	evidence.	Langbein	and	Wigmore	disagree	on	the	
time	period	in	which	the	rule	emerged	to	achieve	this	purpose	for	unsworn	hearsay	evidence.	
																																																						
41 Ibid. at 308. 
42 Ibid. at 220. 
43 John H. Langbein, “Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View From the Ryder Sources” (1996) 96 
Colum. L. Rev. 1168 at 1199 [Historical Foundations]. 
44 Ibid. at 1195-1202 
45 See e.g. criticism of some scholars in the literature levied in Evidence Law and the Jury, supra note 39 at 222.  
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Langbein,	putting	 the	emergence	of	 the	 rule	 in	 the	mid-1700s,	 sees	 the	 rule	emerging	at	 the	
intersection	of	the	rise	of	the	professional	advocate,	the	judge’s	loss	of	influence	over	the	jury,	
and	the	advent	of	evidence	law	as	a	control	on	the	rectitude	of	the	jury’s	decision.	Wigmore,	
putting	the	emergence	of	the	rule	much	earlier	in	the	1600s,	sees	the	rule	only	emerging	as	a	
control	on	the	rectitude	of	the	jury’s	decision.	
	
2.1.4	Richard	Friedman	
The	third	theory	advanced	is	by	Richard	Friedman,	who	challenges	the	suggestion	that	
the	hearsay	rule	is	a	judicial	control	on	the	rectitude	of	the	jury’s	decision.	Friedman	suggests	
that	the	core	of	the	hearsay	rule	is	the	right	to	confront	the	witness	during	their	testimony.46	This	
right	applies	in	judge	alone	and	jury	trials	and	is	unconcerned	with	perceived	judicial	attitudes	
about	 lay	 jurors.	Examining	early	British	cases	 law	on	sworn	statements,	Friedman	makes	the	
historical	argument	that	the	hearsay	rule	emerged	as	a	product	of	the	accused	person’s	right	to	
confront	their	accuser.		
Freidman	provides	 a	 variety	 of	 examples	 from	 sixteenth	 to	 eighteenth	 century	British	
common	 law.	 For	 instance,	 the	 jurisprudence	 surrounding	 depositions	 crystalized	 during	 this	
time.	 Depositions	 were	 not	 allowed	 to	 be	 used	 at	 trial	 unless	 the	 adverse	 party	 had	 an	
opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant.47	Similarly,	Magistrates	under	the	reign	of	Queen	
Mary	could	take	statements	sworn	 from	witnesses	 in	 felony	cases	 for	 the	express	purpose	of	
																																																						
46 Richard D. Friedman, “No Link: The Jury and The Origins of the Confrontation Right and the Hearsay Rule” in 
John W. Carins & Grant McLeod, eds. The Dearest Birth Right of the People of England: The Jury in the History of 
the Common Law (Oxford: Hard Publishing, 2002) at 93. 
47 Ibid. at 95. 
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preserving	their	evidence	before	a	trial.	If	the	declarant	was	alive	and	able	to	travel	to	court,	the	
statement	could	not	be	used	at	trial.	The	rationale	was	that	the	accused	person	could	not	be	
denied	their	right	to	confront	the	witness.48	These	sworn	statements	were	eventually	prohibited	
by	the	Courts	of	King’s	Bench	and	Common	Pleas	 for	misdemeanour	cases	as	well.	The	Court	
specifically	reasoned	that	“the	defendant	not	being	present	when	[the	statements]	were	taken	
before	the	[examining	authority,	in	this	case	the	mayor],	and	so	had	lost	the	benefit	of	a	cross-
examination.”49	
In	treason	and	other	politically	charged	trials,	hearsay	statements	given	before	trial	were	
sometimes	used	out	of	context	against	the	accused.	As	early	as	1521	treason	defendants	began	
to	demand	 that	witnesses	be	brought	before	 them	“face	 to	 face”.50	By	 the	mid-1600s	 it	was	
understood	through	acts	of	Parliament	and	by	the	courts	that	treason	witnesses	must	be	cross-
examined	by	the	accused.51	
Freidman	readily	admits	 that	 the	right	 to	confrontation	was	not	cleanly	applied	 in	 the	
time	leading	up	to	the	eighteenth	century.	Some	courts	enforced	the	right	sporadically.	Still,	the	
affirmation	or	denial	of	the	right	was	never	dependant	on	the	jury’s	perceived	ability	to	evaluate	
the	 hearsay	 evidence.	 The	 concern	was	 always	 the	 procedural	 issue	 of	 whether	 the	witness	
should	give	their	testimony	in	open	court,	face	to	face	with	the	adverse	party.52		
																																																						
48 Ibid. at 96. 
49 R. v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163 at 165, 87 ER 584 at 585, quoted in Ibid. 
50 Friedman, supra note 46 at 97. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. at 98. 
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Friedman	recognizes	 that	 the	right	 to	confrontation	 is	narrower	than	the	scope	of	 the	
hearsay	 rule.	 The	 right	 to	 confrontation,	 as	 conceived	 by	 Freidman,	 only	 extends	 to	 sworn	
statements	taken	for	the	purpose	of	serving	as	testimony.53	It	does	not	extend	to	out	of	court	
statements	not	made	 for	 the	purpose	of	 litigation;	 for	example,	a	 casual	 conversation	with	a	
civilian	 in	 which	 an	 accused	 person	 incriminates	 him	 or	 herself.	 Moreover,	 the	 right	 to	
confrontation	 does	 not	 extend	 to	 implied	 assertions	 in	which	 a	 person’s	 conduct	 appears	 to	
reflect	a	belief.54	These	types	of	statements	became	recognized	by	courts	as	inadmissible	hearsay	
after	sworn	hearsay	statements	were	prohibited	at	common	law.	The	statements	represent	the	
growth	of	the	hearsay	doctrine	beyond	its	initial	scope,	which	is	aimed	at	protecting	the	right	to	
confrontation.	These	unsworn	statements	are	not	congruent	with	the	historical	rationale	of	the	
hearsay	rule.	Rather,	they	are	separate	policy	concerns	conflated	with	the	historical	rule.	Perhaps	
for	this	reason,	says	Friedman,	“it	 is	 in	this	same	era	that	we	first	see	the	justification	for	the	
hearsay	rule	being	laid	at	the	feet	of	the	jury.”55	
	
2.1.5	Edmund	Morgan	
	 The	fourth	theory	advanced	is	by	Edmund	Morgan,	who	suggests	that	the	hearsay	rule	is	
a	product	of	a	judicial	desire	to	ensure	that	only	reliable	evidence	is	put	to	the	trier	of	fact.	Like	
most	 exclusionary	 rules	 of	 evidence,	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 is	 unrelated	 to	 concerns	 about	 the	
evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	Morgan’s	research	reveals	three	rationales	for	the	hearsay	rule	
																																																						
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. at 99. 
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until	 the	 1700s,	 all	 of	 which	 are	 unrelated	 to	 juries.56	 Hearsay	 is	 rejected	 because	 it	 is	 not	
information	based	on	a	witness’	observations:	 it	 is	 information	based	on	what	 the	witness	 is	
credulous	enough	to	believe.	A	hearsay	statement	is	not	made	under	oath.57	And	the	opposing	
party	in	litigation	is	unable	to	receive	the	benefit	of	cross-examining	the	hearsay	declarant.		
Cross-examination	 is	 necessary	 for	 its	 ability	 to	 shed	 light	 the	on	potential	 sources	of	
unreliability	 in	 testimonial	 evidence.	 Morgan	 identified	 four	 ‘hearsay	 dangers’	 that	 exist	
whenever	 a	witness	 testifies	 about	 an	 out	 of	 court	 statement.	 A	 court	 is	 unable	 to	 test	 the	
declarant’s	sincerity,	use	of	language,	memory,	and	perception	of	the	statement	in	question.58	
Cross-examination	allows	the	opposing	party	to	test	these	potential	sources	of	unreliability	and	
make	them	plain	to	the	trier	of	fact.	This	allows	the	trier	to	better	weigh	the	testimonial	evidence.	
Such	insight	into	the	reliability	of	testimony	is	lost	when	hearsay	evidence	is	admitted.		
Note	 that	 cross-examination	 is	 not	 necessary	 for	 its	 perceived	 ability	 to	 remedy	 an	
evaluative	issue	with	lay	jurors.	Under	Morgan’s	theory,	the	historical	role	of	cross-examination	
in	the	hearsay	rule	is	a	product	of	the	adversary	system.	Cross-examination	is	required	to	allow	
the	opposing	party	an	opportunity	to	expose	sources	of	unreliability	in	testimony.	This	applies	
regardless	of	whether	the	trier	of	fact	is	a	judge	or	jury.59	
Morgan	acknowledged	a	caveat	to	his	research.	His	theory	begins	to	show	cracks	in	its	
application	to	the	case	law	after	the	early	1700s.	After	the	hearsay	rule	was	formed	in	the	1600s,	
																																																						
56 Edmund M. Morgan, “Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept” (1948) 62 Harv L Rev 177 at 
182-83 [Hearsay Dangers]. 
57 Edmund M. Morgan, “The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence” (1936) 4 U Chi L Rev. 247 at 254 [Jury 
and Exclusionary Rules] 
58 Hearsay Dangers, supra note 56. 
59 Jury and Exclusionary Rules, supra note 57 at 255. 
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some	 decisions	 creating	 exceptions	 to	 the	 rule	 referenced	 perceived	 issues	 with	 the	 jury’s	
competence.	Morgan	conceded	that	these	hearsay	exceptions	were	influenced	by	the	jury’s	role	
as	trier	of	fact.60	He	reconciles	the	discrepancy	by	recognizing	that	the	hearsay	doctrine	is	the	
product	of	conflicting	considerations.	Much	of	the	doctrine,	including	the	creation	of	the	hearsay	
rule,	 is	 influenced	by	 the	 reliability	 of	 hearsay	 evidence.	 Some	of	 the	 exceptions	 to	 the	 rule,	
however,	are	influenced	by	concerns	about	the	jury.61		
Despite	 these	 caveats,	Morgan’s	 theory	marked	a	paradigm	shift	 in	 the	 literature.	His	
suggestion	that	the	hearsay	rule	stems	from	a	concern	for	the	reliability	of	testimonial	evidence	
brought	a	new	dimension	to	the	debate	about	the	historical	rationale	of	the	hearsay	rule.	Equally,	
his	research	is	one	of	the	most	significant	challenges	to	the	jury	control	theory	on	which	Wigmore	
premises	his	analysis.		
	
2.1.6	H.L.	Ho		
	 H.L.	Ho	advances	the	sixth	theory.	Ho	considers	fairness	to	be	the	lynchpin	of	the	historical	
rationale	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 Hearsay	 is	 based	 on	 two	 conceptions	 of	 fairness.	 First,	 the	
unfairness	 to	 the	adverse	party	 in	assuming	 that	 the	declarant	would	have	proven	his	or	her	
hearsay	 statement	 if	 he	 or	 she	 testified.62	 Under	 the	 adversarial	 system	 generally,	 the	 party	
producing	a	witness	bears	the	risk	that	the	witness	will	not	be	able	to	prove	his	or	her	anticipated	
evidence.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 why	 a	 witness’	 testimony	 may	 not	 prove	 their	
																																																						
60 Ibid. at 255. 
61 Ibid at 255-56. 
62 H.L. Ho, “A Theory of Hearsay” (1999) 19(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 at 403 [A Theory of Hearsay]. 
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anticipated	evidence.	The	witness’	demeanour	may	betray	their	testimony	in	the	opinion	of	the	
trier	of	fact.	The	witness	may	not	be	able	to	repeat	their	out	of	court	statement	after	having	their	
conscience	bound	by	an	oath.	The	witness	may	fear	the	threat	of	a	perjury	charge	now	that	they	
are	testifying	in	court.	The	witness	may	not	have	meant	what	their	statement	purports	to	prove.	
When	hearsay	evidence	is	admitted,	the	court	removes	the	possibility	of	such	risks	materializing.	
Ho	 theorizes	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 fairness	 caused	 by	 this	 aspect	 of	 hearsay	 evidence	 shaped	 the	
creation	of	the	hearsay	rule	and	its	exceptions.63	
	 The	 second	 conception	 of	 fairness	 is	 the	 disadvantage	 to	 the	 adverse	 party	 by	 the	
production	of	hearsay	evidence	without	giving	that	party	the	chance	to	remove	the	prejudice	
caused	by	 that	evidence.64	 This	 requires	 some	unpacking.	 In	any	 trial	 evidence	 is	 adduced	 to	
create	an	inference	that	will	make	a	material	issue	more	or	less	likely.	The	inference	created	is,	
generally,	adverse	to	the	interest	of	the	opposing	party.	For	instance,	when	a	witness	is	called	by	
a	party	and	testifies,	their	testimony	creates	inferences	that	are	prejudicial	to	the	opposing	party.	
The	opposing	party	 has	 the	opportunity	 to	 remove	 the	prejudice	 through	 cross-examination,	
which	can	reveal	unreliability	in	the	testimony.	When	hearsay	evidence	is	admitted,	it	too	creates	
inferences	 prejudicial	 to	 the	 opposing	 party.	 But	 the	 opposing	 party	 has	 no	 opportunity	 to	
remove	the	prejudice	through	cross-examination.	The	opposing	party	is	stuck	with	the	prejudice.	
At	best,	the	opposing	party	can	impose	upon	itself	a	positive	burden	to	adduce	evidence	that	
																																																						
63 Ibid. at 409-10. 
64 Ibid. at 410. 
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undermines	the	credibility	of	the	prejudice.65	For	example,	a	party	may	call	an	alibi	witness	to	
challenge	a	hearsay	statement	that	identifies	the	party	at	a	crime	scene.		
	 Ho	provides	a	number	of	examples	of	precedential	cases	in	which	the	hearsay	rule	and	its	
exceptions	were	applied	in	conformity	with	his	conceptions	of	fairness.66	Consider	Teper	v.	R.,67	
which	conforms	to	Ho’s	first	conception	of	fairness.	In	Teper	a	police	officer	testified	at	an	arson	
trial	that	he	heard	a	woman	shouting	to	a	passing	motorist:	“Your	place	burning	and	you	[sic]	
going	away	from	the	fire.”68	The	statement	was	tendered	as	proof	that	the	accused	person	was	
running	away	 from	a	 fire	 that	he	had	started.	The	Privy	Council	held	 that	 the	 statement	was	
inadmissible	 hearsay.	 Applying	 Ho’s	 theoretical	 framework,	 the	 statement	 impermissibly	
demanded	that	the	trier	of	fact	assume	that	the	woman	would	have	testified	that	the	person	to	
whom	she	was	referring	was	in	fact	the	accused	person,	and	the	accused	person	was	running	
away	from	the	fire.69	
	 R.	v.	Kearley70	conforms	to	Ho’s	second	conception	of	fairness.	Kearley	is	a	drug	trafficking	
case	 in	which	the	accused	person	was	arrested	at	his	residence.	A	police	officer	testified	that	
after	the	arrest	the	accused	person’s	phone	received	several	phone	calls.	The	officer	answered	
the	calls	and	was	met	with	requests	 for	 the	supply	of	drugs.	The	prosecution	did	not	call	 the	
individuals	placing	the	calls	to	testify	at	the	trial	because,	presumably,	these	individuals	would	
be	difficult	to	track	down	and	reluctant	to	testify	against	the	accused.	The	majority	of	the	House	
																																																						
65 Ibid.  
66 See for e.g. Ibid. at 412-418. 
67 Teper v. R., [1952] AC 480, cited in Ibid at 414. 
68 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 414. 
69 Ibid.  
70 R. v. Kearley, [1992] 2 AC 228, cited in Ibid. at 415. 
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of	Lords	held	that	the	officer’s	testimony	was	inadmissible	hearsay	to	the	extent	that	it	implied	
that	the	accused	person	is	a	drug	dealer.	Applying	Ho’s	theoretical	framework,	it	is	unfair	that	
the	police	officer’s	testimony	creates	the	prejudice	of	inferring	that	the	accused	person	is	a	drug	
dealer.	 The	 accused	 person	 has	 no	 opportunity	 to	 remove	 the	 prejudice	 through	 cross-
examination.71	Equally,	it	is	unfair	to	impose	upon	the	accused	person	the	burden	of	producing	
his	own	evidence	to	remove	the	prejudice	caused	by	the	police	officer’s	testimony.	This	would	
have	been	especially	difficult	in	this	case	because	little	information	was	officially	known	about	
the	declarant	callers.72	
	 Subramaniam	v.	Public	Prosecutor73	demonstrates	how	exceptions	 to	 the	hearsay	 rule	
were	able	to	form	historically.	In	this	case	the	accused	person	was	charged	with	possession	of	
ammunition	for	the	purpose	of	helping	terrorists.	The	accused	person	used	the	duress	defence.	
He	wanted	to	 testify	 that	 the	terrorists	 threatened	to	kill	him	 if	he	did	not	comply	with	 their	
demands.	The	Privy	Council	held	that	the	proffered	testimony	was	admissible	because	it	is	not	
hearsay.	The	purpose	of	the	accused	person’s	testimony	was	to	show	his	state	of	mind	so	that	
the	jury	could	understand	his	conduct.	It	was	not	to	show	the	sincerity	of	the	terrorists’	threats.	
Applying	Ho’s	theoretical	 framework,	 the	accused	person’s	testimony	 is	admissible	because	 it	
does	not	offend	either	conception	of	fairness.74	The	state	of	the	accused’s	mind	was	at	issue,	so	
the	accused	person	was	the	source	evidence.	Since	he	was	going	to	testify,	there	was	no	risk	that	
his	evidence	would	not	come	up	to	proof.	Likewise,	the	prosecution	could	remove	any	prejudice	
																																																						
71 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 415. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Subramaniam v. DPP, [1956] 1 WLR 965, cited in Ibid. at 413. 
74 Ibid. 
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caused	to	its	case	by	the	accused	person’s	testimony	about	his	state	of	mind	by	cross-examining	
him	on	this	issue.		
The	end	achieved	by	cross-examination,	for	Ho,	is	exploring	the	reliability	of	the	evidence.	
Ho	is	unconcerned	with	the	competence	of	the	jury.	His	two	conceptions	of	fairness	govern	the	
admission	of	hearsay	evidence	regardless	of	whether	the	trier	of	fact	is	a	judge	or	jury.	
Ho’s	theory	is	qualitatively	different	from	most	of	the	major	theories	in	the	literature.	His	
theory	 is	derived	 in	a	manner	opposite	 that	of	most	 scholars.	Ho	 is	an	evidence	 scholar	who	
theorized	about	the	philosophy	of	evidence.	He	created	a	philosophical	theory	and	used	historical	
cases	to	test	it.	Premised	on	philosophy	and	tested	with	case	law,	Ho’s	theory	aims	to	explain	the	
genesis	of	the	hearsay	rule,	its	exceptions,	and,	atypically,	the	route	the	doctrine	should	take	as	
it	develops	 in	 the	 future.	This	 is	 in	contrast	 to	 legal	historians	 like	Langbein,	who	examined	a	
wealth	of	historical	cases	and	developed	a	theory	from	that	data.	The	result	is	different	theories	
with	different	goals.	Ho’s	theory	is	thin	on	historical	cases	for	proof	and	prescriptive	in	scope.	
Other	theories	in	the	literature	are	thick	on	historical	cases	for	proof	and	descriptive	in	scope.	
	
2.1.7	Frederick	Koch	
	 The	sixth	theory	is	advanced	by	Frederick	Koch,	who	believes	that	the	hearsay	rule	is	a	
merger	of	seven	separate	exclusionary	evidence	rules	that	formed	between	1550	and	1750.75	
The	seven	rules	formed	for	one	or	both	of	two	reasons.	The	first	reason	is	the	judicial	belief	that	
																																																						
75 Frederick Koch, “The Hearsay Rule’s True Reason d’etre: It’s Implications for the New Principled Approach to 
Admitting Hearsay Evidence” (2005) 37:2 Ottawa L. Rev. 249 at 253 [Hearsay’s Reason d’etre]. 
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certain	 kinds	of	 hearsay	 evidence	 should	be	 excluded	because	 they	 are	 too	unreliable.76	 The	
second	reason	is	the	epistemic	need	for	two	elements	of	testimonial	evidence,	cross-examination	
and	 demeanour	 evidence.	 77	 Cross-examination	 is	 needed	 to	 expose	 potential	 flaws	 in	 the	
testimony.	Demeanour	evidence	is	the	information	acquired	through	a	trier	of	fact’s	observation	
of	the	witness	as	they	testified.78		
Koch’s	analysis	of	the	historical	rationale	for	the	hearsay	rule	distinguishes	between	the	
historical	treatment	of	sworn	and	unsworn	hearsay	statements.	These	two	sets	of	statements	
were	 gradually	prohibited	 in	different	 time	periods	 and	 for	different	 reasons.	 Eventually,	 the	
separate	and	various	prohibitions	merged	into	one	rule	prohibiting	hearsay	evidence.		
Sworn	hearsay	statements	were	 initially	banned	between	1595	and	1662	because	of	a	
judicial	distrust	of	their	reliability.79	The	distrust	produced	five	common	law	exclusionary	rules.80	
First,	the	affidavits	rule.81	The	ex-parte	process	of	creating	affidavits	and	depositions	engendered	
the	spectre	of	litigants	exerting	undue	pressure	on	the	declarant	or	altering	the	written	record	
of	their	statement.	In	contrast,	viva	viva	voce	trial	testimony	was	perceived	by	the	judiciary	to	be	
more	reliable.		
Second,	 the	same	parties	 rule.82	Depositions	 taken	 in	one	proceeding	were	prohibited	
from	being	used	in	another	if	the	parties	or	issues	were	not	the	same	in	both.	The	common	thread	
																																																						
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. at 268-256. 
80 Ibid. See also, Koch, supra note 13 at 238-239. 
81 Koch, supra note 13 at 183-191. 
82 Ibid. at 192-209. 
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of	reasoning	though	the	various	decisions	of	the	English	courts	of	common	law	and	equity	was	
the	possible	unreliability	of	the	deposition	evidence	if	the	opposing	party	was	unable	to	cross-
examine	the	declarant.		
Third,	the	viva	voce	rule	took	hold	in	the	common	law	courts.83	During	the	nascence	of	
the	jury,	 lay	 jurors	had	personal	knowledge	of	the	litigants,	witnesses,	and	background	to	the	
dispute.	Later,	during	the	1600s,	the	jury’s	knowledge	of	these	elements	decreased	alongside	a	
shift	to	the	litigants	assuming	the	role	of	the	suppliers	of	evidence.	An	increased	concern	with	
the	reliability	of	witness	evidence	followed.	Viva	voce	testimony	became	the	preferred	means	of	
witness	evidence.			
Fourth,	the	court	of	record	rule	changed	the	practice	of	the	common	law	courts.84	The	
judiciary	increasingly	perceived	the	threat	of	serious	punishment	for	perjury	to	be	an	important	
safeguard	for	the	reliability	of	evidence.	Testimony	not	given	under	the	threat	of	perjury	was	
deemed	unreliable	and	excluded	from	evidence.		
Likewise,	and	fifth,	the	joinder	of	issues	rule	prohibited	the	use	of	depositions	that	were	
not	given	at	trial	under	the	threat	of	perjury.85	
Unsworn	hearsay	 statements	were	prohibited	before	 sworn	hearsay	 statements.	They	
were	first	prohibited	 in	the	courts	of	equity	and	then	 in	the	courts	of	common	 law.	Unsworn	
hearsay	statements	were	prohibited	 for	one	of	 two	reasons	 related	 to	 reliability.86	First,	 they	
were	generally	perceived	by	the	courts	to	be	too	unreliable	to	be	given	consideration	if	other,	
																																																						
83 Ibid. at 210-223. 
84 Ibid. at 223-231. 
85 Ibid. at 231-239. 
86 Ibid. at 242. 
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more	reliable	sources	of	the	same	information	were	available.	Second,	unsworn	hearsay	meant	
that	the	person	with	the	knowledge	of	the	information	generally	would	not	testify	at	the	trial.	
This	 in	 turn	 meant	 that	 the	 person	 could	 not	 be	 put	 to	 cross-examination	 or	 have	 their	
demeanour	assessed.		
	 Koch’s	theory	is	founded	on	a	robust	source	of	historical	case	law.	He	used	the	nominate	
case	reports,	reports	 in	Cobbett’s	State	Trials,	early	published	works	on	evidence	law,	the	Old	
Bailey	 Session	 Papers,	 and	 Sir	 Dudley	 Ryder’s	 Notes.87	 Koch’s	 research	 represents	 the	 most	
comprehensive	examination	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.		
	 Koch	categorically	 rejects	Wigmore’s	assertion	that	 the	hearsay	rule	emerged	out	of	a	
judicial	concern	with	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	The	seven	distinct	exclusionary	rules,	
five	for	sworn	hearsay	and	two	for	unsworn	hearsay,	that	merged	into	a	single	hearsay	rule	by	
1750	 are	 unconcerned	with	 the	 evaluative	 capacity	 of	 lay	 jurors.	 Rather,	 the	 two	 underlying	
reasons	 for	 the	 seven	 exclusionary	 rules	 are	 the	 unreliability	 of	 hearsay	 evidence	 and	 the	
epistemic	need	for	testimonial	evidence;	that	is,	demeanour	evidence	and	cross-examination.		
	 These	 are	 the	 six	 major	 theories	 on	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale.	 They	 are	
presented	to	outline	the	prevailing	views	on	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	Although	not	
explicitly	engaging	with	one	another,	the	theories	agree	some	on	points	and	disagree	on	others.	
What	is	necessary	is	a	reconciling	of	the	theories	to	determine	the	precise	historical	rationale	of	
the	hearsay	rule.	
	
																																																						
87 Ibid. at 33. Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 254. 
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2.2	The	historical	rationale	of	the	hearsay	rule	
This	 section	will	 reconcile	 the	perceived	debate	 in	 the	 literature	and	advance	a	 single	
historical	rationale	of	the	hearsay	rule.	It	will	explain	that	the	hearsay	rule	is	the	product	of	five	
historical	 factors	 which	 underlie	 a	 rationale	 that	 has	 three	 aspects.	 The	 scholarship	 in	 the	
literature	captures	aspects	of	the	rationale.	Scholars	have	failed	to	capture	the	complete	scope	
of	the	rationale	due	in	large	part	to	limitations	in	their	methodologies.	
This	section	will	proceed	in	two	steps.	It	will	first	outline	the	historical	rationale	of	the	
hearsay	rule.	Then	it	will	reconcile	the	perceived	debate	in	the	literature	by	explaining	why	the	
various	scholars	are	describing	aspects	of	the	same,	broad	rationale.	Methodological	differences	
between	the	scholars	will	be	examined	to	show	how	the	 literature	emphasizes	and	expresses	
different	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	The	following	section	will	explain	how	
each	of	the	five	factors	gave	rise	to	the	hearsay	rule	and	its	underlying	historical	rationale.	
	
2.2.1	Outline	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	
The	review	of	the	literature	reveals	that	historically	the	hearsay	rule	was	premised	on	five	
factors.	Analytically,	the	factors	underlie	three	rationales:	
	
1. Inherent	Reliability		
i. The	hearsay	dangers		
ii. No	demeanour	evidence	
	
2. Procedural	Reliability	
iii. The	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	
iv. The	evidence	is	unsworn	
	
3. Fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	
v. Fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	
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The	rationales	are	not	analytically	distinct.	They	spill	into	each	other,	sharing	similar	concerns.		
The	 first	 rationale,	 inherent	 reliability,	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 accuracy	 of	 an	 untested	
hearsay	statement.	The	locus	of	judicial	concern	is	the	accuracy	of	a	statement	when	it	is	made	
out	of	court	and	without	any	of	the	tests	of	courtroom	procedure	(for	example,	the	oath	or	cross-
examination).	The	 inherent	 reliability	 rationale	 is	derived	 from	historical	 judicial	concern	with	
demeanour	 evidence	 and	 the	 hearsay	 dangers.	 The	 absence	 of	 demeanour	 evidence	 was	
concerning	to	judges	because	it	prevented	the	trier	of	fact	from	assessing	the	sincerity	of	the	
hearsay	declarant.	It	was	more	difficult	to	assess	the	accuracy	of	a	declarant’s	statement	without	
observing	the	witness’	sincerity.	In	addition,	there	was	an	epistemological	concern	that	a	witness	
testify	viva	voce.	The	hearsay	dangers	are	the	 inability	to	test	the	declarant’s	sincerity,	use	of	
language,	memory,	and	perception	of	the	statement	in	question.		
The	second	rationale,	procedural	reliability,	 is	closely	related	to	the	 inherent	reliability	
rationale.	It	too	is	concerned	with	the	accuracy	of	the	declarant’s	statement.	However,	whereas	
the	inherent	reliability	rationale	is	concerned	with	the	accuracy	of	the	hearsay	statement	when	
it	 is	 initially	uttered	without	 testing,	 the	procedural	 reliability	 rationale	 is	concerned	with	 the	
ability	to	test	the	statement,	in	court,	through	courtroom	procedure.	The	rationale	stems	from	
judicial	concern	with	the	absence	of	two	features	of	courtroom	procedure:	the	oath	and	cross-
examination	of	the	declarant.	Unlike	the	factors	in	the	inherent	reliability	rationale,	the	oath	and	
cross-examination	do	not	 influence	the	accuracy	of	a	declarant’s	statement	when	it	 is	 initially	
uttered.	 Influence	 upon	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	 statement	 is	 imparted	 only	when	 the	 declarant	
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testifies	in	court.	The	oath	binds	the	declarant’s	conscience	and	cross-examination	examines	his	
or	her	motive	and	ability	to	recollect.	It	is	in	this	manner	that	the	oath	and	cross-examination	
increase	the	reliability	of	hearsay	evidence	through	courtroom	procedure.		
The	 third	 rationale	 encompasses	 one	 factor,	 fairness	 to	 the	 opposing	 party	 in	 the	
adversarial	process.		
The	spillage	of	the	five	historical	factors	between	the	three	categories	of	rationales	is	not	
neat.	 Indeed,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 the	 factors	 touch	 upon	 all	 three	 rationales	 in	
varying	 degrees.	 The	 rationales	 are	 best	 conceived	 as	 aspects	 of	 a	 broader	 rationale	 of	 the	
hearsay	rule.		
		
2.2.2	The	literature	is	discussing	the	same	theory	
	 This	section	will	examine	why	there	is	a	perceived	debate	in	the	literature.	The	theorists	
may	not	have	intended	to	enter	a	debate	on	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	However,	the	
conclusions	inferred	from	their	research	contribute	to	the	debate.	In	this	real	sense,	the	theories	
deserve	reconciliation.	This	section	will	 reconcile	 the	debate	and	explain	how	methodological	
limitations	prevent	scholars	from	articulating	the	same	historical	rationale	of	the	hearsay	rule.	It	
will	further	examine	how	methodology	limited	the	ability	of	scholars	to	articulate	all	aspects	of	
the	historical	rationale.		
The	 scholars	 are	 unwittingly	 describing	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 same	 rationale.	 That	
rationale	has	three	aspects:	the	inherent	reliability	of	hearsay	evidence,	the	procedural	reliability	
in	 admitting	 the	 evidence,	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	 process.	 The	 hearsay	 rule	 was	
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developed	over	155	years.	 It	began	 in	1595	with	 the	establishment	of	 the	affidavits	 rule.88	 It	
crystallized	in	1750	with	the	fusion	of	various	exclusionary	rules.89	During	this	155-year	span	the	
doctrine	that	became	the	hearsay	rule	was	curated,	gradually,	by	different	judges	in	the	different	
courts	 of	 common	 law	 and	 equity.	 It	 makes	 sense	 that	 as	 the	 doctrine	 developed	 judges	
emphasized	different	aspects	of	the	rationale,	and	at	different	times.	For	example,	the	courts	of	
equity	did	not	use	lay	jurors.	It	makes	sense	that	these	courts	did	not	exclude	hearsay	evidence	
out	of	a	concern	for	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	
The	 scholars	 discussing	 the	 historical	 rationale	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 developed	 their	
theories	through	an	examination	of	different	courts	during	differing	time	periods.	It	too	makes	
sense	 that	 their	 theories	 would	 emphasize	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	
rationale.	Their	theories	ought	to	be	thought	of	as	circles	in	a	Venn	diagram.	The	area	in	which	
all	of	the	circles	converge	is	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	The	remaining	areas	are	the	
result	of	the	different	theories	emphasizing	different	aspects	of	the	rationale.		
There	is	one	exception.	All	of	the	theories	agree	that	at	least	part	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	
rationale	is	the	need	to	cross-examine	the	declarant.	The	theories	disagree	on	the	purpose	for	
which	cross-examination	is	necessary.	Some	hold	that	cross-examination	is	necessary	to	show	
the	 trier	 of	 fact	 potential	 sources	 of	 unreliability	 in	 the	 testimony.	 Others	 hold	 that	 cross-
examination	is	necessary	to	remedy	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	As	will	be	discussed	in	
																																																						
88 Koch, supra note 13 at 183. 
89 Koch, supra note 13 at 31. 
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section	2.2.3,	these	two	purposes	are	not	the	same.	The	different	positions	on	the	issue	cannot	
be	attributed	to	methodology;	that	is,	the	study	of	specific	courts	over	specific	time	periods.	
Not	all	scholars	in	the	literature	would	accept	their	theories	are	different	aspects	of	the	
same	theory.	Some	scholars	did	not	intend	to	enter	a	debate	on	the	historical	rationale	of	the	
hearsay	rule.	Some	theories	are	derived	from	their	larger	body	of	work	on	the	rules	of	evidence.	
Wigmore’s	theory,	 for	example,	 is	derived	from	his	Treatise	on	the	Anglo-American	System	of	
Evidence	in	Trials	at	Common	Law.90	Ho	made	no	mention	of	the	literature	when	he	advanced	
his	philosophical	theory	for	the	hearsay	rule’s	rationale.	Conversely,	some	scholars	intentionally	
entered	the	debate	on	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	but	disagreed	with	the	conclusion	
of	other	scholars.	For	example,	Morgan	and	Koch	disagreed	with	Wigmore’s	conclusion	that	the	
hearsay	rule	did	not	arise	out	of	reliability	concerns.		
Whatever	the	disagreement	amongst	scholars,	the	difference	is	largely	methodological.	
When	 methodological	 divergence	 is	 peeled	 away	 and	 the	 theories	 are	 laid	 bare,	 there	 is	
surprising	agreement	between	all	 scholars	on	 the	basic	 tenets	of	 the	hearsay	 rule’s	historical	
rationale.	Those	basic	tenets	are	concerns	with	the	inherent	and	procedural	reliability	of	hearsay	
evidence	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	 process.	 The	 methodological	 disagreements	 in	 the	
literature	create	two	points	of	divergence	among	the	scholars.	Their	research	either	focuses	on	
different	parts	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale,	or	agrees	on	the	historical	rationale	but	
attributes	its	ascendance	to	different	factors.		
																																																						
90 Wigmore, supra note 13. 
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Consider	the	first	instance,	where	divergence	occurs	over	focus	on	different	parts	of	the	
hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	Ho’s	theory	appears	to	advance	a	different	rationale	than	Koch	
or	Morgan’s	theories.	Ho’s	methodology	causes	him	to	focus	on	a	limited	aspect	of	the	hearsay	
rule,	fairness	in	the	adversarial	process.	Ho	starts	his	theory	from	a	philosophical	position	and	
tests	 it	 with	 historical	 cases.	 The	 theory	 is	 coloured	 from	 start	 to	 finish	 in	 the	 language	 of	
philosophical	fairness.	Looking	beyond	the	words	reveals	that	Ho	attributed	the	hearsay	rule’s	
historical	 rationale	 to	 more	 than	 fairness	 concerns.	 Ho’s	 theory	 captures	 concerns	 with	 the	
fairness	and	reliability	of	hearsay.	One	conception	of	fairness	in	Ho’s	theory	is	the	unfairness	to	
the	adverse	party	in	assuming	that	the	declarant	would	have	proven	his	or	her	hearsay	statement	
had	they	testified.91	Stripped	of	the	philosophical	language	in	which	Ho	dresses	it,	this	conception	
of	fairness	has	Morgan’s	hearsay	dangers	at	its	locus.	Hearsay	dangers	refers	to	four	qualities	of	
testimonial	evidence	that	the	trier	of	fact	must	accept	untested	when	considering	hearsay:	the	
declarant’s	sincerity,	use	of	language,	memory,	and	perception	of	the	statement	in	question.	The	
unfairness	in	assuming	that	a	declarant	would	have	proven	his	or	her	hearsay	statement	had	they	
testified	is,	at	its	core,	a	concern	that	the	hearsay	dangers	will	not	be	exposed	in	the	declarant’s	
direct	examination.	The	declarant	is	unable	to	show	the	trier	of	fact	how	sincere	they	are,	how	
well	they	remember	the	observation	they	are	describing,	and	what	they	meant	when	they	said	
the	statement	in	question.	Hearsay	evidence	encourages	the	trier	of	fact	to	either	speculate	how	
well	 the	declarant	would	have	performed	 if	 his	 or	 her	 statement	was	 tested	 for	 the	hearsay	
dangers,	or	assume	that	statement	would	have	been	unaffected	by	testing	entirely.	
																																																						
91 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 403. 
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It	may	appear	axiomatic	that	a	concern	with	fairness	encompasses	a	concern	with	the	
reliability	of	the	evidence.	That	is	just	the	point.	The	three	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	rationale	
are	connected.	Ho	did	not	acknowledge	this	because	of	his	methodology,	which	was	centred	on	
a	narrow	philosophical	proposition	about	fairness.	The	way	in	which	he	framed	his	starting	point	
–	the	hearsay	rule	excludes	evidence	because	of	fairness	–	precluded	him	from	considering	other	
rationales.92	Moreover,	Ho’s	methodology	caused	him	to	not	emphasize	procedural	reliability	as	
an	aspect	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	rationale.		
Consider	now	the	second	instance,	where	theories	agree	on	the	historical	rationale	of	the	
hearsay	rule	but	their	different	methodologies	attribute	the	rule’s	creation	to	different	factors.	
Wigmore	and	Langbein	agree	on	the	same	aspect	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	rationale	but,	because	of	
their	 different	methodologies,	 attribute	 the	 rule’s	 ascendance	 to	 different	 factors.	Wigmore	
examined	 case	 law	between	1550	and	1750	and	 concluded	 that	 the	hearsay	 rule	became	an	
evidentiary	doctrine	of	the	common	law	courts	between	1675	and	1696.93	The	hearsay	rule	was	
subsequently	adopted	in	the	courts	of	equity	under	the	maxim	“equity	follows	the	law”.94	Based	
on	the	time	period	examined,	Wigmore	concluded	that	the	hearsay	rule	emerged	out	of	a	judicial	
concern	that	testimonial	evidence	would	be	overvalued	by	lay	jurors	because	the	evidence	was	
not	 subject	 to	 cross-examination.95	 The	historical	 rationale	 for	 the	hearsay	 rule	was	 squarely	
placed	within	a	concern	for	the	rectitude	of	the	decision.		
																																																						
92 If Ho realized that the reliability of hearsay evidence is tied to this theory, he failed to articulate it. 
93 Wigmore, supra note 13 at pp. 1685-1686, §1364, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 3. 
94 Koch, supra note 13 at 242.  
95 Wigmore, supra note 13 at p. 1688, §1364 
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Langbein	 reached	 substantially	 the	 same	 conclusion	 but	 attributed	 the	 rationale	 to	
different	 factors.	 In	 addition	 to	 examining	Wigmore’s	 sources,	 Langbein	 examined	 published	
pamphlets	he	labelled	the	Old	Bailey	Session	Papers	and	Sir	Dudley	Ryder’s	Notes.96	From	this	
methodology	Langbein	too	concluded	that	the	prohibition	of	unsworn	hearsay	evidence	emerged	
out	 of	 judicial	 concern	 that	 lay	 jurors	 would	 overvalue	 testimonial	 evidence.97	 This	 squarely	
placed	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	 rationale	with	a	concern	 for	 the	rectitude	of	 the	decision.	
However,	 instead	 of	 attributing	 the	 concern	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 cross-examination,	 Langbein	
attributed	 it	 to	 the	 intersection	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 professional	 advocate,	 the	 judge’s	 loss	 of	
influence	over	the	jury,	and	the	advent	of	evidence	law	as	a	control	on	the	jury’s	decision.98	These	
factors	occurred	in	the	late	1700s,	whereas	Wigmore	placed	the	emergence	of	the	hearsay	rule	
in	the	common	law	courts	in	the	late	1600s.		
Langbein	 saw	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 emerge	 at	 a	 later	 time	 because	 he	 was	 able	 to	 use	
Wigmore’s	 sources,	 learn	 from	Wigmore’s	mistakes	with	 them,	and	 look	at	additional	 sets	of	
data.	For	Langbein,	Ryder’s	Notes	suggested	that	the	hearsay	rule	was	not	established	in	the	late	
1600s.99	Ryder’s	Notes	are	the	most	detailed	judge’s	notes	from	1550	to	1750.100	The	Old	Bailey	
Session	Papers	encouraged	Langbein	to	interpret	decisions	that	disapproved	of	the	use	of	hearsay	
evidence	differently	from	Wigmore.	Wigmore	interpreted	these	comments	as	establishing	the	
hearsay	rule	 in	the	 late	1600s.	Langbein	 interpreted	these	comments	as	attributing	weight	to	
																																																						
96 Langbein, supra note 38; Historical Foundations, supra note 43. 
97 Langbein, supra note 38.	
98 Langbein did not challenge Wigmore’s description of the development of sworn hearsay: see e.g. Before Lawyers, 
supra note 37. 
99 Koch, supra note 13 at 19-20. 
100 Historical Foundations, supra note 43 at 1180, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 46. 
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admissible	 hearsay	 evidence.101	 This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 Langbein	 was	 more	 correct	 than	
Wigmore	because	Langbein	used	more	sources.	To	the	contrary,	Langbein	has	been	criticized	for	
drawing	invalid	conclusions	from	Ryder’s	Notes	and	the	Old	Bailey	Session	Papers.102	The	point	is	
that	 Langbein’s	 different	 methodology	 explains	 why	 he	 drew	 different	 conclusions	 than	 did	
Wigmore.		
The	different	methodologies	used	by	Wigmore	and	Langbein	have	a	twin	effect	on	their	
ability	to	map	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	At	the	one	end,	the	different	methodologies	
cause	different	factors	to	be	attributed	to	the	hearsay	rule’s	creation,	as	discussed	above.	At	the	
other	end,	the	similar	nature	of	the	methodologies	prevents	each	scholar	from	emphasizing	the	
full	scope	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	Both	scholars	base	their	theories	in	historical	
descriptions	of	the	hearsay	rule,	in	particular	the	link	between	the	rule’s	development	and	the	
use	of	lay	jurors.	As	a	result,	it	is	principled	to	place	less	emphasis	on	other	aspects	of	the	hearsay	
rule’s	 rationale,103	 such	 as	 concern	 with	 inherent	 reliability	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	
process.	These	rationales	share	no	nexus	with	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	This	is	not	to	
suggest	 that	Wigmore	 and	 Langbein	 believed	 that	 concerns	with	 the	 inherent	 reliability	 and	
fairness	 of	 hearsay	 evidence	 had	 no	 role	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	Wigmore	 and	
Langbein	 believed	 that	 these	 rationales	 had	 a	 role,	 but	 their	methodologies	 caused	 them	 to	
deemphasize	 the	 rationales	 and	 express	 their	 role	 as	 a	 function	 of	 judicial	 concern	with	 the	
evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	
																																																						
101 Langbein, supra note 38 at 234-242, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 20. 
102 Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 265-66. 
103 Koch, supra note 13 at 4. 
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	 This	section	has	explained	why	there	is	a	perceived	debate	in	the	literature.	Although	the	
theorists	may	not	have	intended	to	enter	a	debate	on	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale,	the	
conclusions	inferred	from	their	research	contribute	to	the	debate.	In	this	real	sense,	the	theories	
deserve	reconciliation.	This	section	has	explained	how	the	theories	describe	different	aspects	of	
the	same	rationale.	Perceived	differences	are	the	produced	of	methodological	limitations.	
	
	
2.2.3	Koch	most	closely	maps	all	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale		
	 Koch’s	research	deserves	special	mention	on	the	topic	of	methodology.	Koch	published	
his	research	 in	2004,	making	him	the	most	contemporary	scholar	 in	the	 literature.104	His	data	
includes	the	sources	covered	by	all	other	scholars	in	the	literature.	With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	
Koch	was	able	to	take	notice	of	where	sources	of	case	 law	might	be	unreliable.	For	example,	
building	on	Langbein’s	 research	on	the	reliability	of	historical	cases,	Koch	was	aware	that	 the	
State	Trials	included	cases	that	occurred	decades	or	centuries	before	they	were	first	published.105	
The	accuracy	of	some	of	these	cases	is	suspect.	To	remedy	this,	at	least	in	part,	Koch	confirmed	
the	accuracy	of	 the	 trials	by	 reference	 to	 the	 juristic	 literature	of	 the	period.106	 In	all,	 Koch’s	
research	 is	 the	most	 comprehensive	 and	 robust	 examination	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	
rationale.		
It	 is	not	surprising,	then,	that	Koch	identifies	all	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	
rationale.	 Koch	 asserts	 that	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 began	 as	 seven	 distinct	 exclusionary	 rules	 of	
																																																						
104 Koch, supra note 13.	
105 Ibid. at 36-41. 
106 Ibid. at 41 
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evidence	that	merged	into	a	single	hearsay	rule	by	the	mid-1700s.	The	seven	rules	formed	for	
one	 of	 two	 underlying	 reasons:	 the	 unreliability	 of	 the	 evidence	 and	 the	 epistemic	 need	 for	
testimonial	evidence;	demeanour	evidence	and	cross-examination.	The	inherent	and	procedural	
reliability	 aspects	 of	 the	 historical	 hearsay	 rationale	 are	 explicitly	 recognized.	 Fairness	 in	 the	
adversarial	 process	 is	 implicit	 in	 the	 requirement	 for	 demeanour	 evidence	 and	 cross-
examination.	 Both	 of	 these	 epistemological	 tools	 are	 products	 of	 viva	 voce	 testimony.	 As	
recognized	by	Ho,	there	is	an	unfairness	in	assuming	that	a	declarant	would	have	proven	his	or	
her	hearsay	statement	if	he	or	she	testified.107	It	is	axiomatic	that	the	requirement	for	demeanour	
evidence	and	cross-examination	is,	 in	part,	a	requirement	that	the	declarant	testify	and	prove	
their	hearsay	statement.	Indeed,	one	of	the	seven	exclusionary	rules	of	evidence	that	merged	to	
create	the	hearsay	rule	is	the	viva	voce	rule,		a	prohibition	on	unsworn	hearsay	evidence	because	
the	declarant	is	unable	to	testify	at	trial.108		
2.3	The	five	factors	that	gave	rise	to	the	hearsay	rule	and	its	rationale	
It	remains	to	be	shown,	through	evidenced	how	and	why	the	hearsay	rule	was	historically	
created.	 Using	 existing	 research	 in	 the	 literature,	 this	 section	 will	 explain	 how	 five	 factors	
contributed	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 For	 analytical	 purposes,	 the	 factors	 are	
categorized	under	one	of	the	three	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	It	should	be	
remembered,	however,	that	each	of	the	factors	spill	into	more	than	one	of	the	three	aspects.	
	
																																																						
107 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 403. 
108 Koch, supra note 13 at 210-223. 
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2.3.1	Inherent	Reliability:	The	hearsay	dangers	
The	hearsay	dangers	described	by	Morgan	are	the	heart	of	the	inherent	reliability	aspect	
of	the	hearsay	rule’s	rationale.	There	are	four	hearsay	dangers:	the	inability	to	test	the	declarant’s	
sincerity,	use	of	language,	memory,	and	perception	of	the	statement	in	question.	There	are	many	
cases	 from	 the	 common	 law	 courts	 of	 the	 1600s	 in	which	 hearsay	 evidence	 is	 not	 admitted	
because	of	 the	 inability	 to	 test	 the	hearsay	dangers.	The	written	reasons	are	not	detailed,	 so	
some	 inferences	need	 to	be	made	 to	 appreciate	 the	 concern	of	 the	 courts.	 In	 the	1680	high	
treason	case	of	Anderson109	an	unsworn	letter	was	tendered	as	evidence.	The	judge	refused	to	
admit	the	letter;	however,	he	asked	if	anyone	was	able	to	testify	to	the	letter’s	contents.	If	they	
were	 able	 to	 testify	 their	 testimony	 would	 be	 admissible,	 presumably	 due	 to	 the	 epistemic	
advantage	of	testimonial	evidence.110	The	court	could	test	the	witness’	sincerity,	the	accuracy	of	
the	letter’s	language,	how	well	the	letter	reflected	the	witness’	understanding	of	what	happened,	
and	 the	 difference	 in	 perception,	 if	 any,	 between	 the	witness	 and	 the	 content	 of	 the	 letter.	
Similarly,	in	R	v.	Pyke,	a	case	from	1696,	the	court	suggested	that	a	letter	about	a	testator’s	will	
could	be	admitted	into	evidence	“after	the	death	of	the	stranger”	but	not	before.111	Presumably	
the	court	wanted	the	testator	to	testify,	in	order	to	shed	light	on	the	integrity	of	the	words	in	the	
will.	The	same	experience	was	realized	in	the	equitable	courts.	According	to	Koch,	by	the	mid-
																																																						
109 The Trials of Lionel Anderson alia Murray, William Russell alias Napper, Charles Parris alias Parry, Henry 
Starkey, James Corker, William Marshal, and Alexander Lumsden, with the Arrigment of David Joseph Kemish, at 
the Old Bailey, for High Treason, being Romish Priests (1680), 7 Cobb St Tr 811 at 865 (Comms of O & T), cited in 
Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 283-284. 
110 Ibid. 
111 R. v. Pyke (1696), 1 Ld. RAYM 730, 91 ER 1387, cited in Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 284. 
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1700s	the	equitable	courts	would	not	consider	unsworn	written	hearsay	evidence	if	the	author	
could	be	formally	examined.112		
There	are	multiple	reasons	why	a	court	may	have	preferred	live	testimony	over	hearsay.	
The	court	may	have	been	concerned	about	the	hearsay	dangers.	In	addition,	it	may	have	been	
concerned	about	fairness	in	allowing	the	opposing	party	to	test	the	evidence,	or	with	the	absence	
of	 an	 oath.	 There	 may	 have	 been	 skepticism	 about	 litigants	 manipulating	 written	 hearsay	
evidence	before	 it	was	presented	to	the	court.	These	alternative	reasons	do	not	preclude	the	
hearsay	dangers	 from	 influencing	a	decision	 to	exclude	hearsay	evidence.	At	 their	 core,	each	
alternative	 reason	 shares	 the	 same	 concern	 as	 the	 hearsay	 dangers.	 Fairness	 in	 allowing	 the	
opposing	party	to	test	the	evidence	is	partially	concerned	with	the	opposing	party	being	able	to	
test	evidence	for	the	hearsay	dangers.	The	other	alternative	factors	–	the	need	for	an	oath	and	
risk	of	manipulation	by	a	litigant	–	are	all	partially	concerned	with	whether	the	hearsay	dangers	
are	present.	They	ask	whether	the	declarant’s	statement	is	sincere,	reflective	of	the	declarant’s	
memory,	articulated	to	reflect	their	memory,	and	from	a	reliable	perspective.	This	is	not	their	
only	concern,	but	 it	 is	a	common	one.	Moreover,	when	courts	excluded	hearsay	for	reliability	
reasons	 their	 decision	was	unlikely	motivated	by	 just	 one	 factor.	Multiple	 factors	 concerning	
reliability	would	have	influenced	the	decision.	Whatever	the	reason	for	exclusion,	if	a	court	did	
not	consider	hearsay	evidence	because	of	its	reliability,	concern	about	the	hearsay	dangers	was	
part	at	least	part	of	the	rationale.		
	
																																																						
112 Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 284-85. 
41	
	
2.2.2	Inherent	Reliability:	No	demeanor	evidence		
	 Demeanour	 evidence	 is	 the	 information	 that	 can	 be	 obtained	 from	 a	 declarant’s	
demeanour	 while	 they	 are	 testifying.113	 Demeanour	 evidence	 is	 an	 acute	 indicator	 of	 the	
declarant’s	sincerity.	It	strikes	at	the	heart	of	the	inherent	reliability	rationale.		
Sworn	hearsay	evidence	was	excluded	from	the	common	law	and	equitable	courts	in	part	
because	it	deprived	the	trier	of	fact	of	demeanor	evidence.	There	was	concern	that	the	trier	of	
fact	might	make	the	wrong	factual	decision	because	it	could	not	observe	the	declarant’s	sincerity	
as	the	statement	was	made.	This	applied	regardless	of	whether	the	trier	of	fact	was	a	judge	or	
jury.	
	 In	the	common	law	courts,	hearsay	evidence	was	excluded	because	of	a	lack	of	demeanor	
evidence	in	the	late	1600s.	In	Fenwick’s	Trial,114	a	decision	from	the	House	of	Commons	in	1696,	
Fenwick’s	counsel	argued	that	a	sworn	hearsay	statement	should	not	be	considered.	Counsel	
submitted:	
Our	law	requires	persons	to	appear	and	give	their	testimony	viva	voce;	and	we	see	
that	their	testimony	appears	credible,	or	not,	by	their	very	countenances,	and	the	
manner	 of	 their	 delivery:	 and	 their	 falsity	 may	 sometimes	 be	 discovered	 by	
questions	 that	 the	 party	 may	 ask	 them,	 and	 by	 examining	 them	 to	 particular	
circumstances.115	
	
In	 1606	 the	 Chief	 Justice	 of	 the	 King’s	 Bench	 said	 viva	 voce	 testimony	 was	 preferable	 to	
depositions,	at	least	in	part	because	jurors	could	better	weigh	the	testimony	after	observing	the	
																																																						
113 Koch, supra note 13 at 87. 
114 Fenwick’s Trial (1696), 13 Cobb. St. Tr. 537 (Parl.), quoted in Koch, supra note 13 at 138. 
115 Ibid. at 593  
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witness	give	evidence.116	The	Star	Chamber	referred	a	disputed	fact	to	a	jury	in	1619	because	the	
jury’s	ability	to	see	and	hear	would	assist	in	weighing	the	evidence.117		
In	the	equitable	courts,	the	absence	of	demeanor	evidence	affected	the	admissibility	of	
hearsay	evidence,	albeit	in	a	subtler	fashion.	In	the	late	1500s	the	Court	of	Chancery	received	
evidence	by	sworn	written	depositions.	By	1600	the	Court	of	Chancery	began	to	refer	contentious	
factual	 issues	 to	 juries,	 where	 witnesses	 testified	 viva	 voce	 and	 were	 subject	 to	 cross-
examination.118	 The	 change	 suggests	 that	 when	 factual	 issues	 were	 in	 dispute,	 the	 Court	 of	
Chancery	wanted	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 to	 assess	 the	 declarant’s	 sincerity	 by	 observing	 his	 or	 her	
demeanor,	in	addition	to	subjecting	the	witness	to	cross-examination.	It	would	be	a	stretch	to	
conclude	 that	 hearsay	 evidence	 was	 ‘excluded’	 when	 factual	 issues	 were	 referred	 to	 juries,	
however.	The	common	practice	 in	 the	Court	of	Chancery	was	to	try	cases	through	the	use	of	
sworn	depositions.	It	is	only	when	factual	issues	were	atypically	contentious	that	matters	were	
referred	to	juries	for	the	receipt	of	live	testimony.	
	
2.2.3	Procedural	Reliability:	The	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	
	 There	 is	 consensus	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 the	hearsay	 rule	was	 created	at	 least	 in	part	
because	of	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant.	This	factor	engages	all	three	
aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale:	inherent	reliability,	procedural	reliability,	and	
fairness	in	the	adversarial	process.	It	is	classified	under	procedural	reliability	because,	historically,	
																																																						
116 Le Case del Union, del Realm, D’Escose, ove Angleterre (1606), Moo KB 790 at 798, 72 ER 908 (KB) at 913 
[cited to ER], cited in Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 277. 
117 Dame Darcy v. Leigh (1619), Hob 324, 80 ER 466 at 467 [cited to ER], cited in Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra 
note 75 at 277. 
118 Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 277 
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cross-examination	 has	 been	 a	 method	 of	 courtroom	 procedure	 to	 test	 the	 accuracy	 of	 a	
declarant’s	statement.	
The	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 for	 cross-examination	 is	 a	 recent	 justification	 in	 the	 150-year	
development	of	the	hearsay	rule.	Much	of	the	surviving	case	law	suggests	that	the	concern	with	
the	lack	of	cross-examination	became	a	main	factor	for	the	exclusion	of	hearsay	evidence	around	
1700,	post-dating	concerns	with	both	the	absence	of	an	oath	and	demeanour	evidence.119	There	
are	earlier	 references	 to	 the	 lack	of	opportunity	 for	 cross-examination	but	during	 those	 time	
periods	the	factor	 is	not	the	main	 influence	for	 the	exclusion	of	hearsay	evidence.120	 Instead,	
concerns	with	the	lack	of	oath	and	demeanour	evidence	drive	the	reasoning	toward	exclusion.	
	 A	judicial	emphasis	on	the	lack	of	opportunity	for	cross-examination	begins	to	appear	in	
the	surviving	case	law	in	the	1700s.	The	same	parties	rule	prohibited	depositions	taken	in	one	
proceeding	from	being	used	in	another	if	the	parties	or	issues	were	not	the	same	in	both.	The	
rule	was	created	in	large	part	because	of	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant.	
In	 Rushworth	 v.	 Pembroke,	 a	 1737	 case	 from	 the	 Court	 of	 Chancery,	 the	 court	 held	 that	
depositions	from	prior	proceedings	could	not	be	introduced	as	evidence	because	the	opposing	
party	did	not	have	an	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	deponents.121	
	 The	joinder	of	issues	rule	prohibited	the	use	of	depositions	that	were	not	given	at	trial	
under	the	threat	of	perjury.	The	rule	was	initially	created	out	of	a	judicial	concern	with	the	lack	
of	a	testimonial	oath.	The	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	of	the	deposition	
																																																						
119 Koch, supra note 13 at 288-300 
120 See for e.g. Koch, supra note 13 at 197. 
121 Rushworth et al. v. Pembroke (Countess of) et al. (1668-69), Hard 472, 145 ER 553 (Ex Ct), cited in Koch, supra 
note 13 at 202. 
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was	 added	 as	 a	 reason	 in	 the	 late	 1600s.	 After	 this	 time	 such	 depositions	 were	 considered	
voluntary	 affidavits	 and	 excluded	 because	 the	 declarant	 could	 not	 be	 cross-examined.122	
Conversely,	 in	 the	 1692	 case	 of	Howard	 v.	 Tremain	 a	 hearsay	 deposition	was	 admitted	 into	
evidence	 because	 the	 opposing	 party	 “did	 cross-examine”	 the	 declarant	 at	 an	 earlier	
proceeding.123	
By	 1701,	 unsworn	 hearsay	 was	 beginning	 to	 be	 excluded	 from	 serious	 criminal	 trials	
because	 of	 judicial	 concerns	 with	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 evidence,	 the	 absence	 of	 demeanour	
evidence,	and	the	lack	of	opportunity	for	cross-examination.124		
	 Special	mention	must	be	made	on	the	scholarly	debate	about	the	purpose	for	which	cross-
examination	was	historically	deemed	necessary.	It	is	the	biggest	debate	in	the	literature	that	is	
not	attributable	 to	methodology.	All	 scholars	agree	 that	 the	hearsay	 rule	was	at	 least	 in	part	
created	out	of	a	judicial	concern	for	the	rectitude	of	the	decision.	All	scholars	further	agree	that	
the	lack	of	opportunity	for	cross-examination	was	a	factor	that	caused	judges	to	be	concerned	
with	the	rectitude	of	the	decision.	Scholars	disagree,	however,	on	the	purpose	for	which	cross-
examination	was	thought	necessary.	Wigmore	and	to	a	lesser	extent	Langbein	believe	that	cross-
examination	is	necessary	to	shed	light	on	potential	sources	of	unreliability	in	hearsay	evidence	
to	lay	jurors	because	they	are	inexperienced	as	triers	of	fact	and	overvalue	testimonial	evidence.	
Wigmore	in	particular	places	the	need	for	cross-examination	with	the	perceived	tendency	of	lay	
jurors	 to	 overvalue	 testimonial	 evidence.	 Under	 this	 view,	 the	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 to	 cross-
																																																						
122 Henry Bathurst, The Theory of Evidence (Dublin: Sarah Cotter, 1761) cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 236. 
123 Howard v. Tremain (1692), 4 Mod 146, 87 ER. 314 (KB) (sub. nom. Howard v. Tremaine) 1 Show 363, 89 ER 
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examine	the	declarant	of	a	hearsay	statement	was	not	relevant	historically	if	the	trier	of	fact	was	
a	judge.	Hearsay	evidence	could	be	readily	admitted	if	the	trial	was	before	a	judge	alone.125	Other	
scholars,	including	Morgan	and	Koch,	believe	that	cross-examination	is	necessary	to	shed	light	
on	 potential	 sources	 of	 unreliability	 in	 hearsay	 evidence	 because	 hearsay	 evidence	 lacks	
reliability.	The	need	for	cross-examination	 is	placed	with	the	unreliability	of	hearsay	evidence	
itself.	Under	this	view,	the	importance	of	cross-examination	historically	was	dependent	on	the	
reliability	of	the	statement,	not	on	the	trier	of	fact.		
The	axis	of	debate	 in	 the	 literature	 is	a	philosophical	 view	on	an	empirical	 issue:	how	
concerned	was	the	judiciary	with	the	ability	of	 lay	jurors	to	evaluate	hearsay	evidence?	While	
methodology	does	not	cause	the	debate,	it	does	shed	light	on	the	answer.	If	one	considers	the	
entire	 155-year	 span	 in	 which	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 developed,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 historical	 judicial	
concern	 with	 the	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 a	 hearsay	 statement’s	 declarant	 was	
premised	on	the	unreliability	of	hearsay	evidence.	Conclusions	to	the	contrary	are	belied	by	the	
the	historical	record.	Wigmore’s	research	was	based	on	an		incomplete	and	temporally	limited	
analysis	 of	 case	 law.	His	 sources	 led	him	 to	 believe	 that	 the	hearsay	 rule	 first	 formed	 in	 the	
common	law	courts	as	a	ban	on	unsworn	extra-judicial	statements.	The	courts	of	equity	 later	
adopted	the	hearsay	rule	because	of	the	maxim	“equity	follows	the	law.”126	This	is	how	one	can	
explain	why	the	hearsay	rule	existed	in	the	equitable	courts	despite	the	trier	of	fact	being	a	judge	
alone.		
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Two	 historical	 facts	 belie	 Wigmore’s	 research.	 The	 hearsay	 rule	 emerged	 out	 of	 the	
equitable	courts	in	cases	that	did	not	use	lay	jurors	as	the	trier	of	fact.127	It	is	impossible	for	the	
hearsay	rule	to	have	been	initially	created	for	reasons	relating	to	to	lay	jurors.	This	undermines	
Wigmore’s	assertion	that	the	courts	of	equity	adopted	the	hearsay	rule	merely	to	follow	the	rules	
of	 the	 common	 law.128	 Additionally,	 the	 first	 mention	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
opportunity	 for	 cross-examination	 in	 the	 surviving	 case	 law	 is	 in	 the	 1700s.	 By	 this	 time	 the	
hearsay	rule	had	already	been	developed	out	of	concerns	with	the	lack	of	an	oath	and	demeanour	
evidence.129	 Both	of	 these	 factors	 relate	 to	 the	 reliability	 of	 hearsay	 evidence.	 They	have	no	
relation	to	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	Even	if	the	judicial	need	for	cross-examination	
stemmed	from	a	concern	with	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors,	this	is	not	the	initial	reason	
for	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 The	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 for	 cross-examination	 is	 a	 subsequently	 added	
reason	in	the	hearsay	rule’s	rationale.130		
Wigmore’s	belief	in	the	purpose	of	cross-examination	is	premised	on	the	hearsay	rule	first	
appearing	 in	 the	 common	 law	courts,	where	 some	cases	were	 tried	by	 lay	 jurors.	Wigmore’s	
premise	is	undermined	by	subsequent	research,	which	employed	different	methodologies.	J.M.	
Beattie	 examined	 the	 case	 law	 of	 felony	 trials	 between	 1660	 and	 1800	 and	 concluded	 that	
unsworn	oral	hearsay	was	admitted	in	jury	trials	until	the	mid-1700s.131	This	is	later	than	the	time	
period	in	which	Wigmore	placed	the	establishment	of	the	hearsay	rule	in	the	common	law	court,	
																																																						
127 Ibid. at 303. 
128 Ibid.  
129 Ibid. at 304. 
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131 J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts of England, 1660-1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) at 232-
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the	late	1600s.	Likewise,	Stephan	Landsman’s	research	suggests	that	unsworn	oral	hearsay	was	
not	prohibited	from	evidence	in	the	Old	Bailey	until	the	1770s.132	Between	1717	and	1730	judges	
at	 the	Old	Bailey	allowed	 juries	 to	hear	significant	volumes	of	unsworn	oral	hearsay.	Hearsay	
became	more	 frequently	 excluded	 between	 1730	 and	 1770.133	 Langbein	 revisited	Wigmore’s	
sources	and	noted	that	between	1675	and	1735	common	law	judges	presiding	over	felony	trials	
in	the	Old	Bailey	were	not	inclined	to	exclude	unsworn	oral	hearsay.134	Langbein	too	places	the	
hearsay	rule’s	creation	in	the	1700s.	
In	all,	then,	the	debate	in	the	literature	over	the	purpose	for	which	cross-examination	was	
deemed	 necessary	 is	 not	 attributable	 to	 methodology,	 but	 methodology	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	
answer.	The	 lack	of	opportunity	 for	cross-examination	 is	undoubtedly	a	 factor	that	 led	to	the	
creation	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 There	 was	 a	 need	 for	 cross-examination	 because	 judges	 were	
concerned	about	the	ability	to	shed	light	on	potential	sources	of	unreliability	in	hearsay	evidence.	
This	could	lead	any	trier	of	fact,	judge	or	jury,	to	make	the	wrong	decision.		
	
2.3.4	Procedural	Reliability:	The	evidence	is	unsworn	
	 Unsworn	 hearsay	 evidence	 was	 historically	 prohibited	 because	 of	 concerns	 with	 its	
reliability,	which	would	affect	the	rectitude	of	the	court’s	decision.	In	the	common	law	courts,	
judges	placed	a	premium	on	testimony	given	after	the	declarant	had	sworn	a	religious	oath	to	
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tell	the	truth	and	was	subject	the	threat	of	serious	state	punishment	for	lying.	There	was	thought	
to	be	four	potential	insulators	of	reliability	in	a	testimonial	oath:	
1. The	oath	was	thought	to	increase	the	inclination	of	witnesses	to	tell	the	truth	and	give	
caution	to	their	words.135		
2. The	 threat	 of	 divine	 punishment	 for	 breaking	 the	 oath	 through	 untruthfulness	 was	
thought	to	increase	the	witness’	sincerity.		
3. The	threat	of	earthy	punishment	for	lying	was	believed	to	increase	truthfulness.136		
4. The	 formality	of	 the	oath	was	 thought	 to	 cause	witnesses	 to	be	more	 careful	 in	 their	
testimony	compared	to	statements	made	in	casual	conversation.137	
In	the	mid-1600s	the	common	law	courts	began	to	insist	on	sworn	testimony.138	During	
this	time	judges	began	to	refuse	receiving	out	of	court	statements	that	were	not	confirmed	by	
witnesses	at	the	trial	under	oath.	Hence	unsworn	hearsay	evidence	was	excluded	from	evidence	
because	of	its	unsworn	nature.	In	the	1670	treason	trial	of	White,	a	pamphlet	was	excluded	from	
evidence	 because	 the	 judge	 believed	 that	 a	 live	 witness	 would	 be	 more	 cautious	 if	 their	
statement	was	given	under	oath.139	In	Langhorn,140	a	1679	case	from	the	Old	Bailey,	a	witness	
testified	that	“another	person	told	him	that	the	accused	was	involved	in	a	plot	to	kill	the	King.”141	
The	testimony	was	characterized	as	hearsay	because	of	its	unsworn	nature.142	In	R.	v.	Hebden	&	
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Williams,	a	1664	case	from	the	Court	of	King’s	Bench,	Justice	Kelyng	dissented	when	unsworn	
hearsay	evidence	was	entered	into	evidence.	Kelyng	J.	characterized	it	as	no	evidence	because	
the	declarant	had	not	been	under	oath	when	he	made	the	statement.143	According	to	Koch,	in	
the	late	1600s	“Crown	counsel	and	judges	either	stopped	witnesses	from	completing	statements	
that	consisted	of	unsworn	hearsay	or	they	told	juries	to	disregard	them.”144	
The	different	implications	of	a	divine	and	state	punishment	for	violating	the	oath	was	a	
narrow	distinction	in	the	1600s.	A	witness’	conscience	was	similarly	bound	out	of	fear	of	divine	
retribution	 for	 lying	 and	 the	 threat	 of	 state	 punishment.	 In	 our	modern,	 increasingly	 secular	
society	the	oath’s	ability	to	bind	a	declarant’s	conscience	is	more	one-sided.	Today,	the	threat	of	
state	punishment	for	dishonesty	is	the	heart	of	the	oath’s	value.	Of	less	but	valid	importance	is	
the	fear	of	divine	retribution;	or	in	the	case	of	an	affirmation,	moral	disapprobation.	
	
2.2.5	Fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	
The	hearsay	rule	developed	in	an	adversarial	justice	system.	As	the	rule	developed	the	
supply	of	evidence	shifted	from	the	judge	and	juries	to	the	litigant	parties.	With	this	change	the	
trier	 of	 fact	 was	 required	 to	make	 factual	 decisions	 on	 unfamiliar	 and	 potentially	 unreliable	
evidence.	 There	 was	 a	 perceived	 risk	 that	 the	 evidence	 supplied	 by	 the	 litigant	 parties	 was	
incorrect,	misleading,	or	fabricated.	A	need	developed	to	test	the	evidence.	There	were	multiple	
ways	of	testing	the	evidence,	 including	the	testimonial	oath,	demeanour	evidence,	and	cross-
examination.		
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Aside	 from	reliability	concerns,	 there	 is	a	measure	of	unfairness	 in	allowing	a	party	 to	
adduce	 evidence	 that	 an	 adverse	 party	 cannot	 test.	 Hearsay	 in	 particular	 removes	 the	
opportunity	to	test	a	declarant’s	statement.	Generally,	the	declarant	of	a	hearsay	statement	is	
not	bound	by	divine	or	earthly	punishment	for	lying.	The	adverse	party	and	trier	of	fact	cannot	
assess	the	declarant’s	demeanour	while	they	provide	their	statement.	The	declarant	cannot	be	
cross-examined.	This	can	produce	two	types	of	unfairness,	each	of	which	has	been	articulated	by	
Ho:	the	unfairness	to	the	adverse	party	in	assuming	that	the	declarant	would	have	proven	his	or	
her	hearsay	statement	if	he	or	she	testified;	and	the	disadvantage	to	the	adverse	party	by	the	
production	of	hearsay	evidence	without	giving	that	party	the	chance	to	remove	the	prejudice	
caused	by	that	evidence.145	The	development	of	the	hearsay	rule	is,	in	part,	an	attempt	to	stymy	
the	unfairness	of	admitting	untested	hearsay	evidence.	
The	 fairness	 rationale	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 is	 difficult	 to	 track	 because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	
surviving	 records	 from	the	1600s	and	1700s.	Much	of	 the	 surviving	 records	are	case	 law	and	
judicial	notes	taken	during	trials.	These	records	articulate	judicial	reasoning	in	the	language	of	
reliability.	 There	 are	 no	 empirical	 studies	 of	 judicial	 attitudes	 toward	 hearsay,	 nor	 are	 there	
academic	articles	on	evidentiary	or	epistemological	concerns	with	hearsay.	These	sources	are	
more	likely	to	capture	a	fairness	rationale	for	the	exclusion	of	hearsay.	Although	the	surviving	
records	 do	 not	 explicitly	 discuss	 a	 fairness	 rationale,	 the	 reasoning	 is	 implicitly	 present.	 For	
example,	 as	 discussed	 in	 section	 2.2.3,	 the	 historical	 judicial	 requirement	 for	 demeanour	
evidence	and	cross-examination	of	a	hearsay	statement’s	declarant	is	an	implicit	requirement	of	
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fairness	for	the	adverse	party.	Demeanour	evidence	and	cross-examination	are	axiomatic	results	
of	viva	voce	testimony.	When	courts	historically	excluded	hearsay	statements	because	of	the	lack	
of	 demeanour	 evidence	 or	 cross-examination,	 they	 were	 implicitly	 voicing	 concern	 that	 the	
declarant	testify	to	prove	his	or	her	hearsay	statement.	As	Ho	recognized,	there	is	an	unfairness	
in	 assuming	 that	 the	declarant	would	have	proven	his	 or	her	hearsay	 statement	 if	 he	or	 she	
testified.146	Indeed,	any	historical	exclusion	of	hearsay	for	reliability	concerns	has	been,	in	part,	
a	concern	with	fairness	to	the	adverse	party.	At	its	core,	a	reliability	concern	is	a	recognition	that	
the	adverse	party	must	receive	an	opportunity	to	test	the	hearsay	statement.		
This	is	particularly	clear	with	respect	to	cross-examination	which,	it	will	be	remembered,	
is	a	subsequently	added	reason	for	the	hearsay	rule.	The	historical	judicial	concern	with	hearsay	
was	never	with	the	unreliability	of	a	statement	per	se.	It	was	with	providing	the	adverse	party	
the	opportunity	 to	 test	 the	 reliability	of	 the	 statement.	 If	 a	party	presented	an	unsworn	oral	
hearsay	statement	at	the	Old	Bailey	after	1770,	that	statement	would	likely	have	been	excluded.	
Part	of	the	reason	would	have	been	because	the	declarant	could	not	be	cross-examined	by	the	
adverse	party.	If,	however,	the	declarant	came	to	the	Old	Bailey	and	testified	to	the	contents	of	
the	 statement,	 and	 the	 adverse	 party	 declined	 to	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant,	 that	 same	
statement	would	now	be	admissible.		
There	is	empirical	research	indicating	that	triers	of	fact	want	to	exclude	hearsay	evidence	
for	reasons	relating	to	fairness	in	the	adversarial	process.	Justin	Sevier,	an	American	scholar	in	
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law	and	psychology,	recently	conducted	two	studies	with	American	adults.147	In	the	first	study,	
321	people	watched	a	hearing	in	which	there	was	one	key	piece	of	evidence,	either	a	hearsay	
statement,	a	live	witness	who	was	not	cross-examined,	or	a	live	witness	who	was	cross-examined.	
The	 study	 found	 that	 the	 participants	 could	 effectively	 weigh	 the	 less	 reliable	 hearsay	
evidence.148	As	triers	of	fact,	they	were	“far	less	satisfied”	with	the	trial	proceeding	when	hearsay	
was	present.149	Their	dissatisfaction	was	specifically	tied	to	the	fairness	in	allowing	the	accused	
person	 the	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 of	 the	 key	 piece	 of	 evidence.	 In	 the	
second	study,	164	people	read	two	variations	of	a	summary	of	Sir	Walter	Raleigh’s	trial.	Raleigh	
was	charged	with	treason	for	his	alleged	involvement	in	a	plot	to	remove	King	James	I	from	the	
throne.150	The	entire	case	against	Raleigh	consisted	of	hearsay,	a	sworn	written	confession	by	
Henry	Brooke,	11th	Baron	Cobham.	Raleigh	objected	to	the	hearsay,	demanding	that	Cobham	
testify	in	person	and	be	subjected	to	cross-examination.	His	objection	failed	and	he	was	convicted	
of	treason.	The	participants	in	the	study	were	asked	questions	about	their	satisfaction	with	the	
case.	They	also	rated	the	degree	to	which	they	believed	the	trial	was	fair	and	the	court	was	able	
to	 uncover	 the	 case’s	 facts.	 The	 second	 study	 confirmed	 the	 results	 of	 the	 first	 study	more	
broadly.	Participants	in	the	second	study	expressed	fairness	based	dissatisfaction	with	the	trial	
of	the	Raleigh.	The	vast	majority	were	dissatisfied	because	of	the	unfairness	in	using	Raleigh’s	
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hearsay	confession	to	obtain	a	conviction.151	Their	dissatisfaction	was	not	 linked	to	rectitude,	
that	is,	any	effects	that	the	confession	might	have	had	on	the	court’s	ability	to	reach	the	correct	
decision.152.	
What	does	 the	 existence	of	 the	 fairness	 rationale	 in	 this	 research	 tell	 us?	 It	 does	not	
necessarily	 suggest	 that	 the	 fairness	 rationale	 influenced	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 the	
hearsay	 rule.	 A	 rule	 of	 evidence	 can	 have	multiple	 and	 different	 purposes	 over	 time.	Mirjan	
Damaška	points	out	that	there	can	be	a	difference	between	the	historical	cause	of	an	evidentiary	
rule	and	its	analytical	rationale.153	The	two	are	often	the	same,	but	not	always.	Damaška	cautions:	
[The	historical	cause	of	an	evidentiary	rule	and	its	analytical	rationale]	are	closely	
connected:	a	factor	that	provides	a	good	justification	for	an	evidentiary	rule	can	–	
as	part	of	the	motivational	syndrome	for	its	acceptance	–	easily	find	a	place	in	the	
causal	story	describing	the	rule’s	origin.	But	this	is	not	always	the	case:	persuasive	
reasons	can	be	advanced	in	favour	of	a	particular	evidentiary	doctrine	or	practice	
although	it	is	also	clear	that	these	reasons	played	no	part	in	its	genesis.154	
	
	The	fairness	rationale	could	be	a	modern	justification	for	the	hearsay	rule	that	did	not	contribute	
to	its	historical	creation.	Perhaps	this	is	why	the	adults	in	Sevier’s	study	–	and	a	scholar	with	a	
non-historical	methodology	like	H.L.	Ho	–	perceive	fairness	to	be	the	controlling	influence	over	
the	use	of	hearsay	evidence.	Perhaps	this	is	why	there	is	an	absence	of	discussion	about	fairness	
in	the	case	law	that	created	the	hearsay	rule.	On	the	other	hand,	the	fairness	rationale’s	presence	
in	Sevier’s	study	shows,	at	the	least,	that	triers	of	fact	link	the	admission	of	hearsay	evidence	to	
a	concern	with	fairness.	Judges	of	the	1600s	and	1700s	may	have	shared	the	same	concern.	There	
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is	no	way	to	tell	one	way	or	the	other	from	the	surviving	records.	On	the	balance,	it	would	be	
unreasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 fairness	 did	 not	 influence	 judicial	 decisions	 to	 exclude	 hearsay	
evidence.	Fairness	is	too	closely	tied	to	inherent	and	procedural	reliability	concerns	which,	we	do	
know	from	the	case	law,	greatly	influenced	the	hearsay	rule’s	development.	It	would	be	naïve	to	
assume	that	judges	in	the	1600s	and	1700s	compartmentalized	their	thinking	strictly	to	reliability	
concerns.	
	 Using	the	sources	relied	upon	by	the	prevailing	scholars	in	the	literature,	the	foregoing	
has	shown	how	five	factors	gave	rise	to	the	historical	hearsay	rule.	We	turn	our	attention	now	to	
the	 current	 application	of	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 The	 five	 factors	 are	 used	 as	 indicia	 of	 difference	
between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	current	application.		
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3.	The	Hearsay	Rule	
	
This	section	will	discuss	the	practical	application	of	the	general	exclusionary	hearsay	rule.	
Using	 the	 five	 factors	 that	gave	 rise	 to	 the	hearsay	 rule’s	historical	 rationale,	 the	 section	will	
identify	 the	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	
practical	application.	The	discussion	centers	on	instances	in	which	hearsay	is	admitted	under	the	
necessity	and	reliability	principle	and	some	traditional	exceptions	to	the	rule,	in	particular	prior	
inconsistent	statements.	Section	4	will	discuss	in	detail	the	other	side	of	the	hearsay	rule	–	the	
categorical	exceptions	to	the	rule.		
	 Section	3.1	will	explain	how	the	current	hearsay	 rule	 is	 constituted	and	operates.	The	
remaining	sections	will	examine	differences	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	
its	current	application.	The	analysis	will	proceed	by	reference	to	the	five	factors	that	gave	rise	to	
the	 hearsay	 rule.	 Each	 of	 the	 five	 factors	 exhibit	 problems	 in	 their	 practical	 application	 that	
nuance	 their	 influence	on	 the	decision	 to	 admit	hearsay	evidence.	 This	 thesis	 explores	 those	
problems,	and	uses	them	as	indicia	of	differences	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	
and	current	application.	Since	the	five	factors	underlie	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale,	a	
change	 in	 the	 factors	will	 indicate	a	 change	 in	 the	application	of	 the	hearsay	 rule’s	historical	
rationale.	For	example,	if	it	is	found	that	there	are	instances	in	which	demeanour	evidence	is	less	
influential	on	the	admission	of	hearsay	than	it	was	historically,	this	will	suggest	a	change	within	
the	inherent	and	procedural	reliability	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	rationale.		
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The	analysis	is	divided	according	to	the	five	factors	for	analytical	purposes.	In	practice,	
the	factors	are	interrelated	and	affect	the	same	underlying	rationale.	A	difference	found	in	the	
application	 of	 one	 factor	 will	 generally	 apply	 to	 other	 factors.	 For	 example,	 if	 demeanour	
evidence	is	found	in	some	instances	to	be	less	influential	than	it	was	historically,	the	analysis	of	
these	instances	will	apply	to	the	hearsay	dangers	and	fairness	in	adversarial	process.	
In	addition	to	tracking	the	differences	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	
practical	 application,	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 differences	will	 be	 identified	 and	 evaluated.	 In	many	
instances,	the	differences	prevent	the	hearsay	rule	from	achieving	its	purpose.	This	part	of	the	
discussion	 occurs	 on	 two	 levels.	 The	 hearsay	 jurisprudence	 is	 examined	 to	 determine	 if	
differences	between	its	historical	rationale	and	practical	application	are	created	by	the	doctrine	
itself.	Practical	considerations	in	the	modern	practice	of	criminal	law	are	considered	to	determine	
if	they	create	any	differences.	
	
3.1	The	current	hearsay	rule		
The	 conduct	 captured	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 is	 express	 or	 implied	 verbal	 or	 written	
statements	made	by	a	person	not	called	as	a	witness	at	a	hearing.155	It	is	still	unclear	whether	
implied	non-verbal	 conduct	 is	 captured	by	 the	hearsay	 rule.156	 The	 classic	occasion	on	which	
hearsay	is	prohibited	is	the	testimony	by	a	witness	of	what	a	non-witness	said.	The	hearsay	rule	
also	captures	some	out	of	court	statements	made	by	 the	very	witness	 testifying	 in	court.	For	
																																																						
155 Khelawon, supra note 4 at paras. 56-58. 
156 R. v. Baldree, 2013 SCC 35, [2013] 2 SCR 520 at paras. 62-63 [Baldree cited to SCC]. 
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example,	prior	inconsistent	statements	are	considered	hearsay	when	they	are	adduced	for	the	
truth	of	their	contents.157	
There	 are	 two	 features	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 that	 limit	 its	 scope:	 the	 availability	 of	 the	
declarant	 as	 a	 witness	 and	 the	 use	 of	 the	 out	 of	 court	 statement	 to	 prove	 the	 truth	 of	 its	
contents.158	Hearsay	evidence	is	formally	defined	in	Canadian	law	as	an	out	of	court	statement	
by	a	person	not	called	as	a	witness	tendered	in	evidence	to	prove	the	truth	of	its	contents.159	
Presumably	what	is	meant	by	“not	called	as	a	witness”	is	the	inability	for	contemporaneous	cross-
examination	on	the	utterance.	Otherwise,	prior	inconsistent	statements	would	not	be	properly	
considered	hearsay.	
Hearsay	jurisprudence	stands	at	the	end	of	a	long	road	and	at	the	start	of	another.160	For	
over	a	century	the	hearsay	rule	was	a	blanket	prohibition	on	hearsay	evidence.	Hearsay	would	
be	 admitted	 into	 evidence	 if	 it	 fit	 within	 an	 ossified	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 This	
occasionally	 resulted	 in	 the	 stretch	 of	 exceptions	 beyond	 their	 functional	 purpose.161	 In	 the	
1960s,	courts	of	appeal,	including	the	Supreme	Court,	began	to	admit	hearsay	evidence	that	did	
not	 fall	 under	 the	 traditional	 exceptions.162	 This	 foreshadowed	 a	 revolution	 in	 hearsay	
jurisprudence	 that	 began	 in	 earnest	 in	 1990163	 and	 was	 canonized	 in	 the	 2006	 case	 R.	 v.	
Khelawon.164		
																																																						
157 R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 SCR 740; [1993] SCJ No 22 (CanLII) [KGB cited to CanLII]. 
158 Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5 at 238. 
159 Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 1 per Fish J. 
160 Hill, Tanovich, & Strezos, supra note 12 at 7-5. 
161 See e.g. R. v. Khan, [1988] OJ No 578 (CA). 
162 See. e.g. Omand, v. Alberta Milling Co., [1922] AJ No 63 (CA); J. H. Ashdown Hardware Co. Ltd. v. Singer et al., 
[1951] AJ No 60 (CA); Ares v. Venner, [1970] SCR 608. 
163 R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 SCR 531, 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC) [Khan cited to CanLII]. 
164 Khelawon, supra note 4. 
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Today	the	hearsay	rule	stares	down	a	new	long	road	in	which	the	admission	of	hearsay	
evidence	is	governed	by	a	principled	rule.	All	hearsay	evidence	must	conform	to	the	twin	criteria	
of	necessity	and	reliability	in	order	to	be	admitted	into	evidence.	Necessity	is	the	unavailability	
of	 the	 hearsay	 statement’s	 content.	 The	 necessity	 criterion	 serves	 a	 truth-seeking	 function.	
Rather	than	losing	the	evidence	of	an	unavailable	declarant,	the	law	deems	it	necessary	to	admit	
the	evidence	as	an	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule.165.1	If	the	declarant	is	deceased,	ill,	incompetent	
to	 testify,	 or	 otherwise	 unavailable,	 the	 content	 of	 their	 statement	 is	 trapped	 without	 the	
admission	of	hearsay.	Hearsay	evidence	must	be	 ‘necessary’	 in	 this	sense	of	being	trapped	 in	
order	to	be	admissible.	Reliability	is	the	ability	to	negate	the	likelihood	that	the	declarant	of	a	
hearsay	 statement	 was	 mistaken	 or	 untruthful.165	 The	 reliability	 criterion	 is	 concerned	 with	
ensuring	the	integrity	of	the	trial	process.166	Reliability	is	satisfied	in	two	overlapping	instances.167	
First,	the	circumstances	in	which	the	hearsay	statement	came	about	produced	a	statement	so	
reliable	that	contemporaneous	cross-examination	of	the	declarant	would	add	little	to	the	trial	
process.	Second,	the	hearsay	statement	can	be	tested	by	means	other	than	contemporaneous	
cross-examination.	The	trier	of	law	will	allow	a	statement	admission	into	evidence	if	there	is	a	
sufficient	basis	for	the	trier	of	fact	to	assess	the	statement’s	truth	and	accuracy.	This	is	called	the	
threshold	reliability	test.168	Necessity	and	reliability	operate	in	tandem.	A	deficiency	in	one	can	
be	 overcome	by	 strength	 in	 the	 other.169	However,	 even	 if	 a	 hearsay	 statement	 satisfies	 the	
																																																						
165.1 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 49. 
165 R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 SCR 915, 1992 CanLII 79 (SCC) at para. 33 [Smith cited to CanLII]. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 49. 
168 Ibid. at para. 92. 
169 Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 72 per Fish J. 
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necessity	 and	 reliability	 principle,	 it	 will	 be	 excluded	 from	 evidence	 if	 its	 probative	 value	 is	
outweighed	by	its	prejudicial	effect.170	
The	hearsay	rule’s	rationale	is	tied	to	the	justice	system’s	value	on	viva	voce	testimony.	
The	Supreme	Court	stated	in	Khelawon:	
Our	adversary	system	puts	a	premium	on	the	calling	of	witnesses,	who	testify	under	
oath	or	solemn	affirmation,	whose	demeanour	can	be	observed	by	the	trier	of	fact,	
and	whose	testimony	can	be	tested	by	cross-examination.	We	regard	this	process	
as	 the	 optimal	 way	 of	 testing	 testimonial	 evidence.	 Because	 hearsay	 evidence	
comes	 in	a	different	 form,	 it	 raises	particular	concerns.	The	general	exclusionary	
rule	is	a	recognition	of	the	difficulty	for	a	trier	of	fact	to	assess	what	weight,	if	any,	
is	to	be	given	to	a	statement	made	by	a	person	who	has	not	been	seen	or	heard,	
and	who	has	not	been	 subject	 to	 the	 test	of	 cross-examination.	 The	 fear	 is	 that	
untested	hearsay	evidence	may	be	afforded	more	weight	than	it	deserves.171	
	
The	three	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	are	present	in	this	statement.	There	
is,	of	course,	not	always	congruity	between	the	way	a	rule	is	described	and	applied	in	practice.	
This	section	will	discuss	in	detail	the	extent	to	which	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	differs	
from	 the	way	 it	 is	 applied.	 For	 now,	what	 is	 notable	 is	 that	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
rationale	are	present	in	the	text	of	the	jurisprudence.		
This	 is	 perhaps	 surprising	 considering	 that	 Wigmore’s	 theory	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
rationale	 is	by	far	the	most	explicitly	endorsed	theory	 in	the	jurisprudence.	The	necessity	and	
reliability	principle	are	drawn	directly	from	Wigmore’s	scholarship.172	In	R.	v.	Smith,	Chief	Justice	
Lamer	(as	he	then	was)	stated	that	the	principles	underlying	the	exceptions	to	the	hearsay	rule	
also	underlie	the	rule	itself.173	Lamer	C.J.C.	cited	Wigmore	for	this	statement.	He	then	quoted	
																																																						
170 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 3.  
171 Ibid. at para. 56. 
172 Khan, supra note 163; Smith, supra note 165 at paras. 29-36. 
173 Smith, supra note 165 at para. 29. 
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Wigmore’s	description	of	the	necessity	and	reliability	criteria	and	his	emphasis	on	the	importance	
of	 cross-examination	 to	 test	 hearsay	 evidence.174	 It	 appears	 that	 Canadian	 jurisprudence	has	
either	misinterpreted	Wigmore’s	theory	or	chosen	to	disregard	aspects	with	which	it	does	not	
agree.	The	jurisprudence	has	not	adopted	Wigmore’s	central	beliefs,	such	as	the	hearsay	rule’s	
primary	concern	with	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors,	and	the	need	for	cross-examination	to	
remedy	this	deficiency.	In	place	of	these	views	the	jurisprudence	has	adopted	aspects	of	other	
theories,	like	Morgan’s	hearsay	dangers	and	Koch’s	focus	on	demeanor	evidence	and	the	oath.175	
Although	Wigmore’s	theory	is	by	far	the	most	referenced,	the	jurisprudence	actually	comprises	
a	 mash	 of	 different	 theories	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale.	 This	 makes	 sense	
considering	that	the	various	theories	describe	aspects	of	the	same	rationale.	The	hearsay	rule’s	
historical	rationale	is	a	fusion	of	concerns	relating	to	the	reliability	of	hearsay	and	fairness	in	the	
adversarial	process.	
The	 procedure	 for	 adducing	 hearsay	 evidence	 is	 governed	 by	 a	 series	 of	 evidentiary	
presumptions.	All	hearsay	evidence	is	presumptively	inadmissible.	The	traditional	exceptions	to	
the	hearsay	rule	remain	in	place,	and	a	statement	falling	under	an	exception	is	presumptively	
admissible.	 However,	 the	 presumption	 may	 be	 defeated	 if	 the	 evidence	 falling	 under	 the	
exception	does	not	 satisfy	 the	necessity	 and	 reliability	principle.176	 Indeed,	 an	entire	hearsay	
exception	 can	 be	 judicially	 eliminated	 if	 it	 does	 not	 comply	with	 the	 necessity	 and	 reliability	
																																																						
174 Ibid.  
175 Koch’s scholarship post-dates much of the hearsay revolution. The jurisprudence has not adopted aspects of his 
theory. It has adopted ideas shared by his theory. 
176 R. v. Mapara, 2005 1 SCR 358, 2005 SCC 23 at para. 15 [Mapara cited to SCC]. 
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principle.	If	a	hearsay	statement	does	not	fall	under	an	existing	exception	it	will	still	be	admitted	
into	evidence	if,	on	a	balance	of	probabilities,	it	satisfies	the	necessity	and	reliability	principle.177	
	 The	 new	 long	 road	 that	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 stares	 down	 lies	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 two	
movements	 in	 Canadian	 evidence.	 The	 first	 is	 the	 free	 proof	 movement.	 It	 experienced	 a	
resurgence	in	Canada	in	1990s.	During	this	time	courts	moved	toward	relaxing	rules	of	evidence	
to	allow	for	the	admission	of	more	information	in	trials.	Justice	L’Heureux-Dubé	observed	in	1993	
in	R.	v.	L.(D.O.)	that	“[t]he	modern	trend	[in	the	law	of	evidence]	has	been	to	admit	all	relevant	
and	 probative	 evidence	 and	 allow	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 to	 decide	 the	weight	 to	 be	 given	 to	 that	
evidence	in	order	to	arrive	at	a	result	which	will	be	just.”178	The	second	is	the	movement	toward	
facilitating	 the	prosecution	of	 sex	and	abuse	crimes	committed	against	children.	As	Professor	
David	 Tanovitch	 notes,	 the	 removal	 of	 gender	 and	 age-based	 stereotypes	 shaped	 the	 then-
nascent	principled	approach	to	hearsay.179	Chief	Justice	McLachlin	reflected	on	this	movement’s	
influence	on	the	hearsay	rule	in	R.	v.	W.J.F.:	
The	 Court's	 decision	 in	 Khan	 to	 permit	 a	 child's	 out-of-court	 statement	 to	 be	
received	 where	 necessity	 and	 reliability	 are	 present	 was	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	
increasing	sensitivity	of	the	justice	system	to	the	special	problems	children	may	face	
in	giving	their	evidence	and	the	need	to	get	children's	evidence	before	the	court	if	
justice	is	to	be	done.180	
	
																																																						
177 Ibid. 
178  R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 SCR 419, 1993 CanLII 46 (SCC) at para. 50 [LDO cited to CanLII], quoted in David M. 
Tanovitch, “Starr Gazing: Looking into the Future of Hearsay in Canada” (2003) 28 Queen’s LJ 371 at 378-79 
[Starr Gazing]. 
179 Starr Gazing, supra note 178 at 380. 
180 R. v. W.J.F., [1999] 3 SCR 569, [1999] SCJ No 61 (CanLII) at para. 42 [WJF cited to CanLII], quoted in Starr 
Gazing, supra note 178 at 380. 
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The	movements	were	not	created	in	a	vacuum.	They	were	created	in	criminal	trials,	where	the	
prosecution	 bears	 a	 heavy	 burden	 of	 proof.	 They	 were	 motivated	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 more	
effectively	 prosecute	 alleged	 offenders.	 The	 hearsay	 rule’s	 revolution,	 standing	 at	 the	
intersection	of	these	two	movements,	was	influenced	by	the	same	context.	The	reformation	of	
the	rule	from	ossified	exceptions	to	a	principled	one	was	spurned	 in	 large	part	by	a	desire	to	
facilitate	the	prosecution	of	alleged	offenders.	This	informs	the	way	the	hearsay	rule	is	currently	
applied.	
	
3.2	The	hearsay	dangers	
The	hearsay	dangers,	as	defined	by	Morgan,	exist	whenever	a	witness	testifies	about	an	
out	of	court	statement.	The	“danger”	particular	to	hearsay	evidence	is	the	inability	of	a	court	to	
test	 the	 declarant’s	 sincerity,	 use	 of	 language,	memory,	 and	 perception	 of	 the	 statement	 in	
question.181	Historically,	cross-examination	was	deemed	necessary	to	allow	an	opposing	party	
the	opportunity	to	test	these	potential	sources	of	unreliability	and	expose	them	to	the	trier	of	
fact.		
The	hearsay	dangers	are	at	the	forefront	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	current	application,	as	they	
were	during	the	rule’s	development	in	the	1600s	and	1700s.	The	Supreme	Court	identifies	the	
inability	to	test	the	reliability	of	hearsay	evidence	as	the	“central	concern”	underlying	the	hearsay	
rule.182	Testing	the	reliability	of	hearsay	evidence	is	believed	to	enhance	the	accuracy	of	a	court’s	
																																																						
181 Hearsay Dangers, supra note 56. 
182 R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144 at para. 159 [Starr cited to SCC]. 
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decision	and	guard	against	unjust	verdicts.	According	to	the	Supreme	Court,	 testing	reliability	
means	testing	the	declarant's	perception,	memory,	narration,	and	sincerity,	as	well	as	observing	
the	declarant’s	demeanour.183	
It	 has	 taken	 the	 case	 law	 some	 time	 to	 consistently	 identify	 the	 hearsay	 dangers.	
Beginning	in	1993	in	R.	v.	K.G.B.,	the	Supreme	Court	identified	the	hearsay	dangers	as	the	source	
of	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 reliability	 concern.	 They	 were	 described	 differently	 than	 Morgan’s	
formulation	of	the	hearsay	dangers:	
[The	hearsay	dangers	are]	the	absence	of	an	oath	or	solemn	affirmation	when	the	
statement	was	made,	the	inability	of	the	trier	of	fact	to	assess	the	demeanour	and	
therefore	the	credibility	of	the	declarant	when	the	statement	was	made	(as	well	as	
the	trier's	inability	to	ensure	that	the	witness	actually	said	what	is	claimed),	and	the	
lack	of	contemporaneous	cross-examination	by	the	opponent.184	
	
The	Court	would	repeat	this	description	of	the	hearsay	dangers	multiple	times	in	the	1990s.185	
These	 factors	 underlie	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale.	 Inexplicably,	 the	 case	 law	 now	
recognizes	 the	 hearsay	 dangers	 in	Morgan’s	 formulation.186	 The	 factors	 identified	 as	 hearsay	
dangers	previously	are	now	labelled	as	their	own	terms.187		
There	are	two	overlapping	methods	to	allay	the	concern	posed	by	the	hearsay	dangers.	
One	 method	 is	 to	 show	 that	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 a	 hearsay	 statement	 came	 about	
safeguard	against	any	real	concern	about	 the	declarant’s	perception,	memory,	narration,	and	
																																																						
183 Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 31; Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 1. 
184 KGB, supra note 157 at para. 32 
185 R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 SCR 1043, 1996 CanLII 154 (SCC) at para. 60 [Hawkins cited to CanLII]; Starr, supra 
note 182 at para. 160. 
186 See e.g. Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 31. 
187 See e. g. Baldree, supra note 156. 
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sincerity.	The	admission	of	a	child’s	statement	to	her	mother	in	R.	v.	Khan	is	a	classic	example.188	
In	Khan	a	 three-year-old	girl	was	sexually	assaulted	by	her	doctor.	Approximately	15	minutes	
later,	she	told	her	mother	that	the	doctor	“put	his	birdie	in	my	mouth,	shook	it	and	peed	in	my	
mouth.”	The	child	had	a	wet	spot	on	her	 jogging	suit	that	was	determined	to	be	a	mixture	of	
semen	and	saliva.	At	trial,	the	child	was	held	to	be	incompetent	to	testify.	Her	statement	to	her	
mother	was	hearsay,	and	it	did	not	fall	under	an	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule.	Nevertheless,	the	
Supreme	 Court	 admitted	 the	 child’s	 hearsay	 statement	 to	 her	 mother	 into	 evidence.	 The	
circumstances	in	which	the	statement	was	made	satisfied	the	Court	that	the	child’s	statement	
did	not	suffer	from	difficulties	in	perception,	memory,	narration,	and	sincerity.	The	child	made	
the	 statement	 immediately	 after	 the	 assault,	 eliminating	 any	 concern	 that	 her	memory	 was	
inaccurate.	Being	three	years	old,	she	had	no	motive	to	lie.	Her	statement	was	made	naturally	
and	 without	 prompting,	 suggesting	 that	 her	 mother	 did	 not	 coax	 her	 into	 making	 the	
statement.189	 The	 content	of	 her	 statement	was	 about	 a	 subject	outside	 the	experience	of	 a	
three-year-old,	suggesting	that	the	statement	was	not	fabricated	or	remembered	and	narrated	
incorrectly.	The	statement	was	also	corroborated	by	the	semen	stain	on	her	clothing.		
Wigmore’s	scholarship	is	the	basis	for	this	method	of	allaying	the	concern	posed	by	the	
hearsay	dangers.	When	Wigmore	wrote	about	the	the	hearsay	rule	most	trials	were	judged	by	
lay	jurors.	The	terms	‘trier	of	fact’	and	‘lay	juror’	could	have	been	treated	as	synonymous	during	
this	time.	Those	circumstances	do	not	exist	in	Canada	today.	Wigmore	also	believed	that	cross-
																																																						
188 Khan, supra note 163. 
189 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 67.  
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examination	was	“beyond	any	doubt	the	greatest	engine	ever	invented	for	the	discovery	of	the	
truth.”190	A	hearsay	statement	should	be	admitted	into	evidence	if	the	declarant	could	not	testify	
and	 the	 statement	 did	 not	 pose	 a	 risk	 of	 misevaluation	 in	 jurors	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 cross-
examination.	 In	 such	 an	 instance	 cross-examination	would	 be	 “superfluous”.191	 The	 Supreme	
Court	explicitly	adopted	Wigmore’s	scholarship	on	this	issue	in	R.	v.	Khelawon:	
One	way	is	to	show	that	there	is	no	real	concern	about	whether	the	statement	is	
true	or	not	because	of	the	circumstances	in	which	it	came	about.	Common	sense	
dictates	that	if	we	can	put	sufficient	trust	in	the	truth	and	accuracy	of	the	statement,	
it	should	be	considered	by	the	fact	finder	regardless	of	its	hearsay	form.	Wigmore	
explained	it	this	way:	
	
There	are	many	situations	in	which	it	can	be	easily	seen	that	such	a	
required	test	 [i.e.,	 cross-examination]	would	add	 little	as	a	security,	
because	its	purposes	had	been	already	substantially	accomplished.	If	
a	 statement	 has	 been	made	 under	 such	 circumstances	 that	 even	 a	
sceptical	caution	would	 look	upon	 it	as	trustworthy	(in	the	ordinary	
instance),	in	a	high	degree	of	probability,	it	would	be	pedantic	to	insist	
on	a	test	whose	chief	object	is	already	secured.192	
	
In	adopting	Wigmore’s	scholarship	in	this	manner	the	Court	tied	the	admission	of	hearsay	to	the	
utility	of	cross-examination.193	This	causes	some	concern.	Wigmore	believed	that	 the	hearsay	
rule	was	created	to	guard	against	the	evaluative	capacity	of	 lay	 jurors,	and	cross-examination	
was	 the	 best	 method	 to	 expose	 frailties	 in	 testimonial	 evidence	 to	 lay	 jurors.	 The	 locus	 of	
Wigmore’s	concern	was	lay	jurors’	ability	to	evaluate	the	reliability	of	hearsay.		
																																																						
190 Wigmore, supra note 13 at vol. I, p. 27, §1367. 
191 Ibid. at p. 1791, §1420 cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 92 
192 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 62. 
193 Unlike Wigmore, however, the jurisprudence will not allow for an exception to the hearsay rule on the basis of a 
non-contemporaneous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant of a hearsay statement (Hawkins, supra note 185 
at paras. 58-60). 
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This	can	be	contrasted	with	the	concern	of	the	hearsay	dangers.	The	hearsay	dangers	are	
the	ability	to	test	potential	flaws	in	a	declarant’s	perception,	memory,	narration,	and	sincerity.	
They	are	distinct	from	the	trier	of	fact’s	ability	to	evaluate	hearsay	evidence.	The	locus	of	concern	
is	the	ability	to	test	hearsay	evidence,	and	the	concern	applies	to	lay	jurors	and	judges	alike.	To	
be	sure,	the	Supreme	Court	is	entitled	to	pick	and	choose	from	aspects	of	Wigmore’s	scholarship.	
However,	Wigmore’s	scholarship	on	this	issue	is	premised	on	lay	jurors’	ability	to	evaluate	the	
reliability	of	hearsay.	That	premise	is	 inapplicable	and	unsound.	 Inapplicable	because	the	vast	
majority	of	trials	in	Canada	today	are	conducted	by	judges	alone.194	Unsound	because	there	is	a	
lack	 of	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 lay	 jurors	 are	 less	 adept	 than	 judges	 at	 evaluating	 hearsay.	
Indeed,	the	existing	research	suggests	almost	the	opposite:	when	deciding	a	case,	lay	jurors	are	
not	less	competent	than	judges.195	
Another	concern	 is	 that	the	hearsay	dangers	may	not	be	allayed	by	cross-examination	
alone.	Sometimes	the	hearsay	dangers	call	for	additional	safeguards,	such	as	the	oath	or	need	to	
receive	 viva	 voce	 demeanour	 evidence.	 There	 is	 considerable	 overlap	 between	 Wigmore’s	
concern	and	the	concern	posed	by	the	hearsay	dangers.	It	is	often	the	case	that	both	concerns	
are	allayed	by	the	circumstantial	guarantees	of	reliability	 in	the	way	a	hearsay	statement	was	
made.	There	are	occasions,	however,	when	the	hearsay	dangers	are	not	allayed	simply	because	
the	circumstances	in	which	a	hearsay	statement	was	made	does	not	call	for	cross-examination.	
																																																						
194 Neil Vidmar, “The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching For a Middle Ground” (1999) 62:2 Law & Contemp Probs 
141 at 147 [Searching for a Middle Ground]. 
195 See generally Neil Vidmar, “Foreword: Empirical Research and the Issue of Jury Competence” (1989) 52:4 Law 
& Contemp Probs 1 at 4 [Empirical Research]. 
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There	may	still	be	a	need	to	test	the	declarant	with	an	oath	and	viva	voce	demeanour	evidence	
to	expose	potential	flaws	in	the	declarant’s	perception,	memory,	narration,	and	sincerity.		
R.	v.	Sheriffe196	demonstrates	this	nicely.	In	that	case	the	accused	was	convicted	of	first	
degree	murder	after	an	expert	witness	testified	about	the	accused	person’s	alleged	ties	to	gangs.	
The	expert	witness	based	his	opinion	on	information	received	from	confidential	informants.	The	
accused	person	argued	on	appeal	that	the	basis	of	the	expert	witness’	opinion	was	hearsay	and	
ought	 to	 have	 been	 excluded	 from	 evidence.	 The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 for	 Ontario	 held	 that	 the	
confidential	informants’	information	was	admissible	under	the	hearsay	rule.197	Though	hearsay,	
the	 information	 was	 necessary	 because	 the	 confidential	 informants	 could	 not	 be	 called	 as	
witnesses.	 The	 information	was	 sufficiently	 reliable	 because	 the	 informants	 had	 a	 history	 of	
providing	accurate	and	truthful	information	to	the	police.		
Clearly,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 was	 comfortable	 with	 the	 veracity	 of	 the	 informants’	
information.	 This	 was	 only	 part	 of	 the	 equation,	 though,	 and	 the	 Court	 should	 have	 looked	
further.	More	relevant	was	the	expert’s	actual	opinion	–	and	how	he	derived	that	opinion	from	
the	 information	 available	 to	 him.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 ought	 to	 have	 treated	
demeanour	evidence	as	critical.	The	informants	were	unlikely	to	be	savory	characters.	They	were	
confidential	informants,	with	a	history	of	speaking	to	the	police,	who	chose	to	disclose	gang	ties	
about	 an	 accused	 murderer.	 These	 are	 not	 the	 type	 of	 people	 who	 look	 trustworthy	 in	 a	
courtroom,	and	they	are	not	known	for	being	careful	with	their	words.	The	trier	of	fact,	in	this	
																																																						
196 R. v. Sheriffe, 2015 ONCA 880, [2015] OJ No 6609. 
197 Ibid. at para. 120. 
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case	 a	 jury,	 should	 have	 been	 able	 to	 see	 the	 informants	 testify	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	
expert’s	opinion	was	credible	in	light	of	having	based	his	opinion	on	their	information.	Even	if	the	
informants’	 information	was	 in	 fact	accurate,	 the	 jury	should	have	been	allowed	to	see	 if	 the	
informants	were	trying	to	be	accurate.	Do	they	look	like	they	were	under	the	influence	of	drugs	
or	alcohol?	Can	you	see	them	thinking	about	their	answers	before	they	speak?	Are	they	being	
flippant?	When	the	source	of	information	is	a	confidential	informant	speaking	about	gang	ties,	
these	are	all	live	issues.	They	all	relate	to	reliability.	And	to	resolve	these	issues	you	need	to	see	
the	 declarant’s	 demeanour.	 Of	 course,	 since	 confidential	 informants	 could	 never	 testify	 in	 a	
court,	the	proper	remedy	would	have	been	to	prohibit	the	expert’s	evidence.		
The	hearsay	dangers	will	not	be	allayed	if	the	test	adopted	in	the	jurisprudence	is	applied	
too	loosely.	It	is	not	difficult	to	imagine	a	situation	in	which	a	loose	application	of	the	threshold	
reliability	test	is	tempting.	For	example,	consider	a	dark	night	in	which	a	person	is	pushed	under	
a	bus	and	dies.	No	one	sees	the	pusher,	but	a	male	witness	is	able	to	give	a	vague	description	of	
him.	The	statement	is	the	strongest	evidence	pointing	to	the	pusher	committing	the	crime.	The	
witness’	statement	is	videotaped	shortly	after	the	push.	When	the	witness	gives	the	description	
of	the	pusher,	he	is	high	on	heroin,	has	motive	to	lie,	and	specifically	tells	the	police	that	he	does	
not	 want	 to	 go	 to	 court.	 The	 witness’	 statement	 is	 not	 sworn	 and	 is	 both	 confirmed	 and	
contradicted	by	other	 evidence.	 Someone	matching	 the	witness’	 description	of	 the	pusher	 is	
arrested	and	charged.	At	trial,	the	witness	claims	to	have	no	knowledge	of	the	push	or	even	giving	
the	statement	to	the	police.	Meaningful	cross-examination	on	his	statement	is	meaningless	now	
that	his	memory	has	failed	him.	Are	the	hearsay	dangers	of	his	statement	allayed?	Hardly.	But	
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this	 is	 evidence	 necessary	 to	 secure	 a	 conviction.	 This	 factual	 situation	 happened	 in	 R.	 v.	
Groves.198	 The	 application	 judge	 admitted	 the	 statement	 into	 evidence,	 reasoning	 that	 the	
statement’s	documentation	on	videotape	and	relative	contemporaneity	with	the	push	provided	
sufficient	reliability	for	admission.199	The	admission	is	too	loose	an	application	of	the	threshold	
reliability	test.	It	is	in	line	with	the	modern	motivation	to	use	the	the	hearsay	rule	to	effectively	
prosecute	alleged	offenders.	Looking	plainly	at	the	hearsay	dangers,	the	statement	should	never	
have	been	admitted.	Although	the	witness’	narration	was	preserved	in	the	videotape,	without	
meaningful	cross-examination	there	was	no	light	shed	on	his	perception	and	memory	of	the	push	
or	the	sincerity	of	his	statement.	
Returning	 to	 the	methods	 of	 allaying	 the	 concern	 posed	 by	 the	 hearsay	 dangers,	 the	
second	method	is	to	show	that	there	are	adequate	substitutes	to	test	the	truth	and	accuracy	of	
the	hearsay	 statement.200	The	classic	example	 is	when	a	 statement	 is	made	at	another	 court	
proceeding	 under	 oath	 and	 cross-examination.	 In	R.	 v.	 Hawkins,201	 for	 example,	 the	 accused	
person’s	then-girlfriend	testified	against	him	at	the	preliminary	inquiry.	Her	statement	was	given	
under	oath	and	she	was	cross-examined	by	the	accused	person’s	counsel.	She	was	recalled	at	the	
preliminary	inquiry	and,	with	explanation,	recanted	much	of	what	she	said.	The	accused	person	
married	his	girlfriend	between	the	preliminary	inquiry	and	the	trial,	rendering	her	incompetent	
to	 testify	 at	 trial	 as	 a	 Crown	witness.	 At	 the	 trial	 the	 Crown	 sought	 to	 admit	 the	 girlfriend’s	
preliminary	inquiry	testimony	under	the	principled	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule.	The	Supreme	
																																																						
198 R. v. Groves, 2011 BCSC 1935, [2013] BCJ No 2258 affirm’d in 2013 BCCA 446. 
199 Ibid.  
200 Khelawon, supra note 4 at 63. 
201 Hawkins, supra note 185. 
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Court	held	 that	statements	given	before	a	preliminary	 inquiry	will	generally	allay	 the	hearsay	
dangers	because	the	statements	are	given	under	oath	and	subject	to	contemporaneous	cross-
examination	in	a	hearing	involving	the	same	parties	and	mainly	the	same	issues.202	In	addition,	
the	statements	are	recorded	in	a	court	certified	transcript	and	the	opposing	party	can	observe	
the	declarant’s	demeanour	during	cross-examination.203	In	short,	there	are	ample	substitutes	to	
test	the	truth	and	accuracy	of	the	declarant’s	statement.	
To	summarize,	the	hearsay	dangers	remain	at	the	forefront	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	current	
application.	 While	 the	 jurisprudence	 has	 taken	 some	 time	 to	 correctly	 identify	 the	 hearsay	
dangers,	 the	 test	 for	 threshold	 reliability	 is	 premised	 on	 testing	 for	 them.	 The	 hearsay	 rule	
assumes	 that	 cross-examination	 will	 generally	 allay	 the	 hearsay	 dangers.	 The	 basis	 of	 the	
assumption	is	Wigmore’s	belief	that	 lay	jurors	overvalue	the	reliability	of	hearsay.	This	causes	
some	concerns.	The	hearsay	dangers	may	not	be	allayed	by	cross-examination	alone	or	when	the	
threshold	reliability	test	is	applied	too	loosely.	In	these	situations,	the	concern	with	the	hearsay	
dangers	is	less	than	it	was	under	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	
	
3.3	No	demeanour	evidence	
	 The	absence	of	demeanour	evidence	remains	a	core	concept	of	the	hearsay	rule,	as	it	was	
during	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 the	 rule.	 The	 influence	 of	 demeanour	 evidence	 on	 the	
admission	 of	 hearsay	 is	 substantial,	 though	 it	 is	 sometimes	 subsumed	 by	 the	 role	 of	 cross-
																																																						
202 Ibid. at 76. 
203 Ibid. at para. 77. 
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examination.	 Though	 initially	 labeled	a	hearsay	danger,	demeanour	evidence	 is	 characterized	
today	as	an	independent	factor	in	the	test	for	threshold	reliability.		
	 Under	 the	 case	 law,	 the	 inability	 to	observe	 the	demeanour	of	 a	hearsay	 statement’s	
declarant	impairs	the	trier	of	fact’s	ability	to	properly	assess	the	statement.	In	K.G.B.	the	Supreme	
Court	held:	
When	the	witness	is	on	the	stand,	the	trier	can	observe	the	witness's	reaction	to	
questions,	hesitation,	degree	of	 commitment	 to	 the	 statement	being	made,	etc.	
Most	 importantly,	 and	 subsuming	 all	 of	 these	 factors,	 the	 trier	 can	 assess	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 interviewer	 and	 the	witness	 to	 observe	 the	 extent	 to	
which	the	testimony	of	the	witness	is	the	product	of	the	investigator's	questioning.	
Such	 subtle	 observations	 and	 cues	 cannot	 be	 gleaned	 from	a	 transcript,	 read	 in	
court	 in	 counsel's	monotone,	where	 the	atmosphere	of	 the	exchange	 is	 entirely	
lost.204	
	
K.G.B.	addressed	the	issue	of	whether	a	videotaped	statement	can	be	admitted	for	the	truth	of	
its	contents	when	the	declarant	recants	its	content	at	trial.	Due	to	the	specificity	of	the	issue,	the	
Court	was	acutely	focused	on	the	importance	of	demeanour	evidence	in	its	comments.	Compared	
to	the	rest	of	the	case	law	on	the	issue,205.1	it	is	possible	that	the	above	passage	is	an	inflated	
endorsement	of	demeanour	evidence	from	the	Supreme	Court.	
In	general	practice	demeanour	evidence	is	an	important	consideration	in	the	calculus	to	
admit	hearsay	evidence.	Consider	R.	v.	Baldree.	In	that	case	the	Supreme	Court	held	inadmissible	
a	drug	purchase	call	made	by	an	unknown	caller	because		
[n]o	effort	was	made	to	find	and	interview	him,	still	less	to	call	him	as	a	witness	-	
where	the	assertion	imputed	to	him	could	have	been	evaluated	by	the	trier	of	fact	
in	the	light	of	cross-examination	and	the	benefit	of	observing	his	demeanour.205		
																																																						
204 KGB, supra note 157 at para. 97. 
205.1 See especially Hawkins, supra note 185 at para. 77. 
205 Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 73 [emphasis added]. 
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The	 jurisprudence	 has	 gone	 so	 far	 as	 to	 outline	 potential	methods	 of	 preserving	 demeanour	
evidence	when	taking	a	statement	so	that	the	statement	can	be	admitted	as	an	exception	to	the	
hearsay	rule	 if	 the	declarant	becomes	unavailable	 to	 testify.	The	statement	can	be	video	and	
audio	recorded	or,	in	exceptional	cases,	an	independent	third	party	can	observe	the	making	of	
the	statement	and	testify	about	the	declarant’s	demeanour.206	
	 The	 case	 law	 has	 generally	 endorsed	 the	 value	 of	 demeanour	 evidence	 in	 relation	 to	
hearsay	 admissibility.	 The	 treatment	 of	 demeanour	 evidence	 generally,	 though,	 is	 far	 more	
conflicted.	In	R.	v.	N.S.,	the	Supreme	Court	addressed	directly	the	value	of	demeanour	evidence	
in	court	proceedings.	The	Court	considered	it	an	“axiom	of	appellate	review”	that	deference	be	
shown	to	the	trier	of	fact	on	credibility	issues	because	judges	and	juries	have	the	“overwhelming	
advantage”	of	observing	the	witness’	demeanour.206.1	That	strong	endorsement	of	demeanour	
evidence	was	in	2012.	Notwithstanding,	appellate	courts	have	in	the	same	time	period	cautioned	
against	 strong	 reliance	 on	 demeanour	 evidence.	 In	 2015	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 for	 Ontario	
cautioned	trial	 judges	“to	bear	 in	mind	that,	 to	the	extent	possible,	 they	should	try	to	decide	
cases	that	require	assessing	credibility	without	undue	reliance	on	such	fallible	considerations	as	
demeanour	evidence.	[Emphasis	added.]”206.2	Other	appellate	cautions	abound.206.3	It	remains	to	
be	seen	whether	this	trend	of	appellate	skepticism	will	trickle	its	way	into	hearsay	jurisprudence.	
	 In	terms	of	testing	the	reliability	of	a	hearsay	statement,	the	value	of	demeanour	evidence	
is	its	ability	to	shed	light	on	the	declarant’s	sincerity.	Observing	the	declarant	allows	the	trier	of	
																																																						
206 KGB, supra note 157 at para. 101. 
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fact	 to	determine	how	certain	or	honest	 the	declarant	 is	 attempting	 to	be.	Nonetheless,	 the	
jurisprudence	has	long	held	to	Wigmore’s	belief	that	cross-examination	is	the	best	method	for	
discovering	 the	 truth.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 a	 hearsay	 statement’s	
declarant	 is	 often	 deemed	 sufficient	 to	 satisfy	 sincerity	 concerns.	 Indeed,	 in	 Hawkins	 the	
preliminary	inquiry	testimony	was	admitted	into	evidence	despite	deep	contradictions	within	the	
hearsay	statement.	The	absence	of	demeanour	evidence	was	not	fatal.	The	Supreme	Court	was	
fundamentally	satisfied	by	the	declarant	being	cross-examined	at	the	preliminary	inquiry.207	In	
addition	 she	 provided	 her	 statement	 under	 oath	 and	 there	 was	 a	 court	 transcript	 of	 her	
testimony.		
	 Cross-examination	 and	 demeanour	 evidence	 will	 often	 shed	 the	 same	 light	 on	 a	
declarant’s	sincerity.	The	value	of	demeanour	evidence	is	subsumed	in	cross-examination	when	
a	witness	testifies	in	court	and	is	contemporaneously	cross-examined.	This	was	the	procedure	in	
the	1600s	and	1700s	when	the	hearsay	rule	was	developed.	The	difficulty	is	that	such	intersection	
does	not	 always	occur	 anymore.	Due	 to	 technological	 advancements,	 there	 are	 two	 types	of	
cross-examination,	 contemporaneous	 and	 non-contemporaneous.	 In	 non-contemporaneous	
cross-examination,	the	declarant	of	a	hearsay	statement	will	be	subjected	to	cross-examination	
by	the	opposing	party	before	the	hearing.	If	the	cross-examination	is	not	video	recorded,	the	trier	
of	fact	at	the	hearing	will	be	unable	to	observe	the	declarant’s	demeanour	during	the	prior	cross-
examination.	If	the	declarant’s	statement	is	admitted	at	the	hearing	under	the	hearsay	rule,	the	
																																																						
206.1 R. v. N.S., 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 SCR 726, at para. 25 [NS cited to SCC]. 
206.2 R. v. Rhayel, 2015 ONCA 377 at para. 89, [2015] O.J. No. 2675 [Rhayel cited to ONCA]. 
206.3 See e.g. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Neinstein (2010), 99 OR (3d) 1 (CA) at para. 66. 
207 Hawkins, supra note 185 at para. 77. 
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trier	of	fact	may	only	have	a	transcript	of	the	cross-examination.	The	declarant’s	demeanour	in	
giving	 the	evidence	will	 be	 lost.	 This	 is	 not	 an	uncommon	occurrence.	 It	 happens	every	 time	
hearsay	 is	 admitted	 because	 a	 witness	 testified	 at	 a	 preliminary	 inquiry	 or	 non-videoed	
deposition	 and	 failed	 to	 attend	 the	 trial	 or	 hearing.	 On	 these	 occasions,	 the	 influence	 of	
demeanour	evidence	on	the	admission	of	hearsay	is	less	than	it	was	historically.	
	 Non-contemporaneous	cross-examination	can	also	raise	epistemic	concerns.	The	ability	
to	see	a	witness’	face	is	deeply	rooted	in	the	criminal	justice	system.208	A	witness’	demeanour	
can	 provide	 non-verbal	 insights	 that	 may	 uncover	 uncertainty	 or	 deception	 and	 assist	 at	
discovering	the	truth.209	A	cross-examiner	may	use	this	information	to	recalibrate	questions,	ask	
new	questions,	or	refrain	from	asking	questions	on	a	particular	topics.	The	process	is	fluid.	As	the	
witness	testifies,	they	disclose	information	through	their	demeanour.	The	cross-examiner	reacts	
with	questions.	The	witness	discloses	new	information	with	their	answers.	The	process	repeats	
itself	until	the	cross-examination	concludes.	All	the	while	the	trier	of	fact	observes	the	witness’	
answers,	 demeanour,	 and	 weighs	 accordingly.	 The	 information	 from	 this	 fluid	 interaction	 is	
absent	 if	 a	 written	 hearsay	 statement	 is	 admitted	 due	 to	 non-contemporaneous	 cross-
examination.	Again,	 this	occurs	every	 time	a	witness	 testifies	at	a	preliminary	 inquiry	or	non-
videoed	deposition	and	does	not	attend	the	trial	or	hearing.	The	vibrancy	of	the	witness’	cross-
examination	is	reduced	to	black	words	on	white	paper.			
																																																						
208 N.S., supra note 206.1 at para. 27. The Supreme Court made this ruling notwithstanding that that no expert evidence 
was put before the Court on the importance of seeing a witness’s face to effective cross-examination and accurate 
assessment of a witness’s credibility (para. 17). 
209 Ibid. at para. 24. 
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	 Overall,	demeanour	evidence	remains	as	important	a	factor	in	the	hearsay	rule	as	it	was	
historically.	It	is	a	core	concept	of	the	hearsay	rule	for	its	ability	to	shed	light	on	the	declarant’s	
sincerity.	The	value	of	demeanour	evidence	is	sometimes	subsumed	by	cross-examination.	This	
generally	does	not	diminish	the	ability	of	demeanour	evidence	to	shed	light	on	the	declarant’s	
sincerity.	 However,	 due	 to	 advancements	 in	 technology	 since	 the	 1600-1700s,	 demeanour	
evidence	can	on	occasion	be	lost	when	hearsay	is	admitted	because	the	declarant	received	an	
opportunity	for	non-contemporaneous	cross-examination.	
	
3.4	The	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	
	 The	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	remains	as	influential	a	factor	as	
when	 it	 became	 a	 late	 justification	 for	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 It	 is	 complicated	 in	 practice	 by	 the	
disjunction	between	its	theoretical	role	in	hearsay	jurisprudence	and	its	application	in	criminal	
hearings.	 Due	 to	 this	 disjunction,	 the	 truth	 gathering	 function	 of	 cross-examination	 may	 be	
overstated;	or	it	may	be	stated	correctly	and	practiced	differently	by	criminal	defence	lawyers.	
With	 regard	 to	 its	 influence,	cross-examination	 frames	 the	principled	exception	 to	 the	
hearsay	rule.	It	is	based	on	Wigmore’s	belief	in	it	as	the	best	method	for	ascertaining	the	truth	in	
a	trial.	In	R.	v.	Smith,	the	Supreme	Court	shaped	the	contours	of	the	principled	exception	to	the	
hearsay	rule	in	the	mold	of	Wigmore’s	high	regard	for	cross-examination:	
It	has	long	been	recognized	that	the	principles	which	underlie	the	hearsay	rule	are	
the	same	as	those	that	underlie	the	exceptions	to	it.	…	
	
Of	the	criterion	of	necessity,	Wigmore	stated:	
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Where	the	test	of	cross-examination	 is	 impossible	of	application,	by	
reason	of	 the	declarant's	death	or	 some	other	cause	 rendering	him	
now	 unavailable	 as	 a	 witness	 on	 the	 stand,	 we	 are	 faced	with	 the	
alternatives	of	receiving	his	statements	without	that	test,	or	of	leaving	
his	knowledge	altogether	unutilized.	The	question	arises	whether	the	
interests	 of	 truth	 would	 suffer	 more	 by	 adopting	 the	 latter	 or	 the	
former	alternative	 ...	 .	 [I]t	 is	 clear	 at	 least	 that,	 so	 far	 as	 in	 a	 given	
instance	some	substitute	for	cross-examination	is	found	to	have	been	
present,	 there	 is	 ground	 for	 making	 an	 exception.	 [Emphasis	 in	
original.]	
	
And	 of	 the	 companion	 principle	 of	 reliability	 --	 the	 circumstantial	 guarantee	 of	
trustworthiness	--	the	following:	
	
There	are	many	situations	in	which	it	can	be	easily	seen	that	such	a	
required	test	 [i.e.,	 cross-examination]	would	add	 little	as	a	security,	
because	its	purposes	had	been	already	substantially	accomplished.	If	
a	 statement	 has	 been	made	 under	 such	 circumstances	 that	 even	 a	
sceptical	caution	would	 look	upon	 it	as	trustworthy	(in	the	ordinary	
instance),	in	a	high	degree	of	probability,	it	would	be	pedantic	to	insist	
on	a	test	whose	chief	object	is	already	secured.210	
	
Of	the	two	overlapping	ways	in	which	a	hearsay	statement	can	be	deemed	sufficiently	
reliable	 for	 admission,	 the	 ability	 to	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 is	 acutely	 important	 when	
reliance	 is	 placed	on	 the	 latter,	 the	use	of	 adequate	 substitutes	 for	 contemporaneous	 cross-
examination.211	 Non-contemporaneous	 cross-examination	 goes	 a	 long	 way	 to	 satisfying	 the	
reliability	requirement.212	When	considering	the	admissibility	of	prior	inconsistent	statements	for	
example,	 the	 ability	 to	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 is	 the	most	 important	 factor	 supporting	
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admissibility.213	It	was	the	controlling	factor	when	the	Supreme	Court	admitted	prior	inconsistent	
statements	under	the	hearsay	rule	in	K.G.B.214	and	R.	v.	F.J.U.215	
Cross-examination	is	deemed	necessary	in	the	case	law	because	of	its	ability	to	expose	
the	hearsay	dangers	to	the	trier	of	fact.216	Through	questioning,	an	opposing	party	can	test	the	
declarant’s	sincerity,	use	of	language,	memory,	and	perception	of	the	statement	in	question.	The	
purpose	for	which	cross-examination	is	deemed	necessary	is	surprising	in	light	of	the	Supreme	
Court’s	explicit	adoption	of	Wigmore’s	scholarship	to	create	the	necessity	and	reliability	principle.	
It	 is	 another	 instance	 of	 the	 Court	 selectively	 choosing	 from	Wigmore’s	 scholarship	 on	 the	
hearsay	rule.	Wigmore	believed	that,	historically	and	currently,	cross-examination	of	a	hearsay	
statement’s	declarant	is	necessary	to	prevent	lay	jurors	from	overvaluing	the	statement.217	Cross-
examination	 is	 not	necessary	 in	 situations	where	 lay	 jurors	 are	not	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 or	 cross-
examination	would	“add	little	security”218	to	the	statement’s	accuracy.	Despite	claiming	to	adopt	
Wigmore’s	scholarship,	the	Supreme	Court	has	averted	Wigmore	on	these	important	tenets.	The	
case	law	is	steadfast	that	the	hearsay	rule	is	concerned	with	exposing	the	hearsay	dangers,	and	
the	 role	 of	 cross-examination	 is	 to	 test	 for	 them.	 Only	 Justice	 L'Heureux-Dubé	 has	 adopted	
Wigmore’s	view.	Writing	in	dissent	(not	on	this	issue)	in	R.	v.	Starr,	she	stated:	
The	rule	against	hearsay	developed	at	the	same	time	as	the	modern	form	of	trial	
and	is	associated	with	a	deep-seated	distrust	of	the	jury	system.	It	is	premised	on	a	
belief	that	the	jury	will	erroneously	assess	the	probative	value	of	evidence	and	the	
retention	of	the	rule	reflects	continued	suspicions	about	jury	deliberations.	The	rule	
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against	hearsay	 is	 "founded	on	a	 lack	of	 faith	 in	 the	 capacity	of	 the	 trier	of	 fact	
properly	to	evaluate	evidence	of	a	statement".219	
	
Based	on	this	premise,	L'Heureux-Dubé	J.	sought	to	 loosen	the	hearsay	rule	to	reflect	the	full	
competency	of	lay	jurors.	L'Heureux-Dubé	sought	a	solution	in	search	of	a	problem	however.	The	
hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	was	not	developed	out	of	a	concern	for	the	evaluative	capacity	
of	lay	jurors.	Cross-examination	has	always	been	deemed	necessary	to	shed	light	on	potential	
sources	of	unreliability	in	hearsay	evidence.	
There	 is	 congruence	 in	 the	 role	 cross-examination	 played	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
historical	 rationale	 and	 the	 role	 assigned	 to	 it	 in	 the	 current	 jurisprudence.	According	 to	 the	
jurisprudence,	 the	 “central	 concern”	 of	 hearsay	 evidence	 is	 its	 reliability.220	 Reliability	 is	
conceptualized	as	the	hearsay	dangers;	that	is,	concern	with	the	declarant's	perception,	memory,	
narration,	and	sincerity.221	The	hearsay	jurisprudence	endorses	methods	of	testing	hearsay	for	
the	hearsay	dangers,	and	of	the	methods	cross-examination	is	privileged.		
We	just	distinguish	between	the	theoretical	and	practical	role	of	cross-examination.	The	
roles	are	not	the	same.	The	theoretical	role	of	cross-examination	is	to	test	the	veracity	of	the	
declarant’s	statement.	For	example,	the	Supreme	Court	views	cross-examination	as	the	“ultimate	
means	of	demonstrating	truth	and	of	testing	veracity.”222	Without	cross-examination,	according	
to	 the	 Supreme	Court,	 there	may	be	 “no	other	way	 to	 expose	 falsehood,	 to	 rectify	 error,	 to	
correct	 distortion	 or	 to	 elicit	 vital	 information	 that	 would	 otherwise	 remain	 forever	
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concealed.”223	 While	 the	 historical	 hearsay	 rule	 privileged	 cross-examination,	 there	 is	 no	
indication	 that	 it	 did	 so	 to	 such	an	extent.	 The	 jurisprudence	 is	more	 in	 line	with	Wigmore’s	
profound	faith	in	cross-examination.		
	 The	practical	role	of	cross-examination	in	criminal	law	is	broader.	In	criminal	practice,	the	
goal	 of	 the	 cross-examining	defence	 counsel	 is	 to	 raise	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 on	 the	 evidence.	
Though	not	 formally	 recognized,	 considerations	other	 than	 the	 reliability	of	 the	evidence	are	
employed	in	criminal	practice	to	raise	a	reasonable	doubt.	There	is	tremendous	overlap	between	
the	reliability	of	the	evidence	and	raising	a	reasonable	doubt;	but	the	overlap	is	not	perfect.	The	
difference	 between	 the	 theoretical	 and	 practical	 roles	 of	 cross-exemption	 allow	 an	 accused	
person	 to	 cross-examine	 on	 considerations	 broader	 than	 reliability.	When	 this	 occurs,	 cross-
examination	takes	on	epistemic	and	practical	qualities	that	are	beyond	the	scope	of	testing	the	
reliability	 of	 the	 evidence.	 This	method	of	 cross-examination	 is	 not	 explicitly	 accepted	 in	 the	
hearsay	jurisprudence.	It	is,	however,	accepted	in	practice	by	judges	and	counsel.	Indeed,	it	is	a	
regular	occurrence.		
	 In	terms	of	epistemic	qualities,	a	witness	may	have	difficulty	articulating	their	evidence	
to	 the	 court.	 The	witness	may	 suffer	 from	 crippling	 anxiety	 or	 be	 unfamiliar	with	 courtroom	
procedure	or	unclear	about	what	details	they	ought	to	include	in	their	testimony.	All	of	these	
difficulties	are	unrelated	to	the	reliability	of	the	witness’	evidence.	Nonetheless,	a	skilled	cross-
examiner	 is	 duty	bound	 to	expose	 these	difficulties	 in	 cross-examination,	 if	 it	 is	 in	his	or	her	
client’s	best	interest,	to	convince	the	trier	of	fact	to	not	rely	on	the	witness’	evidence.	The	cross-
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examination	will	have	little	to	do	with	shedding	light	on	the	reliability	of	the	witness’	evidence	
and	much	to	do	with	preventing	the	witness	from	articulating	that	evidence.		
In	 terms	of	 practical	 qualities,	 a	witness	may	be	quick	 to	 anger	or	 have	 an	otherwise	
unpleasant	disposition.	For	example,	they	may	be	a	gang	member	distrustful	of	the	police,	court	
process,	and	trier	of	fact.	The	accused	person’s	lawyer	may	choose	to	cross-examine	in	a	manner	
that	 brings	 out	 the	witness’	 unfavourable	 personality,	 tying	 their	 distasteful	 character	 to	 the	
reliability	of	 their	evidence.	Trials	are	a	human	process.	The	 trier	of	 fact	may	be	unwilling	 to	
believe	the	witness’	evidence	despite	whatever	veracity	it	may	possess.		
Perhaps	most	poignant	in	terms	of	practical	qualities	is	the	occasion	on	which	a	witness’	
evidence	 is	acutely	 tied	 to	 their	 credibility.224	Granted,	 reliability	 is	always	 implicated	when	a	
witness’	 credibility	 is	 questioned.	 Reliability	 becomes	 divorced	 from	 credibility	 when	 cross-
examination	focuses	the	trier	of	 facts’	attention	on	the	witness’	character	 to	the	exclusion	of	
their	evidence.	Consider	 the	common	dynamic	when	a	witness	 is	 the	 former	co-accused	of	a	
defendant.	Cross-examination	can	be	used	to	paint	the	witness	as	needing	to	testify	in	a	manner	
that	secures	the	accused	person’s	conviction	in	order	to	receive	a	lighter	sentence.	This	may	or	
may	not	be	true.	While	in	theory	cross-examination	must	shed	light	on	the	truth,	in	practice	the	
cross-examination	is	intended	to	tie	the	witness’	evidence	to	their	character	so	tightly	that	the	
trier	of	fact	is	unwilling	to	put	any	faith	in	the	witness’	evidence.	This	is	not	the	same	as	testing	
the	reliability	of	the	evidence.	Cross-examination	may	permissibly	explore	whether	a	witness	has	
incentive	to	lie,	but	it	cannot	allow	a	truthful	witness	to	be	cast	as	a	lair.		
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This	occurs	 frequently.	Take	Edward	Greenspan’s	cross-examination	of	David	Radler	 in	
the	United	States	of	America	v.	Conrad	M.	Black	and	others.225	The	cross-examination	is	examined	
by	Gordon	Cudmore	in	The	Mystery	of	Hearsay.226	Conrad	Black	was	charged	with	multiple	fraud-
related	offences.	David	Radler	was	Black’s	business	partner.	Radler	signed	a	plea	agreement	with	
the	prosecution	and	became	 the	 star	prosecution	witness	 against	Black.	 The	plea	 agreement	
turned	on	Radler	testifying	‘to	the	truth’	against	Black	before	Radler’s	trial.	If	Radler	told	the	truth	
at	Black’s	trial,	he	would	receive	a	favourable	sentence	at	his	subsequent	trial.	Greenspan’s	cross-
examination	of	Radler	painted	him	as	an	opportunist	who	tells	the	truth	in	line	with	his	interest:	
when	Radler’s	interest	changes,	so	too	does	his	version	of	the	truth:	
THE	COURT:	 [Restating	a	question	asked	by	defence	counsel]	“And	I’m	going	to		
suggest	to	you,	you	know	full	well	that	if	you	come	off	your	script,	
you	know	that	the	government	will	tell	the	judge	that	you’re	a	liar,	
don’t	you?”	
	
WITNESS:	 I	have	no	script,	sir.	
	
DEFENCE:	 Is	that	your	answer:	
	
WITNESS:	 That’s	my	answer.	
	
DEFENCE:	 Okay.	And	so	the	key	to	your	future	in	this	courtroom,	I	put	it	to	you,	
is	[the	prosecutor].	Do	you	appreciate	that?	
	
WITNESS:	 Well,	I’m	getting	a	greater	appreciation	of	it	from	you	in	any	case.	
	
(Laughter)	
	
DEFENCE:	 Maybe	 you	 should	 have	 hired	 me	 a	 long	 time	 ago.	 Now,	 the	
government	wants	to	make	absolutely	sure	that	you	say	what	they	
want	because	they	added	a	clause	to	your	agreement	stating	that	
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you	will	not	be	sentenced	until	you	have	testified	in	this	trial.	Isn’t	
that	right?	
	
WITNESS:	 The	clause	is	in	there	that	I	will	not	be	sentenced	until	I	testified,		
yes.	
	
DEFENCE:	 So,	there’s	a	clause	in	that	plea	agreement,	right?	
	
WITNESS:	 Yes.	
	
DEFENCE:	 And	you	signed	the	plea	agreement	on	September	20th,	2005,	that	
you	will	not	be	 sentenced	until	 the	others	have	been	prosecuted,	
correct?	The	fact	is	you	haven’t	been	sentenced	yet,	have	you?	
	
WITNESS:	 No,	I	haven’t	
	
DEFENCE:	 The	fact	is	is	that	you	must	perform	here	or	lose	your	deal,	correct?	
	
….	
	
WITNESS:	 I’m	here	to	tell	the	truth,	sir.	
	
DEFENCE:	 I	see.	I	see.	And	that’s	your	answer	to	my	question?	
	
WITNESS:	 That’s	my	answer,	yes.	
	
DEFENCE:	 Okay.	You’ll	tell	the	truth	even	if	it	hurts	[the	prosecutor]	and	makes	
him	angry	at	you,	right?	You’re	just	going	to	tell	the	truth,	correct?	
	
WITNESS:	 I	will	answer	your	questions	truthfully.	
	
DEFENCE:	 If	he	thinks	you’re	lying,	you	know	you’re	in	big	trouble,	don’t	you?	
	
WITNESS:	 I	now	know,	yes,	certainly.227	
	
	
Did	 Radler	 have	 to	 testify	 in	 a	 manner	 which	 convicted	 Black	 in	 order	 to	 receive	 his	 plea	
agreement	 with	 the	 prosecution?	 Would	 Radler’s	 observations,	 unadulterated,	 produce	
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testimony	 that	 achieved	 this	 result?	 We	 will	 never	 know.	 Greenspan’s	 cross-examination	
focussed	so	intensely	on	Radler’s	character	that	the	truth	of	his	evidence	was	obscured.	The	jury	
was	encouraged	to	disregard	the	content	of	Radler’s	evidence	because	he	was	so	deeply	mired	
in	an	incentive	to	lie.	The	strategy	worked	too.	Black	was	acquitted	of	all	of	the	charges	that	relied	
upon	 Radler’s	 testimony.228	 Surely	 this	 is	 not	 what	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 had	 in	mind	when	 it	
deemed	 cross-examination	 the	 “ultimate	 means	 of	 demonstrating	 truth	 and	 of	 testing	
veracity.”229		
This	is	not	to	say	that	the	cross-examination	strategy	is	improper	or	even	undesirable.	To	
the	contrary,	it	can	be	proper.	Criminal	defense	counsel	in	Ontario	are	duty	bound	to	advance	
this	strategy	if	it	helps	their	client.230	As	part	of	the	duty	the	practical	role	of	cross-examination	
must	be	to	raise	a	reasonable	doubt.	The	role	 is	 laudable;	the	disjunction	between	 it	and	the	
theoretical	role	of	cross-examination	is	the	problem.	The	hearsay	jurisprudence	assumes	that	an	
accused	person’s	 lawyer	will	 cross-examine	 the	declarant	 to	expose	 reliability	 issues,	but	 the	
lawyer	may,	and	in	many	instances	will,	cross-examine	more	broadly,	and	emotionally,	for	the	
purpose	of	raising	a	reasonable	doubt.			
	 	It	is	unclear	whether	the	epistemic	and	practical	qualities	imbued	in	raising	a	reasonable	
doubt	 through	 cross-examination	were	 present	when	 the	 hearsay	 rule	was	 developed	 in	 the	
1600s	 and	 1700s.	 Cross-examination	 was	 a	 relatively	 late	 justification	 for	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
development,	post-dating	concerns	with	absence	of	an	oath	and	demeanour	evidence.231	The	
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same	parties	rule	prohibited	depositions	taken	in	one	proceeding	from	being	used	in	another	if	
the	parties	or	issues	were	not	the	same	in	both.	The	rule	was	created	in	large	part	because	of	the	
lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant.	Likewise,	the	joinder	of	issues	rule	prohibited	
the	use	of	depositions	that	were	not	given	at	trial	under	the	threat	of	perjury.	It	was	eventually	
justified	 in	 the	 late	 1600s	 in	 part	 because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 the	
declarant	of	the	disposition.232	These	two	rules	did	not	delineate	between	cross-examination	for	
the	purposes	of	testing	reliability	and	raising	a	reasonable	doubt.		
On	the	other	hand,	Richard	Friedman’s	scholarship	on	the	nexus	between	the	modern	
hearsay	rule	and	the	right	to	confront	the	witness	shows	that	by	the	mid-1600s	accused	persons	
in	treason	trials	had	the	right	to	confront	the	sworn	testimony	of	their	accusers	“face	to	face”.233	
Confrontation	 in	 treason	 trials	 suggests	 a	 right	 to	 cross-examine	 for	 the	purpose	of	 raising	 a	
reasonable	doubt.	 It	 is	unlikely	 that	 the	accused	person	was	 limited	 to	 shedding	 light	on	 the	
accuser’s	sincerity,	use	of	language,	memory,	and	perception	of	the	statement	in	question.	
A	third	possibility	 is	that	the	historical	hearsay	jurisprudence	advanced	a	truth	seeking	
role	for	cross-examination	and	the	lawyers	of	the	day	practiced	beyond	that	role.	This	is	what	
occurs	today	in	varying	degrees.	The	surviving	historical	records	do	not	make	clear	how	cross-
examination	was	practiced	in	court.		
If	cross-examination	was	not	practiced	to	raise	a	reasonable	doubt	–	that	is	to	say,	the	
epistemic	 and	 practical	 qualities	 in	 raising	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	were	 not	 present	 -	 there	 is	 a	
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difference	 between	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 current	 application.	
Contemporaneous	cross-examination	is	deemed	important	in	the	historical	and	current	hearsay	
jurisprudence	because	of	its	ability	to	shed	light	on	the	hearsay	dangers.	In	practice,	however,	
cross-examination	 is	 employed	 to	 fill	 a	 broader	 array	 of	 roles.	 This	 brings	 into	 question	 the	
importance	of	cross-examination	in	the	hearsay	jurisprudence.	Its	truth	gathering	function	may	
be	overstated;	or	it	may	be	stated	correctly	and	applied	differently	by	defence	lawyers.		
	
3.5	The	evidence	is	unsworn		
Like	 demeanour	 evidence,	 the	 absence	 of	 sworn	 evidence	 remains	 one	 of	 the	 core	
concepts	of	the	hearsay	rule.	It	was	previously	identified	as	a	‘hearsay	danger’	and	is	now	labelled	
as	its	own	factor.	
	 The	 role	 of	 sworn	 evidence	 has	 changed	with	 the	 times.	 Gone	 is	 the	 suggestion	 that	
supernatural	 retribution	 will	 follow	 if	 a	 witness	 lies	 under	 oath.234	 The	 spectre	 of	 such	
punishment	remains	a	consequence	of	the	oath	for	some	witnesses,	but	it	is	no	longer	part	of	
the	 the	 oath’s	 philosophical	 significance.	 Rather,	 like	 the	 solemn	 affirmation,	 the	 oath’s	
significance	is	 its	 impression	upon	the	witness	of	the	moral	obligation	to	tell	the	truth.235	The	
oath	and	 solemn	affirmation	are	 court	procedures	 that	augment	 the	 reliability	of	 testimonial	
evidence.	They	are	employed	to	aid	the	trier	of	fact	in	arriving	at	the	correct	decision.	
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	 In	practice	the	oath	and	affirmation	operate	in	tandem	with	criminal	law.	A	witness	who	
describes	one	version	of	events	to	the	police	and	another	version	at	trial	is	liable	for	prosecution	
for	 a	 number	 of	 offences.	 Under	 the	 Criminal	 Code,	 the	 witness	 could	 be	 found	 guilty	 for	
obstruction	of	justice	(s.	139),	public	mischief	(s.	140),	or	fabricating	evidence	(s.	137).	In	addition,	
if	a	witness	provides	contradictory	statements,	both	of	which	are	under	under	oath	or	solemn	
affirmation,	the	witness	could	be	further	prosecuted	for	perjury	(s.	131).	Together,	the	threat	of	
state	punishment	and	the	moral	suasion	of	the	oath	or	solemn	affirmation	increase	a	witness’	
inclination	to	tell	the	truth	at	trial	-	or	at	least	be	cautious	with	their	words.236	Between	the	two,	
the	 threat	 of	 state	 punishment	 is	 a	 far	 greater	 influence	 on	 the	 truthfulness	 of	 a	 witness’	
statement	than	the	moral	obligation	to	tell	the	truth.	
	 So	 important	 is	 sworn	 evidence	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 that	 it	 is	 almost	 a	 necessary	
requirement	for	the	admission	of	prior	inconsistent	statements.	In	K.G.B.	the	Supreme	Court	held	
that	the	oath	and	solemn	affirmation	augment	the	reliability	of	a	statement	to	such	an	extent	
that,	 all	 things	being	equal,	 their	 absence	 in	 a	prior	 inconsistent	 statement	 strongly	 suggests	
inadmissibility.237	Among	other	 considerations,	 requiring	a	prior	 inconsistent	 statement	 to	be	
sworn	at	its	utterance	prevents	the	trier	of	fact	from	accepting	unsworn	testimony	over	sworn	
testimony.238	It	also	prevents	the	trier	from	potentially	convicting	the	accused	person	solely	on	
unsworn	testimony.239	Currently	statements	taken	for	the	purpose	of	preserving	their	words	and	
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veracity	ought	to	be	made	under	oath	or	solemn	affirmation	and	follow	an	explicit	warning	of	
criminal	prosecution	for	lying.240	
	 Sworn	evidence	is	not	a	mandatory	requirement	for	the	admission	of	hearsay.	The	need	
is	acute	for	prior	inconsistent	statements.	The	overriding	concern	for	the	admission	of	hearsay	
evidence	is	always	necessity	and	reliability.	The	absence	of	an	oath	or	solemn	affirmation	for	any	
hearsay	statement	can	be	overcome	by	the	circumstances	in	which	the	statement	was	made	and	
other	means	of	testing	it.	Indeed,	even	for	prior	inconsistent	statements,	alternative	measures	
for	impressing	the	importance	of	telling	the	truth	upon	the	witness	can	substitute	for	the	oath	or	
solemn	affirmation.241		
	 In	all,	then,	the	oath	remains	an	important	concept	of	the	hearsay	rule.	Its	influence	upon	
a	witness	has	shifted	with	the	times,	focusing	today	on	the	threat	of	state	punishment.	As	a	court	
procedure	intended	to	augment	the	reliability	of	testimonial	evidence,	the	oath	serves	to	aid	the	
trier	of	fact	in	arriving	at	the	correct	decision.	
	
3.6	Fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	
	 The	admission	of	hearsay	evidence	occasions	two	types	of	unfairness:	the	unfairness	to	
the	adverse	party	in	assuming	that	the	declarant	would	have	proven	his	or	her	hearsay	statement	
if	he	or	she	testified;	and	the	disadvantage	to	the	adverse	party	by	the	production	of	hearsay	
evidence	 without	 giving	 that	 party	 the	 chance	 to	 remove	 the	 prejudice	 caused	 by	 that	
																																																						
240 Ibid. at para. 94. 
241 Ibid. at para. 96 
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evidence.242	 These	 two	 types	 of	 unfairness	 primarily	 comprise	 the	 factor	 ‘fairness	 in	 the	
adversarial	process.’		
Fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	is	one	of	three	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	
rationale	 and	 remains	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 current	 application	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 The	 test	 for	
threshold	reliability	aims	to	attenuate	the	two	types	of	unfairness	inherent	in	admitting	hearsay	
evidence.	However,	the	test’s	 influence	is	affected	by	changes	in	 litigation	procedure.	 Indeed,	
modern	 litigation	procedure	 in	preliminary	 inquiries	has	 created	a	 third	 type	of	prejudice	 for	
people	accused	of	serious	criminal	offences.	
	 We	begin	with	the	first	type	of	unfairness:	the	unfairness	to	the	adverse	party	in	assuming	
that	the	declarant	would	have	proven	his	or	her	hearsay	statement	if	he	or	she	testified.	It	is	not	
guaranteed	that	the	declarant	would	have	uttered	the	hearsay	statement	if	he	or	she	knew	that	
they	 were	 subject	 to	 an	 oath	 or	 affirmation,	 cross-examination,	 and	 observation	 by	 the	 the	
adverse	 party,	 judge,	 and,	 potentially,	 lay	 jurors.	 In	 determining	 the	 admissibility	 of	 hearsay	
evidence,	courts	are	concerned	with	whether	the	hearsay	statement	exhibits	sufficient	indicia	of	
reliability	 so	 as	 to	 afford	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 “a	 satisfactory	basis	 for	 evaluating	 the	 truth	of	 the	
statement."243	This	is	the	test	for	threshold	reliability,	and	it	is	supposed	to	minimize	unfairness	
in	 the	adversarial	process	by	 screening	out	hearsay	 statements	 that	are	devoid	of	a	basis	 for	
testing	its	truth	or	accuracy.	The	test	is	concerned	with	the	basis	for	evaluating	the	statement’s	
truth,	not	the	actual	truth	of	the	statement.	The	actual	truth	of	the	statement	is	left	for	the	trier	
																																																						
242 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 410. 
243 Baldree, supra note 156 at 83, quoting Hawkins, supra note 185 at para. 75. 
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of	 fact	 to	determine.	Hence	 if	a	declarant	 testifies	at	a	preliminary	 inquiry	 that	 she	saw	“the	
accused	and	an	alien	kill	the	victim	with	a	spaceship”,	and	the	declarant	cannot	be	found	at	trial,	
her	 hearsay	 statement	 would	 likely	 be	 admitted	 into	 evidence	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 The	
declarant	would	have	made	the	statement	under	oath	or	solemn	affirmation,	been	visible	to	the	
adverse	party	when	making	the	statement,	and	would	have	been	cross-examined.	Although	the	
truth	of	the	statement	is	clearly	false,	the	basis	to	determine	its	falsity	is	clear.		
While	 this	 may	 make	 sense	 in	 isolation,	 in	 modern	 criminal	 trials	 it	 can	 exacerbate	
unfairness.	There	are	sub-proceedings	in	criminal	trials	where	evidence	is	not	weighed.	The	sub-
proceedings	 include	 preliminary	 inquiries	 and	 directed	 verdict	 applications.	 In	 these	 sub-
proceedings,	a	hearsay	statement	admitted	into	evidence	is	taken	at	its	highest.	This	creates	a	
tension.	The	hearsay	rule	assumes	that	hearsay	evidence	will	be	appropriately	weighed	by	the	
trier	of	fact,	including	the	possibility	that	it	will	be	disregarded.	In	a	preliminary	inquiry	or	directed	
verdict	application,	admitted	hearsay	is	never	disregarded.	It	is	assumed	to	be	true.	Significantly,	
if	a	hearsay	statement	is	not	admitted	into	evidence	in	a	preliminary	inquiry	or	directed	verdict	
application,	 its	 omission	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 end	 the	 prosecution.	 The	 tension	 between	 the	
different	assumptions	of	weight	in	the	hearsay	rule	and	the	sub-proceedings	did	not	exist	during	
the	hearsay	rule’s	creation	and	is	still	not	accounted	for	in	the	current	hearsay	jurisprudence.		
Take	preliminary	inquiries.	Evidence	is	presented	by	the	prosecution	to	show	that	there	
is	 evidence	 upon	 which	 a	 jury	 acting	 reasonably	 could	 convict	 the	 accused	 person.244	 One	
purpose	of	the	preliminary	inquiry	is	to	screen	out	charges	for	which	the	prosecution	does	not	
																																																						
244 United States of America v. Shephard, [1977] 2 SCR 1067. 
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have	 any	 evidence	 that	 could	 result	 in	 a	 conviction.	 The	 evidence	 is	 not	 weighed	 by	 the	
preliminary	 inquiry	 judge.	Every	 inference	 in	the	evidence	 is	taken	at	 its	highest	to	afford	the	
opportunity	to	commit	the	accused	person	to	trial,	where	he	or	she	can	be	judged	in	full	by	a	
trier	 of	 fact.245	 These	 conditions	 can	 set	 up	 a	 perfect	 storm	 of	 unfairness,	 one	which	 is	 not	
uncommon	in	Canadian	courtrooms.	A	hypothetical	illustrates	the	point:	A	completely	fanciful	
and	untrue	hearsay	statement	is	tendered	at	a	preliminary	inquiry.	The	declarant	does	not	attend	
and	 the	 statement	 meets	 the	 test	 for	 threshold	 reliability.	 The	 hearsay	 statement	 will	 be	
admitted	into	evidence	and	deemed	true.	Assume	that	the	hearsay	statement	is	the	lynchpin	for	
the	prosecution,	giving	it	enough	evidence	to	commit	the	accused	person	to	trial.	There	is	a	great	
deal	 of	 unfairness	 here.	 The	 prosecution	 is	 permitted	 to	 tender	 a	 statement	 that	 the	 court	
assumes	 would	 have	 been	 proven	 by	 the	 declarant	 if	 he	 or	 she	 testified	 –	 and,	 worse,	 the	
statement	 is	deemed	to	be	 true.	The	unfairness	cascades	onto	other	unfairness.	The	accused	
person	is	unable	to	discover	the	hearsay	statement	through	cross-examination.	The	statement,	
despite	being	fanciful	and	untrue,	commits	the	accused	person	to	trial.	Typically,	that	trial	is	four	
to	six	months	away.	If	the	accused	person	is	detained	in	custody,	they	must	remain	detained	for	
that	time.	By	contrast,	if	the	statement	had	been	weighed	for	the	untruth	that	it	is,	the	accused	
person	would	have	been	discharged	at	 the	preliminary	 inquiry.	Their	ordeal	with	the	criminal	
justice	 system	 would	 have	 been	 at	 an	 end,	 barring	 the	 exceptional	 use	 of	 a	 preferred	
indictment.246	
																																																						
245 R. v. Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54, [2001] 2 SCR 828 [Arcuri cited to SCC]. 
246 Criminal Code, RSC 1985. c C-46, s. 577. 
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	The	second	type	of	unfairness	in	‘fairness	in	the	adversarial	process’	is	the	disadvantage	
to	the	adverse	party	by	the	production	of	hearsay	evidence	without	giving	that	party	the	chance	
to	remove	the	prejudice.247	This	unfairness	can	manifest	in	directed	verdict	applications	at	trial.	
An	accused	person	can	apply	for	a	directed	verdict	of	acquittal	at	the	end	of	the	prosecution’s	
case.	The	test	is	the	same	as	at	a	preliminary	inquiry:	is	there	evidence	upon	which	a	jury	acting	
reasonably	 could	 convict	 the	accused	person?248	 Every	 inference	available	on	 the	evidence	 is	
taken	 at	 its	 highest	 in	 the	 prosecution’s	 favour.	 A	 successful	 directed	 verdict	 application	 has	
strategic	implications	for	the	accused	person.	If	the	application	is	granted,	the	accused	person	is	
acquitted	by	the	judge.	They	do	not	have	to	call	evidence	in	their	defence	to	defeat	the	charge.	
If	the	directed	verdict	application	is	denied,	the	accused	person	is	in	the	same	position	they	were	
in	before	the	application	was	made.	They	may	need	to	call	evidence	in	their	defence.	
Apply	 the	 previously	 discussed	 hypothetical	 into	 the	 context	 of	 a	 directed	 verdict	
application.	 A	 completely	 fanciful	 and	 untrue	 hearsay	 statement	 is	 admitted	 during	 the	
prosecution’s	case	at	 trial.	The	statement	 is	 the	 lynchpin	of	 the	charge	surviving	 the	directed	
verdict	application.	An	application	to	direct	a	verdict	of	acquittal	is	made	by	the	accused	person.	
The	hearsay	jurisprudence	assumes	that	the	hearsay	statement	will	be	weighed	by	the	trier	of	
fact	as	untrue.	However,	in	the	directed	verdict	application	the	statement	is	deemed	to	be	true.	
As	a	result,	the	directed	verdict	application	is	denied.	In	order	to	remove	the	prejudice	created	
																																																						
247 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 410. 
248 Arcuri, supra note 248. 
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by	the	untrue	hearsay	statement,	the	accused	person	will	have	to	call	evidence	in	their	defence,	
or	gamble	that	the	trier	of	fact	will	weigh	the	statement	as	untrue.		
A	dissonance	between	the	hearsay	 jurisprudence	and	criminal	 litigation	procedure	can	
create	a	third	type	of	unfairness	that	did	not	exist	during	the	hearsay	rule’s	development.	There	
exists	in	preliminary	inquires	procedures	not	accounted	for	in	the	hearsay	jurisprudence.	These	
procedures	 change	 the	 purpose	 for	 which	 cross-examination	 is	 conducted.	 The	 effect	 is	
unfairness	to	the	cross-examining	party.		
A	witness'	testimony	before	a	preliminary	inquiry	will	generally	be	admitted	as	hearsay	
evidence	if	the	witness	is	unavailable	to	testify	at	trial.	The	fact	that	the	witness’	statement	was	
made	under	oath	or	solemn	affirmation	and	subject	to	contemporaneous	cross-examination	by	
the	 adverse	 party	 on	 the	 same	 issues	 will	 be	 sufficient	 to	 satisfy	 the	 test	 for	 threshold	
reliability.249	Driving	admissibility	is	the	adverse	party’s	ability	to	cross-examine	the	declarant.	In	
almost	all	 instances,	the	cross-examining	party	 in	a	preliminary	 inquiry	 is	 the	accused	person.	
Litigation	procedure	may	cause	the	accused	person’s	litigation	strategy	to	change	between	the	
preliminary	 inquiry	and	 trial.	 The	cross-examination	conducted	at	 the	preliminary	 inquiry	will	
serve	a	purpose	different	 than	cross-examination	at	 trial.	However,	 if	 the	declarant	does	not	
attend	 the	 trial,	 the	 accused	person	will	 be	unable	 to	 implement	 the	new	 cross-examination	
strategy.	 Instead,	 the	 accused	 person	 will	 be	 stuck	 with	 the	 cross-examination	 from	 the	
preliminary	inquiry.		
																																																						
249 Hawkins, supra note 185 at 76. 
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A	change	in	cross-examination	strategy	can	occur	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	One	reason	is	
that	the	accused	person	faces	a	number	of	charges	at	the	preliminary	 inquiry	and	reasonably	
believes	 that	 they	 can	 be	 discharged	 on	 the	weaker	 charges	 through	 cross-examination.	 The	
accused	person	may	choose	 to	cross-examine	 the	declarant	extensively	on	 the	subject	of	 the	
weaker	charges	in	the	hope	of	obtaining	a	discharge.	The	witness’	evidence	on	the	other	charges	
will	be	left	unchallenged,	saving	the	surprise	of	cross-examination	on	these	issues	for	the	trial.	
The	 tactic	 is	 a	 strategic	 one.	 It	 assumes,	 fairly,	 that	 the	 witness	 will	 be	 available	 for	 cross-
examination	at	trial.	If	the	witness’	evidence	is	admitted	at	trial	under	the	hearsay	rule,	however,	
the	 accused	 person	 is	 unable	 to	 implement	 the	 second	 half	 of	 their	 strategy.	 The	 hearsay	
jurisprudence	assumes,	unfairly,	that	the	witness	has	been	fully	cross-examined.		
Cross-examination	strategy	between	a	preliminary	inquiry	and	trial	can	also	change	when	
the	preliminary	inquiry	is	held	for	jointly	charged	accused	persons.	The	prosecution’s	witnesses	
will	almost	always	be	cross-examined	on	the	assumption	that	none	of	the	accused	persons	will	
plead	guilty	and	testify	against	their	former	co-accused	at	trial.	It	is	not	uncommon	though	for	
this	very	thing	to	happen	between	the	preliminary	inquiry	and	trial.	One	cannot	anticipate	it,	but	
it	is	a	real	risk.	The	change	is	a	tactical	decision	initiated	by	the	prosecution	and	accepted	by	the	
pleading	accused	person.	If	one	of	the	accused	parties	pleads	guilty	and	testifies	against	his	or	
her	former	co-accuseds	at	trial,	there	may	need	to	be	recalibration	for	the	cross-examination	of	
other	witnesses	from	the	preliminary	inquiry.		
	A	common	example	makes	this	clearer.	Imagine	that	two	men	are	charged	with	illegally	
possessing	a	shotgun.	The	prosecution	is	not	sure	which	of	the	two	men	is	the	culprit,	so	both	
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are	prosecuted.	At	the	preliminary	inquiry	an	eyewitness	testifies	that	she	saw	a	man	holding	the	
shotgun.	The	witness	cannot	identify	which	of	the	two	accused	men	possessed	the	shotgun.	The	
cross-examination	strategy	of	the	accused	parties	at	the	preliminary	inquiry	will	be	to	cast	the	
eyewitness’	observation	as	too	unreliable	to	identify	the	offender.	This	all	changes	if	one	of	the	
accused	parties	pleads	guilty	in	exchange	for	testifying	against	the	other.	Assume	that	one	of	the	
accused	parties,	X,	pleads	guilty	to	possessing	the	shotgun	and	is	set	to	testify	at	the	trial	that	his	
former	co-accused,	Y,	was	 in	 joint	possession	of	that	weapon	with	him.	Y’s	cross-examination	
strategy	of	the	eyewitness	will	change.	Y	would	likely	want	to	cross-examine	the	eyewitness	in	a	
manner	that	suggests	X	was	in	sole	possession	of	the	shotgun.	The	cross-examination	would	fit	
into	a	new	defence	theory	for	Y,	created	after	the	preliminary	inquiry	and	before	the	trial,	that	X	
was	in	sole	possession	of	the	shotgun	and	is	testifying	against	Y	to	secure	a	lower	sentence	from	
the	prosecution.	The	strategy	is	similar	to	Edward	Greenspan’s	cross-examination	of	David	Radler	
in	United	States	of	America	v.	Conrad	M.	Black	and	others.250	The	strategy	comes	crashing	down	
if	the	eyewitness	is	unable	to	be	found	at	the	time	of	trial	and	her	statement	is	admitted	into	
evidence	under	the	hearsay	rule.	The	hearsay	jurisprudence	assumes	that	Y	had	the	opportunity	
to	 cross-examine	 the	 eyewitness	 at	 the	 preliminary	 inquiry.	 In	 reality,	 that	 opportunity	 is	
hollowed	by	X’s	guilty	plea	and	anticipated	testimony.		
The	 same	 dynamic	 can	 occur	 when	multiple	 accused	 persons	 are	 tried	 together	 at	 a	
preliminary	inquiry	and	severed	in	prosecution	before	the	trial.	The	accused	persons	will	share	a	
preliminary	 inquiry	but	not	share	a	 trial.	Often,	 the	prosecution	decides	 to	sever	 the	accused	
																																																						
250 Cudmore, supra note 2 at 107. 
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parties	before	 the	 trial	 so	 that	 they	 can	be	 compelled	 to	 testify	 against	one	another	 at	 each	
other’s	respective	trials.	The	anticipated	testimony	of	the	severed	accused	party	can	change	each	
defendant’s	 cross-examination	 strategy	 of	 the	 witnesses	 from	 the	 preliminary	 inquiry.	 The	
example	of	the	‘shotgun	eyewitness’	is	applicable	to	this	situation,	as	is	the	resulting	unfairness.	
If	a	witness	from	the	preliminary	inquiry	cannot	be	found	at	the	time	of	trial,	the	accused	person	
will	 be	 unable	 to	 initiate	 his	 or	 her	 new	 cross-examination	 strategy.	 Instead,	 the	 hearsay	
jurisprudence	will	deem	the	accused	person	 to	have	applied	 their	 strategy	at	 the	preliminary	
inquiry.	 The	 hearsay	 evidence	 will	 be	 admitted	 despite	 a	 hollow	 cross-examination	 of	 the	
declarant	at	the	preliminary	inquiry.		
The	unfairness	created	by	preliminary	inquiry	procedure	is	not	generated	by	the	hearsay	
rule	in	all	instances.	Under	section	715(1)	of	the	Criminal	Code,	preliminary	inquiry	testimony	will	
generally	 be	 admitted	 into	 evidence	 at	 trial	 if	 the	 declarant	 refuses	 to	 be	 sworn	 or	 to	 give	
evidence,	is	dead,	insane,	so	ill	as	to	be	unable	to	travel	or	testify,	or	is	absent	from	Canada.251	
The	hearsay	rule	allows	for	the	admission	of	preliminary	 inquiry	testimony	not	captured	by	s.	
715(1).252	This	occurs	quite	frequently	in	practice.	It	is	not	uncommon	for	a	witness	to	not	show	
up	 to	 the	 trial.	 Without	 contact	 with	 the	 witness,	 the	 prosecution	 cannot	 prove	 that	 the	
conditions	precedent	of	s.	715(1)	are	met.	It	falls	to	the	hearsay	rule	to	determine	whether	the	
testimony	can	be	admitted	into	evidence.	
																																																						
251 Criminal Code, RSC 1985. c C-46, s. 715(1) 
252 R. v. Saleh, 2013 ONCA 742, [2013] OJ No 5554 at para. 76 [Saleh]. 
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Section	715(1)	of	the	Criminal	Code	is	a	statutory	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule.	However,	
it	does	not	consider	 the	necessity	and	 reliability	principle	 to	determine	admissibility.	Hearsay	
evidence	falling	within	s.	715(1)	is	automatically	admitted	into	evidence.	In	this	respect,	it	is	an	
exception	to	the	hearsay	rule	that	operates	differently	than	the	common	law	exceptions.	The	
admissibility	 of	 hearsay	 falling	 within	 s.	 715(1)	 is	 rarely	 challenged.	 It	 can	 be	 challenged	 by	
asserting	that	the	hearsay’s	probative	value	does	not	outweigh	its	prejudicial	effect.	Even	more	
rare,	s.	715(1)	can	be	constitutionally	challenged	for	operating	in	a	manner	that	renders	the	trial	
unfair.	Under	a	constitutional	challenge,	the	trier	of	law	would	likely	determine	admissibility	with	
reference	to	the	necessity	and	reliability	principle.		
	In	 summary,	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	 process	 remains	 an	 underlying	 factor	 in	 the	
current	application	of	the	hearsay	rule.	The	test	for	threshold	reliability	aims	to	attenuate	the	
two	types	of	unfairness	 in	admitting	hearsay	evidence:	 the	unfairness	to	the	adverse	party	 in	
assuming	that	the	declarant	would	have	proven	his	or	her	hearsay	statement	if	he	or	she	testified;	
and	the	disadvantage	to	the	adverse	party	by	the	production	of	hearsay	evidence	without	giving	
that	party	the	chance	to	remove	the	prejudice	caused	by	that	evidence.	However,	the	test	fails	
to	recognize	litigation	procedures	that	exacerbate	the	two	types	of	unfairness.	A	third	type	of	
unfairness	 exists	 due	 to	 criminal	 litigation	 procedures	 that	 change	 the	 strategy	 of	 cross-
examination	for	accused	parties.		
This	section	has	used	the	 lens	of	the	five	factors	that	underlie	hearsay	rule’s	historical	
rationale	 to	 identify	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 the	
practical	application	of	the	exclusionary	rule.	The	hearsay	dangers	remain	at	the	forefront	of	the	
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hearsay	rule’s	current	application.	However,	the	hearsay	dangers	may	not	be	allayed	by	cross-
examination	alone	or	when	the	threshold	reliability	test	is	applied	too	loosely.		
									 Demeanour	 evidence	 remains	 as	 important	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 as	 it	 was	
historically.	The	value	of	demeanour	evidence	is	sometimes	subsumed	by	cross-examination,	and	
this	may	render	demeanour	evidence’s	influence	less	than	it	was	during	the	historical	creation	of	
the	hearsay	rule.	
									 The	oath	remains	an	important	concept	of	the	hearsay	rule.	Its	influence	upon	a	witness	
has	shifted	with	the	times,	focusing	today	on	the	threat	of	state	punishment.	
The	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	remains	a	paramount	factor	in	the	
hearsay	rule’s	application.	It	is	complicated	in	practice	by	the	disjunction	between	its	theoretical	
role	in	hearsay	jurisprudence	and	its	application	in	criminal	hearings.	Due	to	this	disjunction,	the	
truth	gathering	function	of	cross-examination	may	be	overstated;	or	it	may	be	stated	correctly	
and	practiced	differently	by	criminal	defence	lawyers.	
Fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	remains	an	underlying	factor	in	the	current	application	
of	the	hearsay	rule.	The	test	for	threshold	reliability	aims	to	attenuate	the	two	types	of	unfairness	
in	 admitting	 hearsay	 evidence.	 A	 third	 type	 of	 unfairness	 exists	 due	 to	 criminal	 litigation	
procedures	that	change	the	strategy	of	cross-examination	for	accused	parties.	
The	 attention	 turns	 now	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 rule’s	 current	 application,	 the	 hearsay	
exceptions.	
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4.	The	Hearsay	Exceptions	
	
This	section	discusses	the	nature	and	extent	of	differences	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	
historical	rationale	and	the	practical	application	of	the	rule’s	exceptions.	The	analysis	proceeds	
by	reference	to	the	relevant	hearsay	exceptions.	Once	again,	the	five	factors	that	gave	rise	to	the	
hearsay	rule	frame	the	discussion.	The	five	factors	are	indicia	of	differences	between	the	hearsay	
rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 current	 application.	 A	 change	 in	 any	 of	 the	 factors	 indicates	 a	
difference	between	the	application	of	the	hearsay	rule	and	its	historical	rationale.	
There	are	over	a	dozen	recognized	exceptions	to	the	hearsay	rule.	Some	are	well	known,	
others	are	far	more	obscure.	The	taxonomy	of	exceptions	employed	in	Canada’s	leading	criminal	
evidence	texts	is	used	to	sort	the	exceptions.	The	texts	are	The	Law	of	Evidence	in	Canada:	Fourth	
Edition253	and	McWilliams’	Canadian	Criminal	Evidence:	Fourth	Edition.254	From	this	taxonomy,	
discussion	will	occur	only	 for	exceptions	 for	which	 there	 is	a	difference	between	 the	hearsay	
rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 their	 practical	 application.	 The	 exceptions	 are:	 admissions,	 res	
gestae,	 dying	 declarations,	 and	 the	 co-conspirator’s	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 Prior	
inconsistent	statements	could	be	added;	however,	they	are	excluded	from	discussion	because	
the	difference	between	their	practical	application	and	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	was	
analyzed	in	section	3,	namely	with	respect	to	demeanour	evidence.	
A	statement	falling	under	an	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule	is	presumptively	admissible.	
The	presumption	may	be	defeated	if	the	statement	does	not	satisfy	the	necessity	and	reliability	
																																																						
253 Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5. 
254 Hill, Tanovich, & Strezos, supra note 12. 
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principle.255	Moreover,	 an	exception	 to	 the	hearsay	 rule	 can	be	 challenged	 to	determine	 if	 it	
conforms	to	the	necessity	and	reliability	principle.256		
What	follows	is	an	analysis	of	the	following	hearsay	exceptions:	admissions,	res	gestae,	
dying	 declarations,	 and	 the	 co-conspirator’s	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 Each	 exception	 is	
explained	and	analysis	is	provided	on	the	difference	between	its	current	application	the	hearsay	
rule’s	historical	rationale.	
	
4.1	Admissions	
	 The	admissions	exception	is	a	loose	thread	in	the	fabric	of	the	hearsay	rule.	Theoretically,	
it	renders	the	principled	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule	incoherent.	In	practice,	it	renders	fairness	
in	the	adversarial	process	less	influential	than	it	was	historically.		
An	admission	is	an	out	of	court	statement	made	by	a	litigant	and	tendered	as	evidence	at	
trial	 by	 the	 opposing	 party.257	 Hearsay	 is	 governed	 by	 the	 necessity	 and	 reliability	 principle.	
Though	characterized	as	hearsay	evidence,	admissions	are	excepted	from	the	hearsay	rule	for	a	
different	reason.	Admissions	are	accepted	under	a	theory	of	the	adversarial	system	which	holds	
that	 a	party	 cannot	 complain	of	 their	 own	 statement’s	 unreliability.258	 The	declarant	party	 is	
presumed	to	have	satisfied	him	or	herself	of	the	statement’s	reliability	upon	utterance	of	the	
																																																						
255 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 42. 
256 Ibid. 
257 R. v. Foreman (2002), 62 OR (3d) 204 (Ont CA) at 215-216 [Foreman]. 
258 R. v. Evans, [1993] 3 SCR 653, [1993] SCJ No 115 (CanLII) at para. 24 [Evans cited to CanLII]. 
100	
	
statement.	The	trier	of	fact	is	left	to	weigh	the	statement’s	lack	of	an	oath	or	affirmation	and	the	
absence	of	the	declarant’s	demeanour.		
The	admissions	exception	extends	 to	out	of	court	 statements	 that	are	not	against	 the	
party’s	interest259	and	statements	made	by	another	and	adopted	by	the	party	out	of	court.260	The	
key	to	bringing	a	statement	within	the	admissions	exception	is	the	declarant’s	belief	when	the	
statement	was	uttered.	The	declarant	must	have	some	belief	that	the	statement	is	true.261	The	
standard	 is	 low.	 In	 criminal	 trials	 the	 admissions	 exception	 serves	 a	 prime	 vehicle	 for	 the	
admission	of	evidence.		
	 An	admission	is	entered	into	evidence	under	different	schemes	depending	on	whether	it	
is	uttered	to	a	person	in	authority.	If	an	admission	is	uttered	to	a	person	in	authority,	such	as	a	
police	officer,	the	confessions	rule	applies.262	The	prosecution	must	prove	that	the	admission	was	
given	voluntarily	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.	In	addition,	as	a	result	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	concern	
with	the	hearsay	dangers,	the	police	have	an	obligation	to	record	all	custodial	statements	where	
feasible.263	If	an	admission	is	not	uttered	to	a	person	in	authority,	such	as	a	parent	or	friend,	the	
confessions	rule	does	not	apply.	The	utterance	will	be	admitted	after	it	satisfies	the	requirements	
of	the	admissions	exception.		
The	admissions	exception	belies	the	second	aspect	of	fairness	in	the	adversarial	process.	
When	hearsay	is	admitted	into	evidence	the	adverse	party	is	not	given	a	chance	to	remove	the	
																																																						
259 Falcon v. Famous Players Film Co., [1926] 2 KB 474, 489 [Famous Players]. 
260 See e.g. Stowe v. Grand Turk Ry. (1918), 39 DLR 127 (Alta CA) [Grand Turk Ry]. 
261 See e.g. R. v. Matte, 2012 ONCA 504, [2012] OJ No 3327 [Matte] 
262 R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 SCR 3 [Oickle cited to SCC]. 
263 R. v. Moore-McFarlane, [2001] OJ No 4646 (CA) at para. 58 [Moore-McFarlane]. 
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prejudice	caused	by	that	evidence.264	Instead,	the	party	that	wishes	to	remove	the	prejudice	must	
call	 its	 own	 evidence.	 This	 unfairness	 is	 the	 backbone	 of	 adversarial	 theory	 supporting	 the	
admissions	exception.	The	theory	presumes	that	reliability	issues	with	an	admission	can	be	cured	
by	the	adverse	party	taking	the	witness	stand,	testifying,	and	exposing	him	or	herself	to	cross-
examination.	In	the	context	of	criminal	trials,	this	introduces	a	strategic	element	that	did	not	exist	
during	the	hearsay	rule’s	development.	During	the	1600s	and	1700s,	an	accused	person	did	not	
enjoy	 a	 right	 to	 silence.	 The	 right	 only	 became	 recognized	 in	 earnest	 in	 1848,	well	 after	 the	
hearsay	rule	crystallized.265	The	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	does	not	contemplate	strategic	
decisions	by	accused	persons	 to	 testify	 to	 remove	 the	prejudice	caused	by	hearsay	evidence.	
Rather,	that	decision	is	assumed.		
In	practice	the	decision	to	testify	and	expose	oneself	to	cross-examination	is	one	of	the	
most	 important	 decisions	 an	 accused	 person	 can	 make.	 Unlike	 when	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 was	
developed,	the	right	to	silence	is	constitutionally	protected.266	There	are	a	number	of	reasons	
why	an	accused	person	may	not	want	to	testify:	
● there	may	be	unsavory	characteristics	about	the	accused	person	exposed	in	cross-
examination	that	are	best	left	hidden	from	the	trier	of	fact;	
● the	accused	person	may	not	want	to	disclose	his	or	her	criminal	record	to	the	trier	
of	fact;	
																																																						
264 Ibid. at 410. 
265 Christopher Sherrini, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Regulatory Proceedings: Beginnings (That 
Never Began)” (2004) 30 Man. L.J. 315 – 352 [Privilege Against Self-Incrimination]. 
266 Oickle, supra note 265. 
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● the	accused	person	may	hold	 information	that	would	incriminate	his	or	her	co-
accused;	and,	
● the	accused	person	may	have	difficulty	remembering	details	or	narrating	his	or	
her	story.		
All	of	these	considerations	are	unrelated	to	the	accused	person’s	factual	guilt	or	innocence.	These	
considerations	must	be	sacrificed,	however,	if	a	hearsay	admission	is	entered	into	evidence	and	
the	accused	person	wants	to	remove	the	prejudice	caused	by	that	evidence.	Even	testifying	on	a	
hearsay	 voir	 dire	 poses	 problems.	 The	 accused	 person	 is	 open	 to	 a	 broad	 right	 of	 cross-
examination	that	can	reveal	strategic	information	about	his	or	her	defence.	In	all,	the	calculus	
determining	whether	to	testify	often	results	in	accused	persons	remaining	silent.		
The	 calculus	 is	 affected	 by	 the	 ease	 with	 which	 admissions	 are	 admitted	 under	 the	
exception.	Small	details	of	evidence	are	readily	admitted.	The	details	are	relevant	to	the	case	but	
not	 important	 enough	 to	 justify	 the	 risk	 of	 testifying.	 For	 example,	 a	 member	 of	 a	 criminal	
organization	may	be	charged	with	conspiracy	to	commit	drug	and	gun	offences	after	having	his	
phone	wiretapped	for	a	number	of	weeks.	At	trial	the	prosecution	will	use	the	wiretapped	calls	
as	 evidence	 of	 the	 accused	 person’s	 criminal	 acts.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 prosecution	will	 need	 to	
connect	 the	 accused	 person	 to	 the	 voice	 on	 the	wiretapped	 phone.	 A	 way	 of	 achieving	 the	
connection	is	to	play	a	wiretapped	conversation	in	which	the	accused	person	states	his	address.	
This	is	a	common	occurrence.	The	conversation	can	be	as	trivial	as	a	delivery	order	for	pizza.	The	
law	presumes	that	the	accused	person	is	honest	when	he	provides	his	name	and	address	to	the	
pizza	operator.	This	creates	 two	difficulties	 that	compromise	 fairness.	First,	people	may	 lie	 in	
103	
	
commonplace	interactions	for	various	reasons.	They	are	not	under	oath	or	otherwise	compelled	
to	be	honest,	nor	do	they	know	that	the	information	might	be	used	against	their	interest	in	a	
criminal	 trial.	 In	 the	context	of	ordering	a	pizza,	 it	 is	not	uncommon	to	give	another	person’s	
name	and	address.	Second,	if	the	address	is	in	fact	incorrect,	the	factual	detail	may	not	be	large	
enough	to	warrant	testifying	and	exposing	oneself	to	cross-examination.	This	situation	occurred	
in	R.	v.	Gardner	et	al.267	In	that	case,	one	of	the	alleged	gang	members	provided	his	address	and	
phone	number	to	a	pizza	operator.	He	determined	that	it	was	not	worth	the	risk	to	testify	on	a	
hearsay	voir	dire.	If	he	did,	the	prosecutor	almost	certainly	would	have	cross-examined	him	on	
the	guilt	of	his	co-accused	and	the	inner	workings	of	his	alleged	criminal	organization.	That	in	
itself	could	have	been	a	death	sentence	from	his	co-accused.	
In	conclusion,	the	admissions	exception	is	built	upon	the	unfairness	to	the	adverse	party	
of	not	having	a	chance	to	remove	the	prejudice	caused	by	hearsay	evidence.	This	forces	accused	
persons	in	criminal	trials	to	make	a	strategic	decision	that	did	not	exist	when	the	hearsay	rule	
was	developed.	The	impact	of	fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	is	rendered	less	influential	than	
it	was	historically.	
	
4.2	Res	Gestae	
	 Three	 subcategories	 comprise	 the	 res	 gestae	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 They	 are	
declarations	 of	 bodily	 and	 mental	 findings	 and	 conditions,	 declarations	 accompanying	 and	
																																																						
267 R. v. Gardner et al., 2013 ONCJ 351. The strategic decision by the alleged gang member is not captured in the 
decision. 
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explaining	relevant	acts,	and	spontaneous	declarations.268	The	preconditions	and	inner	workings	
of	each	of	the	subcategories	are	not	relevant	for	the	purpose	of	this	thesis.	What	is	important	is	
that	the	subcategories	are	premised	on	a	notion	of	reliability	derived	from	the	circumstances	in	
which	 a	 hearsay	 statement	 is	 created.	 The	 res	 gestae	 exception	 as	 a	whole	 presumes	 that	 a	
statement	made	with	relative	contemporaneity	to	an	event	or	feeling	will	allay	against	two	of	the	
four	hearsay	dangers.269	The	declarant’s	memory	will	be	 fresh	and	 there	will	be	 little	 time	to	
concoct	an	 insincere	statement.270	These	factors	compensate	for	the	statement’s	 lack	of	oath	
and	 demeanour	 evidence,	 and	 inability	 to	 contemporaneously	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant,	
giving	the	statement	sufficient	reliability	for	admission.	
	 The	 res	 gestae	 exception	 did	 not	 exist	 during	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 development.	 The	
presumption	that	reliability	is	derived	from	contemporaneity	is	not	always	borne	in	practice.	The	
res	gestae	exception	in	all	of	its	forms	can	cause	the	factors	of	lack	of	oath,	demeanour	evidence,	
and	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	to	wield	less	influence	than	they	did	under	the	
hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale.	 Central	 to	 this	 diminished	 influence	 is	 the	 conflation	 that	
contemporaneity	between	an	event	or	feeling	and	a	statement	results	in	reliability.	It	does	not.	
At	 best	 it	 results	 in	 a	 sincere	 statement.271	 Sincerity	 may	 on	 occasion	 overlap	 neatly	 with	
reliability,	but	reliability	encompasses	more	than	sincerity.	Cross-examination	is	needed	to	prod	
the	declarant’s	perception	of	 the	event	or	 feeling	and	what	 they	meant	when	they	said	 their	
																																																						
268 See e.g. Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5 at 332.	
269 Ibid. 
270 Kevin P. Doyle, The “New Approach” to the Admission of Hearsay Evidence (LLM Thesis, University of Alberta 
Faculty of Law, 1994) [unpublished] at 73-105. 
271 Ibid. at 77 
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statement.	 Through	 these	 avenues	 of	 questioning,	 the	 adverse	 party	 and	 trier	 of	 fact	 can	
determine	if	the	declarant’s	sincere	statement	is	true.		
Worse	 is	 the	 occasion	when	 the	 declarant	 is	 not	 sincere.	 The	 heart	 of	 the	 res	 gesate	
exception	is	an	assumption	that	the	declarant	is	sincere	because	he	or	she	lacks	opportunity	to	
concoct	an	untrue	statement.	In	the	context	of	a	declaration	of	bodily	condition,	this	assumption	
is	stretched	to	a	tautology.	The	exception	assumes	that	a	declarant	is	sincerely	speaking	about	
their	 bodily	 condition	 because	 they	 are	 contemporaneously	 experiencing	 it,	 and	 they	 are	
experiencing	the	bodily	condition	because	they	are	speaking	about	it.272	Declarations	of	bodily	
condition	require	cross-examination	and	an	oath	to	guard	against	insincerity.		
The	contemporaneity	 that	allows	 the	declarant’s	memory	of	an	event	or	 feeling	 to	be	
accurate	may	also	disallow	the	declarant	from	properly	narrating	their	statement.	The	result	is	a	
true	 statement	 expressed	 in	 a	 way	 that	 allows	 for	 misinterpretation.	 Cross-examination	 is	
needed	to	explore	the	declarant’s	narration.	Consider	this	example:273	A	man,	X,	catches	his	wife	
in	their	bedroom	cheating	with	her	lover,	Y.	Overcome	with	emotion,	X	takes	a	gun	and	shoots	
himself	above	his	heart.	Bleeding,	X	follows	the	fleeing	Y	outside	where	he	 is	observed	by	his	
neighbours	screaming	at	Y,	“look	at	what	you’ve	done.”	X	is	hit	by	a	car	and	dies	on	the	road.	
Although	X’s	statement	 is	 factually	 true,	and	undoubtedly	sincere,	his	statement	 is	consistent	
with	being	shot	by	Y	and	shooting	himself.	The	statement	should	never	go	to	the	trier	of	fact	for	
interpretation.	It	lacks	an	oath,	demeanour	evidence,	and	cross-examination,	and	it	would	likely	
																																																						
272 Ibid. at 77. 
273 The example is adopted from the hypothetical in Tanovitch, supra note 178 at 405. 
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require	 the	 accused	person	 to	 tender	 evidence	 to	 rebut	 its	 prejudice.	 The	only	 guarantee	of	
reliability	 for	 the	 statement	 is	 its	 contemporaneity	with	 the	 fatal	 injury,	 and	 that	 factor	 has	
caused	confusion	rather	than	clarity.	
	 Most	problematic	with	the	res	gestae	exception	is	its	lack	of	a	necessity	requirement.	The	
declarant	need	not	testify.274	A	statement	falling	within	the	exception	is	presumed	to	have	such	
a	high	circumstantial	guarantee	of	reliability	that	it	possesses	greater	evidentiary	value	than	viva	
voce	testimony.275	Even	if	the	declarant	testifies	his	or	her	prior	consistent	res	gestae	statement	
can	 be	 admitted	 into	 evidence	 under	 the	 exception.276	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 the	 superior	
circumstantial	guarantee	of	reliability	that	is	believed	to	negate	a	necessity	requirement	is,	for	
the	reasons	already	explained,	not	well	founded.	Where	a	declarant	is	available	to	testify,	the	
content	of	the	res	gesate	statement	should	be	received	in	court,	under	oath	or	affirmation,	with	
the	benefit	of	demeanour	evidence	and	cross-examination.	
In	 all,	 the	 presumption	 in	 the	 res	 gestae	 exception	 that	 reliability	 is	 derived	 from	
contemporaneity	can	cause	the	factors	of	lack	of	oath,	demeanour	evidence,	and	opportunity	to	
cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 to	 wield	 less	 influence	 than	 they	 did	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
historical	rationale.	
	
																																																						
274 R. v. Shea, 2011 NSCA 107, [2011] NSJ No 653 at paras. 69-75 [Shea]. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Hill, Tanovich, & Strezos, supra note 12 at 7-80. 
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4.3	Dying	Declarations	
The	dying	declaration	exception	can	be	discussed	in	short	order.	It	suffers	from	the	same	
deficit	as	the	res	gestae	exception	in	relation	to	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	A	dying	
declaration	occurs	when	a	person	makes	a	statement	about	their	mortal	injury	while	having	“a	
solemn	conviction	that	he	or	she	will	soon	die	and	there	is	no	hope	whatsoever	of	recovery.”277	
The	statement	must	be	made	by	a	victim	in	a	homicide	trial.278		
The	dying	declaration	exception	is	based	on	a	religious	theory	that	the	declarant	believes	
in	a	Judeo-Christian	creator	and	fears	divine	retribution,	causing	him	or	her	to	speak	truthfully	at	
the	time	of	death.279	Since	the	deceased	are	a	difficult	population	to	survey,	this	theory	has	never	
been	statistically	supported.	It	carries	even	less	weight	in	today’s	increasingly	secular	society.		
Like	the	res	gestae	exception,	dying	declarations	are	premised	on	a	conflation	between	
sincerity	 and	 reliability.	 Cross-examination	 and	 an	 oath	 are	 needed	 to	 carefully	 explore	 the	
declarant’s	 perception	 of	what	 caused	 their	 injury	 and	what	 they	meant	 by	 their	 statement.	
Sincerity	is	a	concern	as	well.	Dying	men	and	women	do	not	lose	their	ability	to	lie.280		
The	 dying	 declaration	 exception	 is	 still	 applied	 in	 practice.281	 Increasingly,	 though,	
prosecutors	 are	 abandoning	 the	 exception	 in	 favour	 of	 admission	 through	 the	 necessity	 and	
reliability	analysis.282	Under	this	framework,	the	necessity	of	the	statement	is	emphasized	and	
corroborating	evidence	is	presented	to	compensate	for	the	lack	of	reliability.	
																																																						
277 Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5 at 358-359. 
278 R. v. Jurtyn, [1958] OJ No 229 (CA) [Jurtyn]. 
279 Doyle, supra note 273 at 65. 
280 This expression is adapted from Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 115 
281 See e. g. R. v. Muise, 2013 NSSC 141, [2013] NSJ No 290 [Muise]. 
282 See e. g. R. v. Byers, ONSC April 2, 2011 (Unreported) [Byers]. 
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4.4	Co-Conspirators	Exception	
The	 co-conspirators	 exception	 is	 applied	 mainly	 (but	 not	 exclusively)283	 in	 criminal	
conspiracy	 cases.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 justifies	 the	 exception	 in	 large	 part	 on	 the	 need	 to	
prosecute	conspiracy	charges.	 In	R.	v.	Mapara	the	Court	candidly	admitted	that	depriving	the	
prosecution	 “of	 the	 right	 to	 use	double	 hearsay	 evidence	of	 co-conspirators	 as	 to	what	 they	
variously	 said	 in	 furtherance	of	 the	conspiracy	would	mean	 that	 serious	criminal	 conspiracies	
would	often	go	unpunished.”284	While	there	are	many	criticisms	of	the	co-conspirators	exception,	
a	 narrow	 issue	 can	 be	 examined	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 identifying	 the	 differences	 between	 the	
hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	practical	application.	The	co-conspirators	exception	allows	
for	the	admission	of	words	and	acts	of	any	unindicted	person	alleged	to	be	a	co-conspirator.	In	
so	doing,	the	exception	can	operate	in	a	manner	completely	inconsistent	with	the	hearsay	rule’s	
historical	rationale.	
In	order	to	appreciate	the	 issue,	some	explanation	of	the	co-conspirator’s	exception	 is	
required.	 A	 trier	 of	 fact	 may	 consider	 certain	 words	 and	 acts	 of	 the	 accused	 person’s	 co-
conspirators	in	determining	whether	the	prosecution	has	proven	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	
an	accused	person	is	a	party	of	a	conspiracy.	The	analysis	is	described	in	three	steps	known	as	
the	Carter	approach:285	
1. The	trier	of	fact	must	first	be	satisfied	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	the	alleged	
conspiracy	in	fact	existed.	
	
2. If	the	alleged	conspiracy	is	found	to	exist	then	the	trier	of	fact	must	review	all		
																																																						
283 See. e.g. the facts of R. v. Dieckmann, 2014 ONSC 717, [2013] OJ No 6154 [Dieckmann]. 
284 Mapara, supra note 176 at para. 29. 
285 R. v. Chang, [2003] OJ No 1076 (CanLII) at para. 53 [Chang], quoting R. v. Barrow,	[1987] 2 SCR 694, [1987] 
SCJ No 84 (CanLII) at para. 73 [Barrow cited to CanLII]. 
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the	evidence	 that	 is	 directly	 admissible	 against	 the	 accused	and	decide	on	a	
balance	 of	 probabilities	 whether	 or	 not	 [the	 accused]	 is	 a	 member	 of	 the	
conspiracy.	
	
3. If	the	trier	of	fact	concludes	on	a	balance	of	probabilities	that	the	accused	is	a		
member	of	the	conspiracy	then	[the	trier]	must	go	on	and	decide	whether	the	
Crown	has	established	such	membership	beyond	reasonable	doubt.	In	this	last	
step	 only,	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 can	 apply	 the	 hearsay	 exception	 and	 consider	
evidence	of	acts	and	declarations	of	co-conspirators	done	in	furtherance	of	the	
object	of	the	conspiracy	as	evidence	against	the	accused	on	the	issue	of	his	guilt.	
	
In	the	last	step,	the	trier	of	fact	can	apply	the	co-conspirators	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule	and	
consider	 a	 co-conspirator’s	 acts	 and	 declarations	 done	 in	 furtherance	 of	 the	 object	 of	 the	
conspiracy	against	the	accused	person.		
	 Implicit	in	the	co-conspirators	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule	is	the	trier	of	fact’s	finding	
that	the	person	the	prosecution	alleges	is	a	co-conspirator	is,	in	fact,	a	member	of	the	conspiracy.	
Without	 this	 finding,	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 rule	 falls	 away.	 Co-conspirators	 are	 held	
responsible	 for	 each	 other’s	words	 and	 acts	 on	 the	 premise	 that,	 in	 agreeing	 to	 engage	 in	 a	
common	design,	co-conspirators	have	agreed	to	act	as	each	other’s	agents.286	A	co-conspirator’s	
statements	are	also	effectively	part	of	 the	actus	 reus	 of	 the	offence	of	 conspiracy.	Once	 it	 is	
established	 that	 parties	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 same	 conspiracy,	 the	 acts	 and	words	 of	 one	 are	
admissions	against	all.	The	theoretical	foundation	for	the	co-conspirators	exception	is	a	mix	of	
the	admissions	and	res	gestae	exceptions.287	The	differences	between	the	practical	application	
of	those	exceptions	and	the	historical	rationale	(discussed	in	sections	4.1	and	4.2)	are	applicable	
to	the	co-conspirators	exception.	
																																																						
286 Chang, supra note 288 at paras. 55 & 82-84. 
287 Ibid. 55, 82-84 & 123. 
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The	trier	of	fact	must	be	satisfied	that	an	alleged	co-conspirator	is	probably	a	part	of	the	
conspiracy	with	the	accused	person	in	order	for	the	alleged	co-conspirator’s	words	and	acts	to	
be	 attributable	 to	 the	 accused	 person.	 The	 words	 and	 acts	 of	 a	 co-conspirator	 are	 reliable	
evidence	against	the	accused	person	because	they	were	done	to	further	a	common	enterprise	–	
an	agreed-upon	scheme	–	between	the	accused	person	and	co-conspirator.288	It	is	this	context	
that	provides	the	circumstantial	guarantee	of	reliability.289	Without	this	established	connection,	
the	co-conspirator’s	words	and	acts	are	not	relevant	and	reliable	evidence	respecting	the	accused	
person.		
	 Nevertheless,	 in	Ontario	 there	 is	no	need	 to	prove	 that	an	alleged	 co-conspirator	 is	 a	
probable	 member	 of	 the	 conspiracy	 before	 that	 person’s	 words	 and	 acts	 can	 be	 used	 to	
incriminate	the	accused	person.290	 In	R.	v.	Farinacci	 the	Court	of	Appeal	 for	Ontario	curiously	
reasoned	that	the	co-conspirators	exception	possesses	sufficient	reliability	from	the	requirement	
that	 the	only	statements	considered	are	 those	made	 in	 furtherance	of	 the	conspiracy.291	This	
reasoning	misunderstands	threshold	reliability	under	the	co-conspirators	exception.	Anyone	can	
make	a	 statement	 in	 furtherance	of	a	conspiracy.	What	matters,	and	what	gives	a	 statement	
threshold	reliability,	is	that	the	statement	made	in	furtherance	of	the	conspiracy	 is	made	by	a	
member	 of	 the	 conspiracy.	 Otherwise,	 the	 words	 and	 acts	 of	 any	 person	 who	 advances	 a	
conspiracy,	however	unattached	they	may	be	from	the	conspiracy,	will	be	used	to	incriminate	
the	accused	person.		
																																																						
288 Ibid at paras. 116-117 
289 Ibid. 
290 R. v. Farinacci, 2015 ONCA 392 [Farinacci]. 
291 Ibid at para. 55. 
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The	co-conspirators	exception	admits	statements	made	in	furtherance	of	the	conspiracy	
for	reasons	relating	to	relevance	and	reliability.	With	regard	to	relevance,	the	words	and	acts	of	
alleged	co-conspirators	that	are	unrelated	to	the	advancement	of	the	conspiracy	are	not	relevant	
to	a	conspiracy	charge.	With	regard	to	reliability,	the	agency	principle	which	partly	underlies	the	
co-conspirators	exception	only	extends	 to	 statements	made	 in	 furtherance	of	 the	conspiracy.	
Each	party	to	the	conspiracy	implicitly	authorizes	the	others	to	speak	and	act	on	his	or	her	behalf	
only	insofar	as	they	further	the	conspiracy.292	Acts	or	words	not	in	furtherance	of	the	conspiracy	
are	not	authorized	and	therefore	not	reliable.		
A	word	or	act	made	in	furtherance	of	the	conspiracy	is	not	relevant	if	it	is	not	made	by	a	
probable	member	 of	 the	 conspiracy.	 The	 facts	 of	 Farinacci	 are	 instructive.293	 Lucas	 and	 Len	
Farinacci	were	brothers	engaged	 in	mid-level	 cocaine	dealing	 in	St.	Catharines,	Ontario.	They	
were	charged	with	conspiring	to	move	a	large	of	amount	of	cocaine	to	another	mid-level	cocaine	
dealer	located	in	Toronto.	That	drug	dealer	had	his	own,	separate	conspiracy	to	resell	the	cocaine	
in	smaller	quantities	to	low-level	drug	dealers.	The	low-level	drug	dealers	in	turn	sold	the	cocaine	
on	the	street.	Wiretapped	conversations	of	the	low-level	drug	dealers	were	played	in	court	and	
used	to	convict	Lucas	and	Len	Farinacci,	despite	the	fact	that	the	Farinacci	brothers	were	alleged	
to	engage	in	a	separate	conspiracy.	There	was	no	indication,	other	than	speculation,	that	the	low-
level	drug	dealers’	conversations	were	about	a	conspiracy	related	to	the	Farinacci	brothers	or	
trustworthy.	
																																																						
292 Chang, supra note 288 at para. 55 
293 Farinacci, supra note 293. 
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	 The	blind	spot	created	by	Farinacci	allows	for	the	potential	admission	of	unreliable	and	
irrelevant	 evidence.	 In	 addition	 to	 sharing	 some	 of	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 historical	
rationale	and	the	admission	and	res	gestae	exceptions,	the	co-conspirators	exception	completely	
departs	from	the	historical	rationale	when	evidence	is	admitted	of	unindicted	persons	who	are	
not	probable	members	of	the	conspiracy.	
In	summary,	this	section	has	considered	the	difference	between	the	current	application	
of	four	hearsay	exceptions,	admissions,	res	gestae,	dying	declarations,	and	the	co-conspirator’s	
exception,	and	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	The	admissions	exception	is	built	upon	the	
unfairness	to	the	adverse	party	of	not	having	a	chance	to	remove	the	prejudice	caused	by	hearsay	
evidence.	This	forces	accused	persons	in	criminal	trials	to	make	a	strategic	decision	that	did	not	
exist	when	the	hearsay	rule	was	developed.	The	impact	of	fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	is	
rendered	less	influential	than	it	was	historically.	
The	 presumption	 in	 the	 res	 gestae	 exception	 that	 reliability	 is	 derived	 from	
contemporaneity	can	cause	the	factors	of	lack	of	oath,	demeanour	evidence,	and	opportunity	to	
cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 to	 wield	 less	 influence	 than	 they	 did	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
historical	rationale.	
Like	the	res	gestae	exception,	dying	declarations	are	premised	on	a	conflation	between	
sincerity	and	 reliability.	This	exception	can	also	cause	 the	 factors	of	 lack	of	oath,	demeanour	
evidence,	and	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	to	wield	less	influence	than	they	did	
under	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	
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The	theoretical	foundation	upon	which	the	co-conspirators	exception	rests	is	a	mix	of	the	
admissions	and	res	gestae	exceptions.	The	differences	between	the	practical	application	of	those	
exceptions	 and	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 are	 applicable	 to	 the	 co-conspirators	
exception.	 In	 addition,	 the	 co-conspirators	 exception	 can	 operate	 in	 a	 manner	 entirely	
inconsistent	with	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	when	evidence	is	admitted	of	unindicted	
persons	who	are	not	probable	members	of	the	conspiracy.	
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5.	Conclusion	
	
This	thesis	has	examined	the	difference	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	
and	current	application.	The	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	has	three	aspects:	concern	with	
the	inherent	reliability	of	hearsay	evidence,	concern	with	procedural	reliability	in	admitting	the	
evidence,	and	fairness	in	the	adversarial	process.	Five	factors	underlie	this	rationale:	the	hearsay	
dangers,	 demeanour	 evidence,	 the	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant,	 the	
evidence	 is	 unsworn,	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	 process.	 The	 six	 major	 theories	 in	 the	
literature	describe	aspects	of	the	same	historical	rationale.	Methodological	differences	between	
the	theories	and	deficiencies	within	them	cause	them	to	capture	only	a	portion	of	the	hearsay	
rule’s	 historical	 rationale.	 The	 only	 debate	within	 the	 literature	 that	 cannot	 be	 attributed	 to	
methodological	 differences	 is	 disagreement	 over	 the	 purpose	 for	which	 cross-examination	 is	
necessary.		
While	methodology	does	not	cause	the	disagreement,	it	helps	to	resolve	the	the	issue.	
Historically,	 cross-examination	 was	 deemed	 necessary	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 potential	 sources	 of	
unreliability	 in	hearsay	evidence.	Cross-examination	was	not	deemed	necessary	because	of	 a	
concern	with	the	ability	of	lay	jurors	to	evaluate	testimonial	evidence.	
The	difference	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	current	application	is	
measured	 through	 the	 five	 factors	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 Since	 the	 five	 factors	
underpin	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale,	a	change	in	the	factors	indicates	a	change	in	the	
application	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	
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The	hearsay	dangers	remain	at	the	forefront	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	current	application.	The	
test	 for	 threshold	 reliability	 is	premised	on	 testing	 for	 the	hearsay	dangers.	 The	hearsay	 rule	
assumes	that	cross-examination	will	generally	allay	the	hearsay	dangers.	However,	the	hearsay	
dangers	may	not	be	allayed	by	cross-examination	alone	or	when	the	threshold	reliability	test	is	
applied	too	loosely.	In	these	situations,	the	concern	with	the	hearsay	dangers	is	 less	than	it	 is	
under	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	
									 Demeanour	 evidence	 remains	 as	 important	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 as	 it	 was	
historically.	 The	 value	of	 demeanour	evidence	 is	 sometimes	 subsumed	by	 cross-examination.	
Specifically,	in	non-contemporaneous	cross-examination,	the	declarant	of	a	hearsay	statement	
will	be	subjected	to	cross-examination	by	the	opposing	party	before	the	hearing.	 If	 the	cross-
examination	is	not	video	recorded,	the	trier	of	fact	at	the	hearing	will	be	unable	to	observe	the	
declarant’s	 demeanour	 during	 the	 prior	 cross-examination.	 If	 the	 declarant’s	 statement	 is	
admitted	at	the	hearing	under	the	hearsay	rule,	the	trier	of	fact	may	only	have	a	transcript	of	the	
cross-examination.	The	declarant’s	demeanour	in	giving	the	evidence	will	be	lost.		
									 The	oath	remains	an	important	concept	of	the	hearsay	rule.	Its	influence	upon	a	witness	
has	shifted	with	the	times,	focusing	today	on	the	threat	of	state	punishment.	
The	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	remains	a	paramount	factor	in	the	
hearsay	rule’s	application.	It	is	complicated	in	practice	by	the	disjunction	between	its	theoretical	
role	in	hearsay	jurisprudence	and	its	application	in	criminal	hearings.	Due	to	this	disjunction,	the	
truth	gathering	function	of	cross-examination	may	be	overstated;	or	it	may	be	stated	correctly	
and	practiced	differently	by	criminal	defence	lawyers.	
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Fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	remains	an	underlying	factor	in	the	current	application	
of	the	hearsay	rule.	The	test	for	threshold	reliability	aims	to	attenuate	the	two	types	of	unfairness	
in	admitting	hearsay	evidence.	However,	 the	 test	 fails	 to	 recognize	 litigation	procedures	 that	
enhance	the	two	types	of	unfairness.	A	third	type	of	unfairness	exists	due	to	criminal	litigation	
procedures	that	change	the	strategy	of	cross-examination	for	accused	parties.	
There	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 the	 practical	
application	 of	 the	 following	 exceptions	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule:	 admissions,	 res	 gestae,	 dying	
declarations,	 the	 co-conspirator’s	 exception,	 and	 prior	 inconsistent	 statements.	 Prior	
inconsistent	 statements	 are	 discussed	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 exclusionary	 hearsay	 rule	 in	
section	2.	
The	admissions	exception	is	built	upon	the	unfairness	to	the	adverse	party	of	not	having	
a	chance	to	remove	the	prejudice	caused	by	hearsay	evidence.	This	forces	accused	persons	in	
criminal	 trials	 to	 make	 a	 strategic	 decision	 that	 did	 not	 exist	 when	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 was	
developed.	The	impact	of	fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	is	rendered	less	influential	than	it	
was	historically.	
The	 presumption	 in	 the	 res	 gestae	 exception	 that	 reliability	 is	 derived	 from	
contemporaneity	can	cause	the	factors	of	lack	of	oath,	demeanour	evidence,	and	opportunity	to	
cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 to	 wield	 less	 influence	 than	 they	 did	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
historical	rationale.	
Like	the	res	gestae	exception,	dying	declarations	are	premised	on	a	conflation	between	
sincerity	and	 reliability.	This	exception	can	also	cause	 the	 factors	of	 lack	of	oath,	demeanour	
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evidence,	and	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant	to	wield	less	influence	than	they	did	
under	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.	
The	theoretical	foundation	upon	which	the	co-conspirators	exception	rests	is	a	mix	of	the	
admissions	and	res	gestae	exceptions.	The	differences	between	the	practical	application	of	those	
exceptions	 and	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 are	 applicable	 to	 the	 co-conspirators	
exception.	 In	 addition,	 the	 co-conspirators	 exception	 can	 operate	 in	 a	 manner	 entirely	
inconsistent	with	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	when	evidence	is	admitted	of	unindicted	
persons	who	are	not	probable	members	of	the	conspiracy.	
As	early	as	the	trial	of	Sir	Walter	Raleigh	in	1603,	criminal	cases	have	been	won	and	lost	
on	the	application	of	the	hearsay	rule.	The	doctrine	is	complex	and	not	instinctual.	The	analysis	
in	this	thesis	is	important	for	lawyers,	evidence	scholars,	or	anyone	who	testifies	in	a	courtroom.	
It	aids	in	understanding	what	the	hearsay	rule	is,	where	it	comes	from,	and	where	there	exists	
incongruence	between	the	rule’s	theoretical	purpose	and	practical	application.	These	lessons	can	
guide	the	doctrine’s	development	to	help	ensure	that	the	hearsay	rule’s	application	is	consistent	
with	its	theoretical	purpose.	
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